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Abstract 
In China's market reforms, the emergence of commodity futures markets marked the 
way in which the country took up more sophisticated components of capitalist 
markets. Based on seven months of ethnographic fieldwork in 2005, this thesis is the 
first ethnography conducted in the commodity futures markets of China. It provides 
fie ld records of the relationship between state structures, quasi-public organisations 
and the private sector in a post-Communist market. It shows how social groups align 
to form capital factions, and how these factions attempt to calculate the actions of 
each other. It also provides an account of how knowledge is circulated, and how 
reputation, authority and expertise are developed within the markets. 
The author argues that the notion of"performativity" can be applied to the 
case of Chinese futures markets. The consensus held by market actors and their 
subsequent actions are a major contribution to market reality. In the context of 
Chinese markets. political power plays a particularly crucial role- it li nks up a 
politicized feedback loop between perception, action and reality. 
The thesis applies the concept of technology transfer to assess whether 
futures markets have an inherent "script" that unfolds and is implemented under 
different social, cultural and political contexts. Relaxing assumptions held by 
neoclassical economists (such as individualized rationality), the author believes that 
the feedback loop of knowledge, action and reality is the "vanilla core" of markets. 
One of the key factors in success in market construction is the successful 
implementation of s.uch feedback loops. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"The current Chinese generation is more money-minded. Without the respect for 
gods and spirits there is no fear; without the Confucian ethics of Li and edification 
there is little sense of conscience or shame; unconstrained by the rule of law there is 
corruption ... " (Lang 2005, my translation) The harsh critique from the professor of 
finance Larry Hsien Ping Lang in 2005 sparked off a nation-wide controversy. It is 
disputable whether social order in contemporary Chinese societies has actually 
undergone complete erosion to the extent as Lang has described. Nonetheless, it 
cannot be denied that markets have brought crucial social changes to contemporary 
Chinese societies. 
In Beijing 2005, given the rapid momentum of social and economic change in 
the past three decades, there was a commonly-found sentiment for aspiring urban 
Chinese to check out how well they were doing by international standards. These 
ranged from how much money they earned, how well they governed and managed 
their companies, how much they knew about refined leisure life, how well they ran 
their municipal transport systems, and how well their social manners were. Resenting 
their previous seclusion from the world from the 50s to the 70s, people were eager to 
enter a more open world and look for a new position on the "world stage". However 
in China's futures industry, the question "how is our market different from markets 
of other places?" went beyond self assertion to matters of survival. The futures 
industry of China in 2005 was experiencing a period of slowdown after the rapid 
growth of 2003-04 (see Fig 3 .2). When talking in private, many futures traders and 
brokers described a common frustration that their industry had been under tight 
policy control since 1998, hence greatly restricting their personal career development. 
On the third day of my fieldwork, a futures broker burst into tears in an interview, 
"At first I thought our industry will fly higher than the rest. But where am 1 now? 
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Still standing in the old place ... I am a man who has a family to support. I can't wait 
forever. .. I've been working in the industry for seven years, seeing lots of friends in 
other professions- stock brokers, shop owners, anything - getting rich. Overall our 
country is really taking off ... Well, I still believe in futures. Eventually this industry 
wil l prosper when the policies come, but when? I don ' t have many more seven years 
to waste." On the first contact with field subjects in May 2005, this broker and others 
opened my eyes to see one important meaning of markets: they are a mechanism to 
allocate and redistribute economic wealth. The makeup of markets and the events 
happening there matter, because they have a direct impact on people's lives. 
This research explores what makes a post-Communist market work. China's 
modern commodity futures markets exhibit features of globalised "flow structures" 
of capital and information, yet they are also embedded by the local political, social 
and cultural environment. Political power can be exchanged, alongside with money 
and tangible commodities. The modem face of guanxi (l§hJ1¥, the Chinese word for 
social relationships, pronounced as "guan-shee") networks1 resides within the 
investor community. Instead of rational and calculative individuals, investors often 
behave in gang-like aggregates, demonstrating non-quantifiable attributes (political, 
geographical, industry) of aggregate money. How humans, information flow and 
decision tools constitute configurable pathways of signals and actions. The use of 
chartism, trust in the state, and trust in the masses prevail , but the cognitive heuristics 
are highly subject to reconfiguration. The fieldwork is based on seven months of 
ethnographic fi eldwork over six cities in China in 2005. The fieldwork was 
conducted in a market not yet open to foreign capital. It included two internships, 
three training courses, three industry conferences, and 36 interviews (Appendix 1). 
1 The word guanxi can be applied to kinship, friendship, working relationships, or remote 
acquaintances in general. It is often associated with an elaborate exchange system of gifts, favours and 
banquets, such that its articulation and application is considered to be an art and a separate area of 
study, guanxixue (~~f.*-&~, the study of guanxi) (Yang 1994: 1-6). 
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1.1 Context of the Markets 
Social life in China had undergone enormous changes since the Dengist economic 
reforms in 1978 (Liew 1997:2, Brahm & Li 1996:3). Money was an important theme 
that had brought dramatic transitions in material consumption, interpersonal 
relationships, cultural values and socio-political institutions in the recent three 
decades. 
Fig l.l Faithful believers worshipping at the shrine of the money god Cai 
Shen with gigantic incense sticks on Qingyan Shan. 
Field subjects talked a lot about new hopes and fabulous opportunities in the new 
markets. However, they were also coping hard with the loss of social security, 
waning mutual trust between neighbours. and emergent pressure of life from a 
competitive social environment. In 2005, the pursuit for money was no longer a 
pol iti cal taboo or an ethical flaw. The love of money, once unleashed. could be 
3 
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intense and publicly displayed. During fieldwork I had taken a weekend trip to 
Qingyan Shan (Green Rock Mountain, w:E-!11) in Liaoning, and witnessed that the 
folk deity Cai Shen2(m:1·:t$ , the god of money) was worshipped with renewed fervour. 
A field subject and I started to climb the mountain at 5:30am on a Sunday, and 
reached the shrine of Cai Shen midway up the hill at 7am. Hundreds of faithful were 
already swarming to worship at the shrine. Along the mountain trail there were 
merchants and hawkers selling items for religious offering. A popular rhyme chanted 
by the merchants was: " tall incense sticks for the money god" (bai Cai Shen, shao 
gao xiang ff~tt$ ' ~~W). Every triple pack of gigantic incense sticks cost 20 
yuan, which was more than 2.5% of the local people' s average monthly income. Yet 
their business was extremely good - the desire for money and the folk belief in Cai 
Shen were so strong that at Qingyan Shan, a small market of religious offering had 
been established. Fig 1.1 is a picture I took at the shrine with some difficulty - it was 
hard to find a photo point without being hit by the burning sticks! 
Amongst an infinite set of researchable phenomena in the economic transition, 
China has started out as a Communist country with a planned economy in 1978, yet 
in the 1998 futures traders were already skilfully speculating abstract contracts of 
commodity prices in the future. The changes were never smooth, as China's 
commodity futures markets had experienced a process from "big bang" to rapid 
consolidation within a short period of eight years ( 1991-98). The number of 
commodity futures exchanges grew from one to an explosive sixty, was slashed 
down by regulatory authorities to fifteen, and then cut down further to three. The 
emergence of derivative markets is interesting because financial and commodity 
exchanges are situated at the heart of the capitalist economy. They can be seen as 
fetish social structures that extract capital from society (Geras 1971 , Hertz 1998:25) 
to amplify the movement and redistribution of capital and material wealth. 
2 The origin of Cai Shen is controversial. Many refer to the deifi ed ancient folk heros Zhao Gongming 
(Jfl!i06J.j) or Bi Gan Ctt.T-), but there are other versions and legends from different geograph ical areas. 
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Derivatives are financial tools with a higher level of abstraction. and have amplified 
effects in the leverage of capital. By studying how a ··hardcore" component of 
capitalism is introduced and implemented in a post-Communist country, the case 
study illustrates the integration and tension between planned economy and market 
economy; and the tension between global markets and native/local experience (Hertz 
1998: 4-11). 
1.2 Academic Objectives 
This research originates from three theoretical perspectives. Firstly, I was fascinated 
by the idea of"performativity" from science studies (Calion 1998, MacKenzie and 
Millo 2003, MacKenzie and Muniesa et al 2007; see also "performativists" in chapter 
2). After writing a masters dissertation about the dotcom bubble of Hong Kong (Siu 
2002), I inclined to see markets as logic arrays made up of humans and non-humans, 
where the "arrays" were subject to the configuration and re-con figuration by 
ideologies, public opinions, policies, media discourses, and professional practices. 
Under this perspective, there is a pathway of feedback between speech (knowledge), 
actions (economic activities), and social reality. Some relevant works in science 
studies include markets as experimental devices (Calion & Muniesa 2003), a cyborg 
structure (Mirowski 2002), a circuit of cognitive feedback loops (Barnes 1983), and a 
network of actors, power and artefacts (Hughes 1993 ). Before setting out for 
fieldwork, I was making rough work sketches about metaphorical " logic gates" in the 
fmancial markets - that the logic flow of most derivative products in the markets can 
be represented by corresponding digital logic circuits (see Appendix 3). Viewed from 
the work of the "performativists", it seemed that it was possible to construct markets 
based on speech-acts and the circulation of knowledge, especially if a significant 
proportion of the market population could be convinced. An initial plan of this 
research was to conduct ethnography in a young derivative market to understand 
what the required conditions for market construction were, with special focus on the 
issues of configuration, feedback, and performativity. 
6 
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A second perspective arises from the concept of technology transfer (Akrich 
1992) from science studies, and the concept of social embeddedness in economic 
sociology (see "embedded sociologists" in chapter 2). The market structure can be 
compared with a technological artefact. When this object is transferred from its 
original context of creation and use, and "transplanted" as a "black-box" to a 
different environment, new connections and meanings have to be established 
between the object and its new social surroundings, before the market structure can 
start functioning and serve its purposes. When a derivative market structure is 
deployed to a new country, one research question is to explore whether there is 
something inherent or hardwired in the "market script" itself- economic theories, 
trading rules, institutional arrangements, ideologies, rationality, or teclmologies -
that can trigger some self-aligning and path-dependent processes. Another point of 
research interest is to take note of how markets are aligned with local networks, 
organisations, political environment, and culture. By investigating these processes of 
alignment, adjustment and modification, markets are understood in the context of 
their particular social embedding environment, instead of a set of universal 
mechanisms. 
A third academic purpose of this research is to provide ethnographic data 
from the field. Financial markets and analogous commodity futures markets are a 
relatively new area to science studies and sociology of knowledge. Up till now only a 
limited number of ethnographic studies have been conducted in real-life market 
scenarios (including Abolafia 1993, Beunza & Stark 2002, Calyskan 2004, Hertz 
1998, Knorr Cetina & Brugger 2002, Lepinay 2002, Miyazaki 2007, Muniesa 2002, 
and Zaloom 2005), a majority of them done in the US. There are several books 
written on the futures markets of China from standpoints of investment, professional 
practice, and legendary fictions; but none of them have taken a standpoint from 
sociology. One way to make contributions to the fields of social studies of finance, as 
well as studies of the economy of contemporary China, is to provide empirical data 
from the field, which is rare. 
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1.3 Thesis structure 
For the ethnographer, there are always more events happening in the field than one 
can actually put down in a thesis. As a writer and narrator, I can only make my best 
effor1 to make the selection and present the data in a structured way. Chapter 2 is a 
I iterature review of relevant schools and theories; Chapter 3 is a historical summary 
of commodity futures markets in contemporary China from the 1820s to 2007; 
Chapter 4 is a discussion on methodology issues, with emphases on issues such as 
access, orientalism, and cultural essentialism. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the core finding 
chapters. Chapter 5 is the "cadre chapter", which is about state structures and quasi-
state structures in the markets. Chapter 6 is the "gang chapter", which discusses the 
properties of social networks within the investor community. Chapter 7 is the 
"prophet chapter", which discusses issues of knowledge, decision tools and 
rationality in the markets. Chapter 8 is a short chapter on a technology shift in the 
markets, and how it is associated with gender and employment issues in the futures 
industry. Chapter 9 is the conclusion chapter. 
8 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Markets are intense hubs where money, commodities, power and social relationships 
enter active interplay. In the last century economics has occupied a central and 
dominant academic position to explain what markets are, but there is a revival of 
social scientists from non-economic disciplines in the last two decades to provide 
alternative perspectives and standpoints. This chapter will trace several disciplinary 
perspectives of what markets are, including classical sociology, neoclassical 
economics, institutionalists, behavioural finance, embeddedness sociologists, cultural 
substantivists, and performativists. Then the discussion will proceed to existing 
ethnographic work on markets, perspectives from China studies, and the contextual 
background of commodity futures markets in China. 
2. 1 Classical Sociology 
Early sociologists saw money and exchange as an integral part of society and history. 
According to Marx, markets are part of the mechanism in which capital extracts 
surplus value from production. In the process of exchange, the production value and 
use value of commodities are abstracted into a language of equivalents, which 
becomes the exchange value. The ultimate value is represented by the fetish symbol 
of money (Marx 1946[1887]:35-82). Simmel emphasized that in the process of 
abstraction, commodities and money have swapped places in the human 
consciousness. Money used to be a means to obtain commodities in early societies; 
in modernity money becomes an ultimate goal per se, while commodities are 
realigned as the means and subsequent benefits of money only (Simmel 1990 [ 1900]). 
Weber analyzed the rise of capitalism from the viewpoint of protestant Christian 
ethics. Although modern markets operate upon principles of rational calculation, the 
religious and moral backdrop of western civilizations was seen by him as essential 
for the accumulation of capital, as well as the availability of labour forces in large 
scale (Weber 1958). 
9 
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2.2 Neoclassical Economics 
From the 1880s onwards. the study of markets (supply. demand, prices and utility) is 
disembedded from other '·non-market" social science disciplines. The trend can be 
attributed to a positivist view of markets- the perspective that a model similar to 
classical mechanics can be established between supply and demand. This model 
operates like a frictionless model; it can automatically adjust itself according to 
supply and demand, irrespective to contexts (Lie 1991 , Mirowski 1989, Swedberg 
1987). The more recent political ideology that is sometimes called neoliberalism 
stems from this universalist perspective: unfettered markets are more efficient, 
rational and desirable than government control or protectionism; and markets should 
be left to arrive at a spontaneous and rational equilibrium. The impact of 
universalists was marked by the Chicago School led by Mi lton Friedman; policies of 
political leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Augusto Pinochet in 
privatisation, deregulation and free trade (Harvey 2005); and development think-
tanks such as Hernando de Soto (Mitchell 2007). 
2.3 Institutional Economics 
The old institutional economists in the 1920s differed from neoclassical economists 
in their objects of study and their methods. They focused on institutions as essential 
structures to mediate market forces: Thorstein Veblen proposed an evolutionary view 
of economic institutions, and incorporated social motives into considerations; 
Wesley Mitchell studied business cycles; John Commons wrote about industrial 
relations and the legal foundation of markets (Witte 1954). As a contrast to 
neoclassical economics, the approach of these old institutional economists was 
inductive rather than deductive, descriptive rather than analytic (Velthuis 1999). 
With the dominance of neoclassical economics in the mid 201h century, institutional 
economics was not prominent for several decades. It was only after the 1980s that a 
branch of new institutional economics emerged, represented by researchers such as 
Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Williamson. They depart from the 
10 
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evolutionary approach of Veblen (Gruchy 1978), and tum their attention to 
transaction costs and asymmetrical information. 
Institutional economics and economic sociology potentially have a lot of 
common ground, yet communication between the two sides broke down in the 
1930s - 50s in part due to the hostility held by sociologist Talcott Parsons towards 
institutional economics (Granovetter 1990, Velthuis 1999). Parsons supported the 
approach of analytic abstraction in neoclassical economics, and he was highly critical 
of Veblen and institutional economics. For Parson, institutional economics 
transgressed the disciplinary boundary that he was trying hard to maintain: that 
sociology should study the "ultimate ends" and economics should study the "means", 
as proposed by Lionel Robbins (Velthuis 1999:630). Social institutions, as held by 
Parsons, belong to the subject area of sociology (Coleman 1991 ). The gap between 
neoclassical markets and non-market is also widened by Eugene Fama's efficient 
market hypothesis (EMI-l) in the 1960s.3 By stating that all available information is 
already incorporated into price, "non-market" factors such as institutions, psychology 
and culture can hardly add further knowledge to future price movements. The 
application of institutional economics, psychology and sociology on financial 
markets is further marginalised from the academic mainstream of economics and 
business. 
Both institutional economics and economic sociology have been revamped 
after the 1980s, and both take a more aggressive position against neoclassical 
economics. However, their demarcation ascribed from the time of Parsons still 
persists. The heterodox approach of institutional economics (the study of complex 
3 The Efficient Market Hypothesis stated that in a rational and efficient market, information is quickly 
and efficiently reflected by the market price. It implies that the study of information (price data and 
" non-market" factors alike) can hardly add any further knowledge to price movements in the future. 
The hypothesis comes in weak, medium to strong forms, specifying different scopes of infom1ation 
being "efficiently reflected" . 
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interactions between social and economic institutions) and the study of social 
institutions by economic sociologists (such as the work of Neil Fligstein) may 
actually have more in common to share than both sides have anticipated. 
2.4 Behavioural Finance 
Since the 1980s mainstream finance theories from the neoclassical school (Fama's 
efficient market hypothesis, and the theory of indifference from Miller & Modigliani) 
fa il to fu lly explain real life crises in financial markets. For example during the 
dotcom bubble in 1995-2000, the markets rose to unprecedented optimism. In 1998, 
the exchange rate crisis in Thailand and Indonesia spread to some other East Asian 
economies where economic fundamentals were healthy. In these dramatic events the 
markets do not fully fit into the analytic and deductive pictures of mainstream 
financial theories. Neither are investors independent or rational, nor the prices of 
securities convergent towards an " intrinsic value". The power of computers and 
equations may even have indirect contributions to market crashes, e.g. the strategy of 
arbitrage of the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 (MacKenzie 
2001 ). Such "anomalies" served as Motley fools in a seamless world of rational order, 
mocking at the frictionless models of neoclassical economics. 
After the bust of the dotcom bubble in 2000, disenchanted investors tried to 
seek for explanations of what they have experienced from psychology and sociology. 
Best-sellers in bookstores were about collective behaviour, greater fool theory, 
cascades, herding, imitation, rumours, and the Dutch " tulip mania" in the 17th 
century where tulip bulbs were speculated to extreme prices (Mackay 2002). Major 
works of behavioural finance moved from academic margins to the centre of the 
stage, including Kahneman & Tversky (1979) on psychological patterns of investors; 
DeBonbt & Thaler (1985) on overreactions on financial markets; Shefrin & Statrnan 
( 1985) on behavioural aspects of portfolio management; and Shi ller (2000) on 
irrational exuberance. Kahnernan was awarded a Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 
for his work in psychology on framing and heuristic-based bias. 
12 
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By seeing markets as made up of humans with psychological properties, 
behavioural finance serves to introduce an empirical and social dimension into 
mainstream economics, complementing the analytic and deductive view of 
neoclassical economics. Boom and bust, contagion, herding, overtrading, and risk 
aversion are seen as irrational behaviour of humans in the markets. Behavi.oural 
finance serves to provide explanations that fill in the discrepancy between 
neoclassical economic theories and empirical market phenomena. 
Members from behavioural finance often position themselves as alternatives 
to mainstream finance theories. Ironically, their work may actually defend rational 
calculation as the orthodox foundation how markets should operate. By perceiving 
psychological and social factors as "bias", "mistakes" and "noise" that should be 
eliminated, they are denying these elements from being legitimate and integral 
properties of the markets. Shefrin (2000) wrote in his book Beyond Greed and Fear: 
"One investor's mistakes can become another investor's profits. But one investor's 
mistakes can also become another investor's risk! ... Behavioral finance can help 
practitioners recognize their own errors as well as the errors of others". Behavioural 
finance serves to make gap-filling modifications and justifications where mainstream 
economic theories do not seem to fit with reality. Despite finding a number of 
"anomalies", they leave the bulk foundation of neoclassical economics unchallenged. 
2.5 Substantivism in Anthropology 
Anthropology provides a different approach to study exchange and production 
relations. Bronislaw Malinowski (1922) conducted pioneering ethnography in the 
Trobriands to study the exchange of kula. In 1925 Marcel Mauss drew upon his work, 
alongside to explore further on reciprocity and gift economies. According to Mauss 
(Mauss 1970), while the Melanesians were circulating their material possessions in 
the form of gifts, they were also shaping their social order, tribal boundaries, and 
relationships with spiritual powers. The meaning of their exchange activities was 
closely knit with social relationships, political order, morality, and religion. 
13 
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In the 1940s - 50s, the influence of neoclassical economics propagated to the 
sub-discipline of economic anthropology. As a student of Malinowski with prior 
training in economics, Raymond Firth did a series of ethnographic work in the 
Polynesian society in Tikopia after his PhD (Firth 1936, Huntsman 2003), and helped 
to pave the way of the formalist school in economic anthropology. When studying 
production and exchange activities in target communities, formalists often borrowed 
the notions of markets, calculative maximization and individual rationality as given 
from neoclassical economics (Dilley 1992: 14). They held the view that economic 
rationality on individual basis is universal, regardless of local cultural and social 
contexts (Prattis 1982: 207-208; see also Salisbury 1962, Burling 1962, Leclair 1962, 
Cook 1966, Schneider 1974). 
Karl Polanyi ' s Great Transformation (1944) was the precursor of a 
contrasting approach known as substantivist. According to Polanyi, throughout 
human history market activities were always embedded within larger social and 
cultural contexts. The principles of rational choice and maximisation arise from the 
specific social institutions of modern western societies only. It would be ethnocentric 
if an anthropologist treats these principles as universal, applying them to all forms of 
societies regardless of their particular institutional embeddings. In other forms of 
societies such as the Melanesians, reciprocity and redistribution are major 
components of the local economies (Polanyi 1944:45-58). Polanyi held the view that 
only the substantive meaning of economic - how humans make a livelihood by 
adapting to changing environments (Prattis 1982:209) - is applicable to non-western, 
pre-industrial economies. He also saw the project of economists to "disembed" the 
markets from their historical-temporal and social contexts as an immoral and utopian 
project (Block: xxiii-xxvii). 
Based on Polanyi's works, substantive anthropologists like Dalton and 
Sahlins held the view that when studying indigenous economies, culture and local 
contexts are the foremost factors. Meanwhile formalists such as Salisbury, Burling 
and Cook strongly believed that neoclassical market concepts should be applicable 
regardless oflocality. In the 1960s - 70s, the two sides sparked off a long and heated 
14 
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debate, which polarized the field of economic anthropology into two fiercely 
opposing camps. Perhaps the polemic deserves to take place on a broader stage of 
economics instead (ibid: 216): what is "the economy"; is the neoclassical market 
model universally applicable to all forn1s of social life concerning production and 
exchange? Unfortunately, the formalist-substantivist argument was locked up in a 
narrow scope of methodology within economic anthropology of indigenous 
economies. While the formalists imposed a universal rationality across all cultures 
from a deductive position, the substantivists also "essentializ[ed] a categorical 
difference" between western and non-westem economies (Caliskan 2005:10). As 
both sides were unwilling to relax their restrictive views, the argument was 
exhausted in the late 1970s. 
At a later stage, other researchers have incorporated new dimensions beyond 
the formalist-substantivist debate. The work of Stephen Gudeman (1992) on peasant 
communities in Panama can be considered as an extension to the substantivist view 
without clinging to a dichotomy between western and non-western economies. He 
proposes a position of cultural relativism: that exchange, money and profit are 
culturally constructed. He proposes that for every specific economy in question, local 
understanding and economic metaphors are important. MacFarlane (1987), Hamilton 
(1994) and Gray (2002) also portray different forms of capitalism arising from 
different cultures and civilisations. 
The onset of globalisation can be seen as a last fatal blow to the division 
between formalists and substantivists. In her study of Shanghai's stock market, Hertz 
(1998:5-7) challenges the boundary between "native" and "western". "Native" 
economies are no longer isolated from the rest of the world. In her case, elements of 
Marxism have been integrated as part of the "native" system in Shanghai. Her field 
subjects were mobile across national boundaries and various social orders. They 
adopted concepts and terminologies from western markets, were aware of their 
position relative to the world, yet they lived in a socio-cultural environment with 
significant differences from European-American societies. In empirical reality, what 
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is native and what is foreign becomes a heterogeneous amalgam. which makes the 
formalist-substantivist dichotomy appear restrictive and obsolete. 
2.6 Embeddedness Sociologists 
After the formalist-substantivist controversy quieted down in the 1970s, Polanyi's 
warning against disembedded markets was largely forgotten. It was until Mark 
Granovetter wrote an influential paper Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) that new attention was revived on the 
issue. By putting more attention in economic subject matters, Granovetter attempted 
to reduce the gap between economics and sociology. According to Granovetter, the 
neoclassical model that ignores social and political contexts is "under-socialized", 
while sociologists and anthropologists (especially old substantivists) who only study 
social embeddedness without taking supply and demand into considerations are 
"over-socialized". He proposed the direction of exploring markets at the meso-
level - try not to see market actors as atomized individuals, but to see the markets as 
made up of interpersonal networks, and trace the linkages between micro and macro 
social structures. 
Social network analysis provides a good example of what Granovetter meant 
by "meso-level" analysis. Baker (1984) studied a group of traders in an American 
stock options market. By analysing their number of links, clique density and price 
volatility, Baker found that a large group size with more differentiated sub-networks 
lead to more opportunism in trading behaviour, and a higher volatility in prices. Burt 
(1984, 2005) studied the morphology of social networks, and proposed the pivotal 
importance of "structural holes": those network nodes that can establish valuable 
links between network cliques that are otherwise disconnected. Granovetter (1973, 
1990) found that loose but wide personal networks provides "the strength of weak 
ties", which helps overseas Chinese merchants to build effective business networks 
of trust. 
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Besides social networks, social embeddings of markets are studied from 
institutional, cultural, moral, family and technological dimensions. Neil Fligstein 
(200 1) investigates institutional embeddings such as state policy, regulation and 
corporate control of markets. Viviana Zelizer studies how money and insurance are 
attached to family relations and moral values (Zelizer 1979, 1994). MacKenzie and 
Millo study how the moral connotation of gambling exerts decisive influence on 
market regulation (MacKenzie & Millo 2003). Zukin & DiMaggio (1990) and 
Hamilton (1994) study how markets are embedded by cultures and civilizations. 
Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger (2002) and Beunza & Stark (2004) explore the 
environment of technological artefacts, such as communication networks and visual 
interfaces, on markets. 
The term "embeddedness sociologists" is only arbitrarily taken here to 
describe diverse strands of research. The loose and vague definition of 
embeddedness is both its strength and weakness. Humans, materials, prices, culture, 
networks, knowledge .. . everything can be seen as social, and the markets can be 
seen as being embedded in everything. Apart from sharing a common opposition 
against neoclassical economics and the word "embeddedness", there is hardly a 
central theme that can bring all the different strands further together into a systematic 
school of thought. Sociologists will face questions arising from economists and 
market practitioners: yes, markets are embedded in everything. After getting a 
gigantic, descriptive and complex lattice, can further implementations and 
implications be drawn from the perspective of social embeddedness? 
Another critique of Granovetter' s embeddedness concept comes from Greta 
Krippner: she holds the view that the polarized boundary between the social and the 
economic should be further abolished. In Krippner et al (2004), Krippner criticizes 
Granovetter for keeping a distinct boundary between social and economic 
embeddedness, with the social side too restricted to interpersonal networks, which 
actually helps to maintain the Parsonian demarcation between economics and 
sociology. Krippner proposes that both social connections and economic mechanisms 
should be seen as simultaneously and interactively infiltrating the markets. 
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2. 7 Performativists 
Tn the last decade, a branch of sociologists launched their inquiry from a standpoint 
of epistemology and science studies to inspect the foundations of neoclassical 
economics. Drawing on the earlier works of Austin (1962), Barnes (1983) and Latour 
(1987), they investigate the "perforrnative" properties of economics: how economics 
"performs, shapes and formats the economy, rather then observing how it functions" 
(Calion 1998:2). The core argument is that economists do not merely describe an 
objective reality. They are concurrently building their theoretical basis of knowledge, 
as well as shaping the economic status of society. Case studies from this perspective 
include the markets of financial derivatives (MacKenzie and Millo 2003, MacKenzie 
2007, Lepinay 2007), telecommunication spectrum actions (Guala 2007, Muniesa 
and Calion 2007), fishing quotas (Holm 2007), strawberries (Garcia-Parpet 2007), 
pickles (Didier 2007), and cotton futures (Caliskan 2005). 
As compared to mechanics in physics (MacKenzie 2001 ), economics 
apparently adopts scientific methods based on empirical induction, observing the 
empirical world and taking objective market data; and analytical deduction, making 
conjectures of abstract models, predicting future events by calculable and operable 
models. However, performativists call for attention another process that is often 
overlooked: that market agents (traders, producers, consumers, regulators, and 
governments) sometimes realign their actions in response to economic theories and 
predictions. The knowledge produced by economists tends to feedback into the 
markets, helping to reshape the very subject (the economy) that economists seek to 
study. In other words, by studying the markets, economists may be changing the 
properties of the target of their study. 
A linguistic version of perforrnativity was presented by John Austin in How 
to Do Things with Words (Austin 1962). For example, when a priest proclaims a 
male and a female as "married", or when a monarch declares a subject as outlaw, 
these are "performative utterances". These are speech-acts that can remarkably 
change the identities and social relationships of the subjects involved. Yet the 
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speech-acts involve "conditions offelicity" (Austin 1962), which Bourdieu (1991) 
described as social conditions, such as institutional power of the priest and the 
monarch, to make these performative utterance actually work. The sentences will not 
work if they are spoken by a chef or a serf, or at an inappropriate time and place. 
Similarly for economic theories to work in empirical markets, a lot of active work is 
required from the institutional, material and social dimensions to fulfill the 
conditions of felicity. Michel CalJon proposes that economic reality is constructed by 
integrating composite factors such as economic theories, materiality, institutional 
powers, cultural values, laws and property rights, currencies, accounting and 
marketing procedures, and technological tools (Calion 1998: chapter 1 ). The power 
of change in empirical markets comes from the combination of knowledge, 
materiality and conditions of felicity (MacKenzie 2007:69); the perforrnative effect 
of economic theories alone does not work like "magic" "out of thin air" (Didier 
2007). Calion uses the terms agencemenl and co-performation to describe such a 
heterogeneous synchronization process of knowledge, linguistic representation, 
action, materiality and social institution. 
One criticism of Calion comes from Daniel Miller (Miller 1998). Miller starts 
out from a position similar to that of Calion. He notices that economists are not 
accurately representing the economic reality in the models they construct. They tend 
to project their abstract models onto the real world instead, and keep working on 
their models in a way that Miller describes as "virtualism". By virtualism, Miller 
means that the abstract models remain separated from the economy in reality; 
neoclassical economics is problematic, because it drifts away on its own without real 
engagement with the empirical world. Holm (2007) uses a case study in transferable 
fishing quotas to defend the position of Calion: theoretical models built by 
economists may be abstract at first, but they are not virtual phantoms dangling 
outside reality. Instead, through efforts of qualification, collection of statistics, and 
the implementation of rules and procedures, the abstract models can serve as 
templates to mobilize actual changes in the empirical economy. The power of 
neoclassical economics in part lies in the possibility to close the gap between 
theoretical model and reality. 
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Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2007) launch another critique. They think the 
performativity notion can be used to justify any economic model to go unchallenged, 
because all economic models are to be seen as capable of shaping the economy; all of 
them can be approached as true (p.199). Mirowski warns the performativists that 
they have lost the previous sharp edge of science studies on natural scienti sts, and 
have turned a blind eye to the issues of power and interests when dealing with 
economi.sts. Mirowski holds the view that the performativists have "the economic 
setting deliquesces into a gauzy spider's web of networks, hazy and indistinct" 
(p.202), fai ling to challenge the legitimacy of economic models, and may be readily 
solicited by economists and their sponsors (p.200). Although Mirowski's hostility 
against economists and the performativists is not explicitly and fully substantiated, 
his critique serves as a reminder for the performativists to stay attuned to issues of 
power and interests. 
Calion refuses a position of cultural determinism. He disagrees with the view 
from the culturalist approach that some market agents " resist calculative rationality" 
because they are "embedded in the social or cultural frames which tum them away 
from it'. (Calion 1998: 5). According to Calion, the notion of "calculative device" is 
applicable across markets from different cultural backgrounds. Calion's response to 
the difference in cultural backdrop is to broaden the definition of"calculation": gifts, 
reciprocity, altruism and selfless dedication all involve some form of calculation. 
These actions may involve a different framing in the form of reward, scope of reward, 
and time frame of reward. For Callon (1998), markets are created by framing and 
distanglement from the existing social embedding to allow the calculative devices to 
work. The form of calculation may differ, but the calculative device is a basic unit 
that is universal to a ll markets. 
Here my view diverges from that of Calion ( 1998). Although a position in 
cultural determinism cannot stand in the light of heterogeneous co-performation, on 
the other hand I think, encompassing the notion of calculative device as universal 
risks bringing a shadow of the old formalists back from the 1960s - 70s. Calion has 
tried to broaden the definition of "calculation", but can market agents from all 
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markets fit into the notion of"calculative device"? Civilizations that do not share the 
Weberian foundation of capitalism can have very different forms of morality and 
social order (Hamilton 1994). In these markets the boundary between private and 
public can be different. The unit of cognition and action can switch between the 
individual, kinship groups, micro local cliques, macro social groups, and the state. 
People may incline to "think" in tem1s of pictorial forms of representations or by 
intuition, not by quantifiable numbers. The perception of time frames can be 
different. Market agents may have different cosmic views, and different 
understanding about the state, authorities and charisma. As Gary Hamilton (Hamilton 
1994: 184) wrote about how political orders are legitimized and institutionalized, 
"Imagine ... a civilization that was not historically shaped by Christianity or by any 
other form of monotheism [,] and ... did not. .. conceptualize a meaningful level of 
human action and causation beyond the world of human experience ... For most 
Westerners, this is a difficult mental experiment. .. Such a mental experiment, 
however, is useful to try." Although cultural differences are not essentialist or 
deterministic,4 nonetheless they still have significant contribution towards the 
process of co-performation. 
Despite Calion's efforts to broaden the notion of "calculation", it can still 
suggest mathematical calculation, a universal form of reasoning founded upon 
Weberian rationality, and even a return to the formalism of the 1960s - 70s. The 
broadened definition of"calculation" can be seen as fitting markets outside the 
experience of Enlightenment and Protestant ethics into a primary template of 
Weberian rationality and mathematical calculation,5 which is ethnocentric. The 
4 Calion ( 1998) used the study of Gao ( 1998) on Japanese markets to argue that calculative devices are 
present under different cu ltural backgrounds. Gao is one case of co-performation with efficiency, 
politics and culture, but there can be other scenarios in non-western cultures where the word 
"calculation" is too restrictive. See Yuan ( 1948). 
5 For example, according to the Confucian philosopher Mencius (~r), rational ity based on monetary 
calculation could be associated with " lowly character'' by Mencian values, as opposed to moral 
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broadened definition of calculation is comparable to the new institutional economists, 
who apply the concept of transaction costs to issues that used to be outside the scope 
of neoclassical economics, such as family relations. By promoting the word 
"calculation" (Callon·s case) and "transaction cosC (new institutional economists' 
case) in previously non-applicable areas, Calion and new institutional economists 
actually serve to spread and reinforce the neoclassical model by generic or effective 
performativity (MacKenzie 2007:55). 
Alternative to "calculative device", I suggest a more culture-neutral term 
"choice device", which leaves blank the properties of decision-making. In places 
where economic decisions are, to a greater extent, tilted towards distributed cognition 
(Hutchins 1995) in social collectives and networks instead of individuals; towards 
politics, moral values, norms, inertia ... instead of monetary calculation; the word 
calculation seems to emphasize the mathematical, quantitative aspects of decision-
making and undermine other aspects. I suggest relaxing market devices from the 
word "calculation", so as to encompass wider possibilities how these market agents 
may vary in their behaviours and modes of decision-making.6 The latter is important, 
because it gives us a broader view of the flexibility how market agents can be 
reconfigured. As shown in Siu (2002), market vo latility and uncertainty can arise 
from rapid reconfiguration of choice devices; Weberian rationality and calculation is 
only one of the possible modes of decision-making in the markets. 
thinking by men of decent character: "Those who calculate by dimes and nickels are men of lowly 
character. (~iif(!IZ'~ • ~.m~3t7ci:!2.)- quoted from Gongxunchou ( 0f*ml} by Mencius. 
6 In the comparison between four forms of capitalism (European, American, Russian and East Asian), 
Gray (2002) argues that the American form of capitalism is constrained by holding on to "illusions 
and superstitions ofthe Enlightenment" (P.l32). 
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2.8 Ethnography of Contemporary Markets 
From the 1990s on, ethnographers from sociology and social anthropology became 
more daring in crossing over the previous demarcation between economics and 
sociology/anthropology. They start to walk straight into the heart of contemporary 
markets: the exchanges of commodities, stocks, bonds, and financial derivatives. 
A good example ofthis ethnographic work is Abolafia (1996), who 
conducted ethnographic research over a decade to study the local organisation and 
culture of bonds, stocks and futures markets in the United States. He found that 
traders in each of the three markets act under a different degree of opportunism or 
restraint. Between the polarized viewpoints of hyperrational maximizers and the 
institutional approach of regulation and constraint, Abolafia managed to strike a 
synthesis. The local norms and culture of a particular market pit do not come from 
the inherent rationality of individuals. They are the combined result of social 
interactions within a (largely) closed status group, and the institutional context 
embedding the particular market. Abolafia also explores the issues of reputation, 
norms, cognitive information flow, and regulatory control in these markets. Rather 
than seeing markets as abstract meeting points of supply and demand, he elegantly 
demonstrates that markets are made up of actual communities, cultures and 
institutions. 
Zaloom (2006) is another contribution to this ethnographic literature. Her 
work is an ethnographic study of open-outcry trading at the commodity markets at 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), and electronic trading at the London 
International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE). Caitlin Zaloom records the open-
outcry trading pits as a place spanned by physical movements, social connections, 
reputation, status, and face-to-face human interactions. In contrast, dealers in 
electronic markets act alone in silent concentration. Much of the physical and human 
social aspects of trading are gone; digital traders have to rely on their feelings 
towards the "rhythms of the numbers" on their screens (P. 150). Zaloom sees the 
transition from open-outcry trading to electronic trading as a process of 
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rationalization (P. 162-163). During the realignment of technology and market 
practices. markets are further shifting away from social connections. cultural life, 
physical aggression (P. 176), voices, bodies, and specific locations. Trading rooms 
are getting more quiet and shiny, in a brave new world of electronic representation 
and modernity. 
The ethnography of Hertz (1998) in the stock market of Shanghai, The 
Trading Crowd, is the only existing ethnographic work on Chinese markets. Her 
work was conducted when the "stock fever" swept over Shanghai like a mass 
movement (Wank 2000) in 1992. Hertz spent ten months in Shanghai's street comers, 
VIP trading rooms and stock salons to experience what the episode meant to the 
locals, and gives an account of the interplay between big players (dahu), dispersed 
players (sanhu) and the State (guojia). Her work crosses two methodology 
boundaries: she starts out from a social anthropology position to research a social 
institution usually categorized under economics and finance (p. 15-16); and she 
carefully addresses the power asymmetry between Euro-American capitalism and her 
Chinese field subjects (p. 8-11 ). Hertz finds that her field subjects put a lot of 
emphasis on "policy analysis". China's long-standing social order as a tributary state, 
in part, shapes the contemporary relationship between market and state; the Shanghai 
market cannot be fu lly understood just by applying the concepts of the invisible hand, 
regulation and intervention from economics. Likewise the crowd behaviour of 
dispersed players at street corners and stock salons is very different from that of 
individual Homo economicus. State control and crowd behaviour have some 
properties overlapping with regulation, supply and demand in generic markets, yet 
they have something particularly related to the local political context and social order 
such as guanxi (relationship) networks. The findings of Hertz show that 
contemporary markets cannot be tackled by the approach of pure formalists or pure 
substantivists alone. Her field records of the events surrounding the Ninth Party 
Congress (pp. 174-187) provide a valuable case for the performativists: whether 
market players adhere to the will of state control or group dynamics is a process of 
intricate balance, in which negotiation and reconfiguration take place continuously. It 
would be too coarse and simplistic to read the event merely as " the market triumphs 
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over state control", or as evidence that the post-Communist markets are undergoing a 
unidirectional transition from planned to market economy (Nee 1996). 
Wank (1999) is a study ofhow private enterprises in southeast China city 
Xiamen conducted business in the late 1980s. Wank's study is not directly on 
financial or commodity markets, yet he describes an important feature in the state-
market relationship of contemporary China that is relevant to this study: clientelist 
ties. To conduct business, a firm usually needs some of its members to establish 
interpersonal ties with counterpart contacts in the state structure. On one hand, these 
ties involve obligations and reciprocity very similar to the traditional guanxi 
networks; the ties also involve a power imbalance, with the state side plays an upper 
hand in a vertical power structure. The state or para-governmental side possesses the 
much-sought-after political resources that private enterprises need to rw1 their 
business, such as the power to approve, allocate, distribute, protect, or simply to pass 
on information. These clientelist ties are extensively established and embedded 
within the wider social and political context. Wank points out an important point in 
the transition theory debate of China studies. China's market reforms are not a 
simple transition from guanxi networks or state control to market mechanisms. 
Instead, Wank sees that political power, markets and guanxi networks are 
establishing a new format of association. Through clientelist ties, political power is 
commoditized, exchanged and circulated as an integral part of the markets. 
2.9 China Studies: Social Order 
As markets in China are embedded in the local social order and culture, it is helpful 
to give a brief introduction to a number of specific perspectives from China studies 
on society and commerce that are particularly useful from the viewpoint of the 
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research reported here. The earl y sociologist and anthropologist Fei ( 1992 [1947])7 
suggested the existence of two contrasting concepts of social organisation -
'·differential mode of association'· (~fff~mi, chaxu geju) and ·'organisational mode 
of association" (!WI'fm~~. tuanli geju). In Fei 's analysis, the organisational mode of 
association arises from civilizations rooted in monotheist Christian ity, where a 
cosmic order beyond the human experience exists in people ' s consciousness (Fei 
2005:42-44). The principle of egalitarian human rights and universal laws are 
founded upon the conviction that every member of society is equally related to God 
and salvation. Hence social groups are characterised by equal ity in rights and 
obligations for every member, and there are clearly codified rules and regulations 
applicable to all members of the same group. For most social groups, there is a clear 
boundary between members and non-members. 
Fei's differential mode of association arises, in hjs view, from a human-
centric cosmic view of Confucianism. In a Chinese society where supernatural 
deities have little influence on social and political order,8 society is founded upon 
relational social networks that originate from every single person. These networks 
radiate along the lines of kinship and locality " like ripples spreading out in 
concentric circles" (2005: 34-38). Ethics and moral values (e.g. benevolence, filial 
pie ty, etiquette and trust) are network dependent, as the Confucian standard for 
appropriate behaviour depends on network positions and social distance. The ethical 
standards for fathers and sons, elder brothers and younger brothers, rulers and 
subjects, husbands and wives are different; and there is no universal yardstick 
applicable to everybody. These networks are also scalable and flexible, as they have 
7 Fei Xiaotong was a student of Bronislaw Malinowski. He got his PhD from the London School of 
Economics in 1938, and was one of the earliest researchers who applied ethnographic methods in 
Chinese societies, including his ancestral village in Jiangsu. 
8 Confucius shifted the worship of supernatural deities to the worship of ancestors, further solidifying 
a social hierarchy by kinship and seniority. 
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no definite boundary of where membership applies or not. For example, the "family" 
of a poor peasant may refer to a few persons living under the same roof. However, 
for a powerful and ri ch person of high status, one's "family" would include distant 
relatives and subordinate subjects (2005: 31-32). Unlike the organisational mode of 
association, there is no clear boundary between the self and the social groups. The 
merit ofFei' s work lies in the way how he applied Weber's analysis of the Protestant 
ethic to Chinese societies, linking the religious heritage of two contrasting 
civilizations with their respective social organisations. Fei (2005[1947]) is only a 
thin booklet of 13 7 pages, yet in 194 7 his radical and lively use of local examples 
and Chinese classics in a new light of sociology put him forward as the foremost 
founder of sociology in China. Critiques point out that Fei tended to polarize the 
properties of social organization as "Chinese" or "Western", his roots of 
functionalism (Nee 1994), and that his simple model of social network is later taken 
on by the school of social network analysis (Guldin 1994). Nonetheless Fei's work 
helped to lay a foundation for researchers in later generations. 
Another piece of work in legal studies by Qu (2003[1 947]) is helpful to this 
research. Qu analysed a large volume of laws and penal codes from dynasties from 
Han (202 B.C. - 220 A.D.) to Qing (1636-1912) in China. He listed examples of 
conditional clauses being written into the codes. These conditional clauses specified 
how penalties should be aggravated when an offence (e.g. murder, adultery, assault) 
is committed by a junior person to a senior person in the social hierarchy; and how 
they should be alleviated when an offence is committed in a vice versa direction. The 
conditions of relative social positions are a constitutive part of the legal code. The 
analysis of Qu came to the conclusion that the execution of laws in ancient China 
was slowly and gradually "Confucianized" over the ages from Han to Qing in two 
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millennia, encompassing e lements from the flexible Confucian social order of li (~) 
(Qu 2003: 292-309) and the mode of differential association.9 
Edgerton ( 1985) points out that the infinite possibilities of conditional clauses, 
or exceptions, posed a challenge to legal studies. As the conditional adjustments are 
often exercised by discretion of the scholar-officials, an auxiliary code of guideline is 
needed. Yet the interpretative possibilities ofthe auxiliary guideline can further lead 
to an infinite regression. Traditional China ended up with laws attached to a large but 
finite number of exceptions (Edgerton 1985: 16-21 ). "By recognizing a large but 
finite number of exceptions, Chinese law attempted a compromise between 
permitting personal and circumstantial mitigation for wrong-doing and imposing 
strict liability. It was an attempt to codify complexity ... [O]ver millennia, the 
Chinese system of law epitomized the fundamental opposition between strict rules as 
control mechanisms and the complexities of human living that seem to demand 
exceptions to those rules" (ibid pp. 20-21 ). As shown in the case of exchange Q in 
Chapter 6, this classical dilemma in traditional China is still present in post-
Communist markets of China today. 
The work of Yang (1994) provides a bridge between traditional and 
contemporary Chinese societies. The word guanxi is often associated with an 
e laborate exchange system of gifts, favours and banquets. From her ethnographic 
"fieldwork conducted in China in the 1980s and early 1990s, Yang shows how the gift 
economy operates in a larger context of the socialist state redistributive economy. 
Yang sees the non-hierarchical, rhizomatic networks of human relationships (Fei 
9 Legalists as an ancient philosophical school bad once been prominent (Zhou and Qin dynasties, 770-
206 B.C.). They proposed the rule of law (fa $ ) and the use of codified rules applicable to all social 
classes (Qu 2003: 3 19-329) except the Emperor. On the contrary, the Confucians proposed the rule of 
li (~), which is a system of tlexible social morals specific to particular social roles and relative 
network positions. The rule of li is sustained by case-by-case discretion instead of codified laws; 
edification and education rather than penalties. 
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1947, Liang 1949, Deluze et al. 1984) as a form of secondary society. Yang calls this 
secondary society minjian c~ra,), which means civil space (ibid: 174, 287-301); it is 
the major space where social life can take place outside the state structure (ibid: 289). 
Minjian differs from the standard "western" concept of civil society, because minjian 
is not made up of fully-formed, clearly defined individuals and social groups. In 
Yang's minjian, the boundary between the self, social groups and society is never 
very clear, and social agents are much less individualized. Mutual obligations just 
exist within an abstract, borderless and rhizomatic network of interpersonal guanxi. 
Yang holds the view that this secondary society had already served as a resource of 
mutual support and protection for individuals during the Cultural Revolution; it is not 
being replaced by markets (ibid: 166-176), and it will continue to be a promising 
direction of development for contemporary Chinese society. 
2.10 Post-Communist Markets 
In economic sociology there is a substantial volume ofliterature on the state-market 
relationship in post-communist countries. The published work of Victor Nee about 
Market Transition Theory (MIT) in the American Sociological Review (Nee 1989) 
set the foundations for a long debate. His work was about the shift from a planed 
economy to a market economy, and how it changed social stratification and eroded 
the power of the political elite (Guthrie 2000). Nee produced I 0 testable hypotheses, 
substantiated with a survey project conducted in the province Fujian (:m~) in 1985, 
and used indicators like household income to verify his hypotheses. He showed that 
the market favoured human capital over political capital , and direct production was 
taking over from redistribution (in Polanyi' s sense). Nee held the view that markets 
would eventually diminish the power of the State, and increase the freedom of 
individuals in their exchange activities. Through market reforms Chinese societies 
would converge with those in advanced capitalist nations of the West. 
Nee 's meganarrative of a linear market transition was contested by a number 
of researchers like Rona-Tas (1994), Parish and Michelson (1996), Bian and Logan 
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( 1996), Xie and Hannum (1996), Gerber and Hout ( 1998), and Zhou (2000). The 
Hungarian case of Rona-Tas (1994) proposed the alternative thesis of power 
conversion, which suggested that those in power before economic reforms were still 
in much better positions to gain advantages during the reforms. Sian and Logan 
(1996) found that those working in the state sector and those having redistributive 
powers in their positions had much higher income than others. The main weakness of 
Nee's market transition thesis was that it could not satisfactorily explain empirical 
evidence that the power of former state cadres seemed to persist or gain new vigour 
in new formats. Researchers like Wank ( 1999) suggested that market transitions were 
path-dependent, vary between sectors and regions, and could produce divergent 
forms of economies. 
Gates ( 1996) provides another perspective from Marxist materialism. She 
suggests that since the late imperial times in the Song dynasty (960-1279 A.D.), the 
economy of China has been running upon dual modes of production: the tributary 
mode of production (TMP), and the petty-capitalist mode of production (PCMP). In 
the late imperial times, the tributary mode of production was made up of an elite 
class of Confucian scholar-officials, who operated a national bureaucracy and 
extracted "surpluses" from the masses (Huang 1997: 117). Merchants had a long 
history of being repressed over the dynasties (Yuan 1948), 10 and there was a wide 
gap of class and status between merchants in the PCMP and scholar-officials in the 
TMP (see Ho 1954). 11 Gates suggests that in the post I 949 period, rather than being 
10 Over the dynasties, sometimes merchants were a class barely above farmers and women; sometimes 
they sank to the lowest bottom of the social ladder as equivalents to outcasts. The traditional class 
structure and cultural values had elaborate measures to forbid merchants from acquiring power and 
social status by their monetary capital (Yuan 1948). 
11 The study of Ho ( 1954) found that while Europe was beginning to undergo industrial revolution in 
the 181h cenn1ry, the richest group of merchants in China at that time, the salt merchants ofYangzhou 
(f§m), spent most of their profits to overcome their inferior class status. Instead of reinvesting their 
capital for further production and trade, they channeled their funds to the education of their offspring 
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abolished, the TMP is partially replaced by nationalist in Taiwan and by Communist 
cadres in mainland China. In contrast, the petty-capitalist mode of production is 
made up of the commoner classes who make a subsistence living. They distribute the 
surpluses that remained from the IMP by means of wage labour and 
"patricorporations" - a hierarchical system made up of kinship and gender (Hertz 
1998: 13). Gates argues against the view ofMarx that late imperial China belonged 
to a broad "Asiatic mode of production", where a stagnant empire "vegetat[ ed] in the 
teeth oftime" (Gates: 1996: 18-19). Instead, within the PCMP, dynamic wage labour, 
markets, private property, and classes were already present far back in imperial times. 
However, a large part of surpluses from the PCMP were "channeled to officials" in 
the IMP, in contrast of being channeled to capitalists in the industrial revolution of 
Europe (ibid: 39). What makes the Chinese economy different from its American or 
European counterparts are not essentialist "Chinese characteristics" just because this 
economy is "Chinese" . The difference comes from a longitudinal development of the 
TMP/PCMP economic formation that had been in motion for over a thousand years 
in history, which is both a heritage and burden not shared by their European or 
American counterparts. Gates also dissolves the historical sharp breaks between 
"feudal China" in the pre-1949 China or "sprouts of capitalism" after 1978, as 
sometimes held by Chinese official historiography or historians in China (Huang 
1997:119). The analysis of Gates suggests that, the dual economy ofTMP/PCMP is 
evolving in continuity from the late imperial times, nationalist period, Maoist era, to 
the curTent economic reforms. This framework helps to explain why contrasting 
properties - such as moralism, kinship ties and social harmony on one hand; 
calculative and ruthless competition on the other- seem to coexist in China's 
economy (Huang 1997: 117). 
(to turn them into the upper class of scholar-officials); distributed the wealth through their kinship 
network (to fulfill the moral value of filial piety); and, for a few notorious merchants, spent their 
riches in extravagant showoffs such as sprinkling gold powder on spectacular mountain tops. 
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In my fie ldwork findings in Chapters 5 and 6 there are traces to be found of 
relationships that echo, at least faintly, Gates· distinction between the TMP and 
PCMP. However. while Gates (1996) provides a helpful economic and ideological 
framework to understand contemporary markets of China, the complexity of 
empirical markets is probably beyond the description of any single schematic model 
(Hertz 1998: 15). In fact in the recent decades, TMP and PCMP may be infiltrating 
each other. Political power in state structures and para-governmental bodies is being 
commoditized, circulated and exchanged in the markets. One phenomenon to note is 
the emergence of para-governmental organizations of quasi-pub! ic, quasi-private 
nature (Francis 2001). Corinna-Barbara Francis provides a clear and concise account 
of how post-Communist countries tend to blur the boundary between public and 
private institutions during their market development. Unlike how the earlier 
capitali sts societies emerged alongside a clear demarcation between the public and 
the private spheres, as linked with the Englightenment and the Weberian analysis of 
bureaucratization, many post-Communist countries seemed to follow another path. It 
was through the symbiosis and interdependence between publ ic and private sectors 
that economic developments were realized. 
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Chapter 3 Contextual Background 
In countries where capitalism has been practised for centuries, now it becomes a 
daily routine for market participants to check the self-aligning, free-floating prices of 
agricultural grains traded on national commodity exchanges. However, this is sti!J a 
novel concept in China about setting up such exchanges, and arguably prices are not 
yet fully self-aligning or free-floating according to market forces (Yao 1998:126-
130). In China state leadership has replaced the functions of the private sector in 
setting up futures exchanges, which it has been argued, leads to "distortion of prices", 
and do not align by neoclassical models (Ma 2003). 
3.1 Commodity Futures in China (1820-1920) 
In China historically the prices of agricultural grains had been embedded within 
political and communal contexts. Peasants in ancient dynasties made payments of 
grains as a form of tribute and allegiance to the dual ruling structure - the national 
monarch and the local gentry (Fei 1991 ). Meanwhile the ruling class red istributed 
grains in the form of granaries and warehouses to non-agricultural subjects including 
the officials, the military and the leisure class (Polanyi 1944: 54). Despite the 
presence of bazaar markets and trade, the value of grains was heavily linked up with 
political power and communal relationships. 
The early development of futures products in China can be traced back to the 
exchange rate futures of silver ingots in coastal city N ingbo in the 1820s-30s, when 
different Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin and Hankou had different tmit 
standards for silver. These futures were not recognized by the Qing government, 
nonetheless the "Ningbo standard ingot futures" ($?b't~Jbc.!'tl3~) still became a 
successful product in the 1870s (Shen 2003:114, Du 1996:3-4 ). 
Lei (1981) did historical research from primary archival data on soy 
commodities in northeast China. She found that during 1870-1930 soy products 
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constituted 60-90% of the total exports from the region. Europe and Japan were the 
major destinations of trade, especially during World War I when Europe was in great 
need of soy oil and food supply. An elaborate trading system of licmgzhan (~~ 
taverns with warehouses) and liangshi (;fjl$ grain markets) already existed over the 
region in the late 191h century. The trading system made use of irregular spot and 
forward transactions, 12 and was built upon a personal network of trust and credit. 
Many of the earliest exchanges (jiaoyisuo X~Pfi) in China were established 
by foreign merchants. In 1892, the first stock exchange in China was formed by 
European and American merchants in Shanghai. The "Shanghai Stock Exchange" 
(..t#sJ~~x-:%..PJT) was established in 1906, initiating securities and commodities 
trading (Shen 2003 : 114). Most of its 100 members were British and American 
brokers (Zhu 2007). 
Since the earliest exchanges were largely controlled by foreign brokers and 
backed by colonial interests, there were strong nationalistic appeals from the Chinese 
business c ircles to the Beiyang governrnent 13 demanding for thei r own exchange. 
The first Chinese industry association for stock trading was formed in Shanghai in 
1914. Yu Qiaqing (~~mm) was leading the initiative to establ ish an exchange by 
Chinese merchants in Shanghai, but he encountered a number of difficulties in 
licensing, political turmoils, as well as conflicting interests arising from other 
Chinese merchants in Shanghai (Zhu G.-m. 2007). Meanwhile, with the support of 
republican leader Sun Yat-sen (f*'cp!li) and led by Chinese merchant Wang Jingfang 
(.:EJ;;(J:f), the Peking Securities Exchange (~tzrs:~~~x~rfT) was quicker to come to 
12 See Glossary in Appendix 2 for the meanings of spot, forward, and futures. 
13 The Beiyang government ~tr.Fi&Jf.f ( 1912-1928) was sometimes also known as the warlord 
government. 
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inaguration. It was formed in 1918, trading on stocks, bonds and futures (Shen 
2003:116). 
After the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, Japan gained control over the 
northeast part of China then known as Manchuria. 14 In 1913 the Japanese introduced 
the first futures exchange in Dalian, establishing the export harbour as the hub of a 
combined market of commodity spots, forwards and futures for soybean, soy meal 
and soy oil. Likewise nine other exchanges were establ ished in northeast China under 
Japanese control, one was set up by the Russians in Harbin, and four were 
established by Chinese merchants during 1913-1931. 15 These exchanges traded in 
soybean products, wheat, durra, li v~::slm.:k and fabrics. In addition, currencies were 
traded in the Japanese exchanges only. The three-tier system of liangzhen, liangshi 
andjiaoyisuo served as the mediation system between domestic farmers and overseas 
export grain traders, facilitating the Japanese to control export trade. Lei has shown 
archival evidence that during the period, standardized 3-month and 6-month futures 
contracts already existed in the Yingkou exchange. Transferable paper documents 
were issued by merchants when the shipping route River Liao went frozen; the 
futures contracts were honoured in the following spring when the river thawed (Lei 
1981 pp160-161). In 1918, Japan also expanded its influence to Shanghai. Led by 
several Japanese textile firms (Zhu G.-m. 2007:49 from the Shanghai municipal 
archive), the Japanese merchants and consulate established a new exchange (..t.~~ 
ij IFfr) there to compete with the Europeans and Americans. The exchange traded in 
securities, cotton and yarn (Shen 2003: 117). 
14 The area is now known as the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning. 
15 The Japanese exchanges were established in Dalian, Kaiyuan (i7FJJ)j(), Changchun (:l~U{4f), 
Gongzhuling (03:.~), Tieling (il~), Sipingjie (12!lZJStti), Fengtien (5$7(), Yingkou (1,fO), 
Liaoyang (3m f~), Andong (32*) and, for cuJTencies only, Harbin C'*'~~Jr)t). The Chinese exchanges 
were set up in Fengtian (5$7(), Jilin CE"if;f\), Harbin and Changchun (Lei 1981 pp 158-159). 
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The Japanese initiative stimulated a new wave of nationalistic appeal to 
support Yu Qiaqing·s Chinese exchange in Shanghai. Yu was pre-empted by a 
smaller ri val exchange, Shanghai Chinese Merchants Securities Exchange (_tmf~f§j 
~~3Z~?fi), which was led by Fan Jumei (ill*~) and inaugurated in May 1920. 
Eventually Yu managed to overcome difficulties and inaugurated the Chartered 
Stock and Produce Exchange (_tm~~tmJ=lr:rX~flfi) in July 1920, trading securities, 
cotton, yarn, fabrics, gold, silver, food and oils, and leather (Zhu G.-m. 2007:50). 
3.2 Trust and Exchange Crisis in 1921 (m3t6tifJJJ 
In its first six months, the Chartered Stock and Produce Exchange made a profit of 
30% for its shareholders, and the Shanghai Chinese Merchants Securities Exchange 
also made a profit of 40% in the fust year (Zhu G.-m. 2007:75). This triggered a 
wave of dramatic optimism in forming new exchanges and speculating their stocks, 
known as the " trust and exchange crisis ({§ 3(JillljW})" in 192 1. Shortly within a few 
months in 1921, more than 100 exchanges were formed within Shanghai alone (Zhu 
Y.-g. 2006:75-76). Zhu Y.-g. (2006) listed different historical records that gave a 
total count of 112. 1 17 and 136 exchanges respectively - in fact it was difficult to 
have an accurate total count, because many exchanges were registered within fo reign 
settlement tetTitories Cf..E!.W), or were never registered at a ll. The products traded 
included bonds, stocks, gold, yarn, cloth, linen, coal oil, matches, timber, gunny 
sacks, cigarettes, alcohol, grit, and sand. The proliferation of exchanges quickly 
extended to cities including Ningbo, Guangzhou, Hankou, Tianjin, Nanjing, 
Zhenjiang, and Suzhou. The share prices of exchanges went through an extreme 
boom in summer and autumn 1921, and investors went into a euphoria. All the new 
exchanges founded within the year 1921 had a total capital of 148.55 million yuan, 
which was more than the total capital of all the 82 banks in China added together 
(51.99 million yuan) (Zhu Y.-g. 2006 quoting on People's Bank of China 1960:118). 
Banks and trust companies started to tighten loans to the exchanges in winter 1921. 
This triggered off an abrupt bust throughout the markets. By spring 1922, only six 
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exchanges in Shanghai remained; the others all ended up in bankruptcy. Grievous 
loss and multiple incidents of suicide were reported in the investor community. Zhu 
Y.-g. (2006) holds the view that these speculative markets were "childish, deformed" 
(P.74), and were not helpful in providing fundamental capital for Chinese firms in 
industries and trade (P.84). 
The "trust and exchange crisis" in 1921 led to the loss of public trust in stocks 
and commodities, and a period of depression in futures markets followed (Shen 
2003: 119). Improved regulatory laws in 1929-1930 revived public trust to some 
extent, yet these sporadic market revivals were interrupted by the Sino-Japanese war 
and internal wars. After the communist regime took over China in 1949, the 
Shanghai securities and futures exchange and the exchange at Tianjin were abolished 
in 1949 and 1952 respectively. 
During 1953-1978, the production, pricing and distribution of major 
commodities in China were taken over by agricultural communes and a system of 
state control (Yao 1998). China under Maoist communist rule adopted the policy of 
"price scissors": to finance industrialization by extracting a surplus from agricu lture 
(Liew 1997: 9-25). By cultivating a spirit of altruism and patriotism among the 
peasants, and re-organizing agricultural activities under collectivized communal 
farms (which served as a system of price coercion) (ibid: 15), the state managed to 
procure grains from the peasants at a price below the free market equilibrium price. 
However total agricultural productivity fell during the period due to low incentives. 
Futures exchanges did not resurface until 1992. 
3.3 Devising Futures Markets after 1979 
In 1979 with economic reforms launched by Deng XiaoPing, state procurement 
prices increased significantly. The dual-track price system ({fll~~ii!JLffiU) was also 
introduced: once peasants had fulfilled their state procurement quotas they could sell 
their crops at market prices (ibid: 25-26). Productivity increased under this mixed 
system of planned and market economy, but problems like corruption, state fiscal 
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deficits and regional price gaps also surfaced (Yao 1998:126-127, Liew 1997:26). In 
the midst of the dual-track system, to fulfil provincial procurement quotas rich grain-
deficit provinces tried to buy from farmers in inland grain-surplus provinces at 
higher prices. This drove local governments at various levels into confl icts of 
"commodity wars·'. In 1990, inland Hunan province set up explicit road blocks to 
prevent local farmers from sell ing rice to coastal Guangdong (Liew 1997: 27). 
Similar "wool war" and "tea war" were recorded, where regional authorities erected 
embargoes on cross-provincial flow of trade to protect local interests (Qian et al 1992: 
55). In response to existing problems, in 1993 the central government endorsed the 
policy to "develop a commodity markets system" with a circulation mechanism and a 
pricing mechanism, aiming at the gradual elimination of the dual-track pricing 
system (Yao 1998:127). 
For this initial period of market development, academic references in English 
such as Yao ( 1998), and journalistic reports from Hong Kong and abroad emphasize 
"learning from the West". Meanwhile most of the sources from domestic research 
institutes emphasized the leading role of the Chinese state, and most of them quoted 
Yang Jingyu' s proposal as the first initiating trigger. Qian et al ( 1992) is a collection 
of original government documents and reports in 1988-1992, and Suen et al (2005) is 
a comprehensive academic account. My account is an attempt to triangulate between 
the above sources and perspectives. The early initiatives to reintroduce futures 
markets in China could be traced back to 1986, when the Chinese government signed 
an agreement with the Chicago Board ofTrade (CBOT) about developing a 
commodity futures market in China (Yao 1998:11 0). In 1987, Hong Kong 
businessman Yang Jingyu (.f~~~) made a proposal to top political leaders of the 
state (Suen, Zhu et al 2005:64). The following major moves were led by the state in a 
top-down manner. With the support of then Premier Li Peng (*lllfJ), the early focus 
of research was to maintain the stability of non-staple food prices in urban cities, and 
to balance the interests between producers and consumers. In 1988, the futures 
markets working group was a joint unit between the pricing unit (under the State 
Council's development research centre m~~~Wkflff~J:f:r{AfU#*fl) and the 
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circulation commission (under the National Organizational Reform Commission ~ 
~ltfffiUc5C*~~1WfmE:@~). Research work was conducted on overseas futures 
exchanges, American experts were invited to give training seminars, and study tours 
were organized to the Hong Kong Futures Exchange (ibid: 64, Qian et al 1992: 49, 
236-241 ). A group of Chinese economists was sent to visit the CBOT, 
memorandums were signed between the two sides, and Chinese personnel were sent 
to Chicago for training (Yao 1998:11 0). In June 1988, regional governments from 
Henan, Jilin, Sichuan, Hubei and Guangdong were considered for setting up 
prototype futures markets (Qian et al1992: 48-49, 171-183), and Zhengzhou (~1'1'1) 
in Henan province was selected as the first point of trial on wheat and non-staple 
grains 16 (Suen, Zhu et al2005:64). 
The China Zhengzhou Grain Wholesale Market (cp~~51'1'f*IF~J.tt~ilJ:f:~) 
was established in October 1990 (Qian et al1992: 318-330), and the first wheat 
forward contract was traded in March 1991 (Suen, Zhu et al2005:64). Zhengzhou 
was located on the wheat belt of China in a province geographically central in the 
country; it was located on the intersection of two major railways, the north-south 
Beijing-Guangzhou line C~JJH~) and the east-west Longhai line (~mH~, which 
runs from eastern coastal po1t Lianyungang ~~~ to western city Lanzhou TiJ 1'1'1), 
as comparable to Illinois and Chicago in the US (Qian et al: 106-107). Yet delivery 
and logistics problems arose due to shortage in railway capacity (Suen et al 2005: 66; 
Qian et al 1992: 55). The first set of trading rules was launched in Oct 1992 (Ouyang 
2006: 87); the wholesale market was restructured into the Zhengzhou Commodity 
Exchange in May 1993, and started the trading of standardized futures contracts in 
wheat, corn, soybean, mung bean, and sesame (Ouyang 2006:86-89, Suen et al2005: 
66, Yao 1998: 111). 
16 Com in Jilin, rice in Wuhan, and live pigs in Sichuan were proposed as second-phase trial points in 
1990 (Suen, Zhu et al 2005:64). The plan did not materialize, partly due to political disruptions 
associated with the Tian 'anmen Square Incident in 1989. 
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3.4 Proliferation of Futures Exchanges 
Other provinces and municipal governments were also on the move. With the support 
ofthe National Organizational Reform Commission and the State Council. the 
southern economic special region Shenzhen established the '·Shenzhen Non-Ferrous 
Metal Exchange'· (?~:l:JII.fi'@.~J\ii:5(~pff) for copper, aluminium, lead, zinc and tin 
in June 199 1, and launched the fi rst standardized futures contract in China (since the 
1950s) in a luminium in Oct 1992. In June 1991 , the city ofSuzhoulaunched the 
Suzhou Supplies Exchange (fr.'if1'1'f4~ji:5(~frr, later renamed as Suzhou Commodity 
Exchange r!.~ 1'1'1 fi~rh~i'JX~.PfT). The Shanghai munic ipal government established the 
Shanghai Metal Exchange C.t$~~:5(~pfT) in May 1992, and started the use of 
automatic order-matching computer programs to handle the tradi ng orders (Suen et al 
2005:66). 
Table 3.1 Commodity exchanges (wholesa le markets) in China by the 
end of 1993 
Location 
Exchange I Wholesale 
Products traded Launch time market 
Beijing China Construction Construction materials 1992 
Materials Wholesale 
Market 
Beij ing Beijing T imber and T imber and forestry 1993 
Forestry Wholesale products 
Market 
Beijing Beijing National Chemical products Apr 1993 
Chemicals Exchange 
Beijing Beijing Petrochemical Petrochemical products Nov 1993 
Exchange 
Beij ing Beijing Commodities Agricultural products, Nov 1993 
Exchange metals, energy, 
petrochemicals, T bi lls 
Shanghai Shanghai Metal Non-ferrous metals May 1992 
Exchan_ge 
Shanghai Shanghai Petroleum Crude oil , May 1993 
Exchange petrochemicals 
Shanghai Shanghai Chemical Chemical products Mar 1993 
Commodity Exchange 
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Shanghai Shanghai Coal Coal Dec 1992 
Conunodity Exchange 
Shanghai Shanghai Food and Oils Food and oils May 1993 
Exchange 
Shanghai Shanghai Construction Steel, plywood 1993 
Materials Exchange 
Shanghai Shanghai Agricultural Urea, Potassium chloride Feb 1993 
Resources Exchange 
Tianjin Tianjin Metal Exchange Steel, cast iron Oct 1992 
Tianjin Beiyang (Tianjin) Metallic materials Sep 1993 
Commodity Exchange 
Dalian Dalian Commodity Corn, soybean Nov 1993 
Exchange 
Shenyang Shenyang Metal Metallic materials Sep 1993 
Exchange 
Changchun Changchun Food and Grains 1993 
Oils Exchange 
ChangchLm Changchun Commodity Food, railway 1993 
Exchange transpottation price 
Harbin Harbin Petroleum Food, petroleum, T bills 1993 
Exchange 
Zhengzhou China Zhengzhou Steel, cement 1993 
Construction Materials 
Exchange 
Nanjing Nanjing Petroleum Petroleum Mar 1993 
Exchange 
Suzhou Suzhou Commodity Steel wires, silk Jan 1992 
Exchange 
Chengdu Chengdu Meat Exchange Pork, beef Nov 1993 
Chengdu Sichuan Food and Oils Food and oils Nov 1993 
Commodity Exchange 
Chengdu Sichuan Metal Exchange Metallic wires 1993 
Chengdu Chengdu Agricultural Information for Aug 1992 
Trading & Wholesale agriculhtral production 
Market 
Chongqing Chongqing Metal Metallic materials 1993 
Exchange 
Guangzhou South China Commodity Petroleum, rubber 1992 
Exchange 
Nanhai Guangzhou Steel Steel Aug 1993 
Exchange 
Nanhai Nanhai Non-ferrous Non-ferrous metals 1993 
Metal Exchange 
Shenzhen Shenzhen Non-ferrous Non-ferrous metals Jan 1992 
Metal Exchange 
Haikou Hainan Chinese Rubber, coffee, sugar Nov 1993 
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Mercantile Commodity 
Exchange 
Yantai China Chemical Chemical products 1992 
Resources Market 
Jinan Qi Lu Metal Exchange Metallic materials 1993 
Qinhuangdao Qinhuangdao Coal Coal 1992 
Wholesale Market 
Inner East Mongolia Coal Coal Mar 1992 
Mongolia Exchange 
Lanzhou Gansu Non-ferrous Non-ferrous metals 1993 
Metal Exchange 
Sources: Suen, Zhu and Shi (eds.) (2005) P. 67-68; Suen Shangqing (1994) 
Report on the Development of Chinese markets, China Development Publishing 
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Before the central government could clarify whether commodity futures 
markets were capitalist or socialist and how regulation was going to be administered, 
dozens of provincial and municipal governments jumped onto the bandwagon to 
establish their own futures exchanges. Table 3.1 is a list of 33 futures exchanges 
launched before 31 Dec 1993, trading seven categories and over 50 commodity 
futures products (Suen et al2005: 67-68, Shen 2003: 128). By mid 1994 the number 
of futures exchanges established throughout China was estimated to be over 60 (Y ao 
1998: 112), and Shen (2003) quoted "authorities" who estimated that the number of 
wholesale markets with forward and futures activities was probably over I ,000 (Shen 
2003: 128). More than 50 commodity futures products were traded, including 
perishable and small-scaled products from "beans to beer, T-bills to pork bellies" 
(Yao 1997: 113); some products were difficult to standardize, such as charcoal, 
Chinese herbs, seafood, water melons and potatoes (Suen et al 2005 :74). 
Due to the lack of sound legal and regulatory framework, the following 3 years 
(1991-93) saw a proliferation to 50 futures exchanges in China ... that was equivalent 
to all the futures exchanges in the world combined ... the same product was often 
traded on a number of exchanges resulting in confusion, contracts were not 
standardized and were often completed on unreasonable terms, and exchanges 
were operating without appropriate management (in particular, risks management) 
systems. The market was, to say the least, disorderly. 
(CSRC 2004:32) 
Many of those exchanges sat in the same city and traded the same commodities. 
For example, Shanghai City had seven commodity futures exchanges; Sichuan 
province had five futures exchanges; two futures exchanges sitting in Tianjin City 
both specialized in metal futures; one building in Beijing housed two futures 
exchanges, each occupying a different floor, and petroleum oil futures were traded 
on the competing upper floor and lower floor; and copper futures were traded on 
five futures exchanges. (Yao 1997: 112) 
Apart from Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange which charges a commission fee of 
1.5/10000, most of the new exchanges charge for commission fees around 1/1000 
[of the transaction amount]. No wonder after a provincial director visited an 
exchange in Shanghai, he made a request to all his subordinate departmental heads: 
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"When we return home, every one of you have to launch a new exchange from your 
department!" 
Shen (2003:128) quoting Economic Reference U~~~~¥!D 1 
Feb 1994, my translation 
Suen et al (2005: 69-72) pointed out that at this stage, futures exchanges were usually 
constructed by a joint venture between the State Council, local government, and 
relevant industry enterprises. Since the leaders of many exchanges came from public 
bureaus without formally detaching themselves from governmental bodies, power 
often " infiltrates" into the organizational structure of the exchanges. In some cases 
the military and police units took part in organising futures brokerage firms, and 
some organisations made use of public funds to engage in futures trading - losses 
were recorded by the publ ic account, but profits were recorded as private gains. The 
various exchanges had different rules and regulations in memberships, margins, fees 
and liabi lities, resulting in regional differences and confusion. There were far more 
speculators than hedgers in the markets, resulting in high volati lity of prices and 
weak correlation with spot fundamentals. According to Suen et al (2005), all the 
exchange members were trading members only, but ownership and management did 
not belong to the futures companies. Most of the exchanges adopted the 
organizational structure of"vocational legal person" - they were financed by 
governmental units, and thei r leading positions were appointed by the state. 
Occasionally a few exchanges adopted a shareholding organization (e.g. Beijing 
Commodity Exchange, Hainan Chinese Mercanti le Futures Exchange), or the 
"corporate legal person organization" (e.g. Shenzhen Non-ferrous Metal Exchange), 
where enterprises took a greater role in the ownership and organization structure of 
the exchanges. 
3.5 The Private Sector 
The state-led futures exchanges took the lead, and futures companies in the private 
sector quickly followed. Established in Sep 1992, Guangdong Wantong ClBBI~}f!;~) 
44 
Chapter 3 Contextual Background 4 January 2008 
was the first futures brokerage firm of China in the 1990s (Suen et aJ 2005: 68). In 
Dec 1992, twelve of China's powerful state-owned commodity trading enterprises 
(including China Grain Trading Co., China Cereal and Oil Trading Co. , and China 
Material Trading Co.) organized Chlna International Futures Corporation Ltd. 
(CIFCO, 9=r~~~~t!tJ3Jli:*~f-c0-EIJ) (Yao 1998: 111). In mid Dec 1993, CIFCO 
obtained the statuses of non-clearing member of the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT), the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) (Suen et al2005 : 68). CIFCO was chaired by Tien Yuan (E8 
~), a US-trained PhD in economics, who left his job as the head of the futures 
research working group of the State Council's development research centre since 
1988 for the private sector. The novel written by Liu and Yan (1999) described 
Tien's move from a prestigious state cadre position to join the private sector as an 
unprecedented shock and a "wow" factor to commoners in the market. 
"Oh this person Tien Yuan. He got direct orders from Li Peng to research in futures. 
He started in 1988. Do you know who is Tien Yuan? ... Director of the Research and 
Development Centre of the State Council! American-trained PhD, not yet reaching 
the age of 40, cadre of the ministry rank!" Wang said in a firm voice, and everybody 
listened with great respect. "Guess what, he resigned and founded a futures 
brokerage company, CIFCO ... You look up history, where can you find a ministry-
grade cadre that had resigned before. If this futures thing is not really great, how 
would Tien Yuan resign?" ... Wang's audience were deeply convinced by his 
'analysis'. This futures thing is something wonderful. It will give loads of profits! If a 
ministry-ranked cadre with an American PhD decided to step down to conduct 
futures business, what are we waiting for?" 
Liu and Yan (1999: 17-18), my translation 
Futures companies in the private sector quickly flourished within the following 1-2 
years. The single province ofGuangdong had over 100 futures brokerage companies. 
The total number of futures brokerage firms went over 500, 200 of which were not 
registered with the State Administration oflndustry and Commerce (SAIC) (Yao 
1998). Out of the registered 300 fitms, 50 were joint venture companies specialized 
in futures trading on foreign markets. These joint venture companies were usually 
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controlled by domestic para-governmental bodies, and had the foreign partners 
responsible for daily operation. They had extensively obtained domestic capital to 
speculate on currency. stock index and commodi ty futures in the US. the UK. and 
Japan (Suen et al 2005: 68-69). From 1992 to 1993. the number of practitioners in 
the futures industry rose from under 10,000 in 1992 to 135,500 in 1993 (Shen 2003: 
129); the number of futures contracts traded rose from 200,000 to over I ,000,000 
(Suen et al 2005: 72). 
3.6 "Event 327" and Stringent Regulation 
In Nov 1993, the State Council promulgated the Circular on Resolutely Pulling an 
End to the Blind Proliferation of the Futures Markets (Futures Power Enabling 
Circular f§f.JJ~rliUll:AA1-1riJ"t~~ § ~JFi:l¥1:®~0). The policy was enacted in May-June 
1994, exercising a set of regulatory procedures that consolidated the number of 
futures exchanges from over 50 to 15, downsized 500 brokerage fi rms down to 170. 
and pruned off20 futures products such as steel, sugar, rice, coal, gaso line and bonds. 
The products were banned from trading due to '·severe inflation caused by over-
speculation". Trading foreign futures products were a ltogether banned, with a small 
exemption list of two dozens of large state-owed commodity enterprises only. On the 
remaining 15 exchanges, only 35 products were allowed to trade; all new products 
had to be approved prior to trading (Yao 1997:116, Suen et al2005: 74-76). 
Measures were imposed on the regional exchanges to detach from local 
governmenta l units, to prevent corner events, to enforce settlement and margin 
requi rements, and to enforce penalties on rule breakers. 
Despite the regulatory efforts in 1993-94, in 1995 a scandal known as "Event 
327" occurred on the Treasury bond futures market in the Shanghai Securities 
Exchange. The incident took place on the futures contracts No. 327, whose 
underlying asset was a Chinese Treasury bond issued in 1992 with a par va lue of 100 
renminbi , coupon rate 9.5%, and maturity date in June 1995. The Shanghai 
Internationa l Securities Co. Ltd. (SISCO, m~~~~~J) (majority owed by the Shanghai 
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municipal government) was betting a declining market on contract No. 327, because 
SISCO got information that Beijing was going to issue 150 billion yuan in T-bonds. 
However, to the surprise of SISCO, on 21 Feb 1995 the Ministry ofFinance 
announced that two-thirds of the bond issuance would be shelved. On 23 Feb 1995, 
the Liaoning Guofa Co. Group Ltd. (~~~' owned by local financial institutions in 
the northeast province Liaoning) and the China Economic Development Trust and 
Investment Co. C cf:!Mi~lff.J CEDTIC, owned by the Ministry of Finance) switched from 
short to long positions. Others followed suit. To struggle against the rising prices of 
futures contract No. 327, within the last 8 trading minutes on 23 Feb 1995, SISCO 
shorted bond futures worth 1,460 billion yuan (about US$180 billion; another 
versions says 211 billion yuan, US$26 billion), equivalent to one-third of China's 
GDP in 1994. Prices were driven down to turn SISCO's position from a loss of6 
million yuan to profits of 1 billion yuan, but the regulators decided to roll back all the 
trades made in the last 7.5 minutes of the trading day. To make matters worse for 
SISCO, on 25 Feb the Ministry of Finance announced that the coupon payout rate of 
the underlying T-bond would be raised from 9.5% to 10.38%, and the repayment of 
principal and interest on each par value of I 00 yuan would be raised from 128.5 to 
148.5 yuan. With a debt ofUS$120 million mostly owed to the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), in Apr 1995 SISCO was merged with Shanghai 
Shenyin Securities Co. Ltd. (l.:$$~N~~), majority owed by ICBC, to become 
Shanghai Shenyin International Securities Co. Ltd. (SSIS _t#jJ$~Nf.it~~~). Two 
years later in Feb 1997, Guan Jinsheng, leader of SISCO, was accused of seemingly 
irrelevant corruption charges in 1992-94 and sentenced to a 17-year tem1s of 
imprisonment; he was released on bail for "medical treatment" in 2003. On the other 
hand according to Yuan (2002), CEDTIC, as the leader of the long factions, should 
have made approximately 7 billion yuan of profits out of Event 327. However, 
CEDTIC had rolled up a debt of over 7.6 billion yuan instead. Yuan and a few 
futures bloggers believed that the actual profits were reaped by someone working in 
CEDTIC through "rat trading" (~.IDJ1~ laoshucang. See Appendix 2). 
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Event 327 revealed the potential of China's new derivative markets to be 
used as a battlefield between various capital factions. who were backed by state and 
regional political power units, leading to clashes between political groups. The 
aftermath of Event 327 was that, the parties involved were alleged for misappropriate 
use of public funds, breaking formal volume trading limits, and trading on insider 
information. Similarly. a series of other comer events also appeared on commodity 
futures products throughout the country (for a detailed list, see Chapter 5). 
Eventually, the then Vice Premier Zhu Rongji C*~~) called for greater 
supervisory and law enforcement. In a few months' time the regulatory framework 
was restructured, a new China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was 
formed, and bond futures were altogether suspended from trading. In Feb 1996, the 
State Council and the CSRC tighten the use of public funds from state-owned 
enterpri ses on futures markets. State-owed enterprises were only allowed to conduct 
futures trading to hedge on those commodities relevant to the enterprise's core 
business. In July 1996, the People' s Bank ofChina announced that banks were 
strictly prohibited from futures trading, further shunning the sources of capital 
flowing into the futures markets (Yao 1997:103-106; Neftci and Menager-Xu 2006: 
250-254; Zhang J. 2001; Li 2004; Wu 2006; Suen et al2005: 80-81). (For further 
details on Event 327, see also the section about Guan Jinsheng, the leader of SISCO 
in Chapter 6.) 
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Fig 3.1 The three futures exchanges in China (1998-2006) 
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In Aug 1998, the State Council announced the Circular on Further 
Consolidation and Regulation of the Futures Markets (!m151:-~-t17~i@i;fDmfeM~ 
rfjt~tf'9iffi5;0), consolidating the existing 14 futures exchanges 17 into three: Shanghai, 
Zhengzhou and Dalian (see Fig 3.1). The number of tradable futures products went 
from 35 down to 12 (see Table 3.2). The other 11 exchanges at Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai (two out of three), Suzhou, Shenyang, Chongqing, Chengdu, Guangdong, 
Shenzhen, and Hainan had to be turned into wholesale markets or futures brokerage 
companies. In 1999-2000, the State Council launched a set of "administrative rules" 
for futures exchanges and futures brokerage firms. A compulsory qualification exam 
was established for all futures practitioners to remain in business; every futures 
brokerage firm had to meet a minimum registered capital of30 million yuan (1.9 
million pounds); and all futures brokerage firms had to undergo annual audits to keep 
their licenses. These measures were supposed to eliminate the weakest firms from the 
industry, and strengthen their capacity of risk management and operational resilience. 
However, shortage of capital sources and stringent regulation also implied low 
trading volumes and a tight period for business, especially for the years 1997-2002 
(Suen eta! 2005: 81) (see Fig 3.2). 
17 Due to problematic management, the delivery warehouses ofChangchun United Commodity 
Exchange issued short warehouse receipts of corn without having corn in the warehouses. Prices were 
disrupted, and the exchange was forced to discontinue its operations in Oct 1995. 
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Table 3.2 Futures Products of the commodity futures exchanges in China (1998 
and 2007) 
Exchange 
Authorized futures Futures products actually 
products (Aug 1998) traded (Dec 20071 
Shanghai Futures Copper, aluminium, natural Copper, aluminium, natural 
Exchange rubber, sticky rice, mbber, fuel oil, zinc 
(SHFE) plywood 
Dalian Soybean, soymeal, beer Corn, No.I soybeans, No.2 
Commodity barley soybeans, soybean meal, 
Exchange (DCE) soybean oi l, RBD palm oil, 
LLDPE 
Zhengzhou Wheat, mung bean, red Wheat (hard winter white 
Commodity beans, peanut kernels and strong gluten), cotton, 
Exchange (ZCE) sugar, PTA, rapeseed oil 
China Financial --- Awaiting product launch: 
Futures (Exchange officially CSI 300 index futures 
Exchange launched on 8 Sep 2006) 
(CFFEX) 
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Fig 3.2 Total Transaction Volume of aU the futures exchanges in China 
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Note: Data for 1994-1998 is the total transaction amount of 15 futures exchanges. Data for 
1999-2007 is the total transaction amount of the 3 exchanges DCE, SHFE and ZCE. 
Sources: Suen, Zhu, Shi et al (2005) Analysis of the sector organization of China' s futures industry; 
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3. 7 Market Revival and new product offerings 
Since 2003, the futures markets of Chlna have been steadily reviving. Since 2004 the 
CSRC carefully and gradually loosened the grip, having approved four commodity 
futures within six months: cotton futures, fuel oil futures, corn futures, and No. 2 
(GMO) soybean futures. Seven more products were launched in 2006-2007: sugar, 
soybean oi l, PTA (a plastic), zinc, rapeseed, LLDPE (a plastic), and palm oil (see 
Table 3.3). Other futures product offerings being studied include crude oil, petroleum, 
power, steel, rice, Chinese T-bonds, and carbon quotas. Dalian Commodity 
Exchange had a trading volume of over 74 million contracts in 2003, and it had once 
become the third largest commodity futures exchange in the world (after the New 
York Mercantile Exchange and the Tokyo Grain Exchange).18 By trading volume in 
2006, DCE was ranked 9111 in the world's exchanges; Shanghai Futures Exchange 
(SHFE) was ranked 16t11; and Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (ZCE) was ranked 
18'11 (see Table 3.3, FIA 2006). By transaction amount, in 2006 SHFE accounts for 
60% oftransactions in China's futures markets, DCE accounts for 25%, and ZCE 
took up 15% (Yang and Jin 2007). 
18 Ranking excludes financial futures like index futures and bond futures. 
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Table 3.3 New futures products approved by the CSRC since 2004 
New product Exchange Launch Date 
Cotton ZCE 1 June 2004 
Fuel oil SHFE 25 Aug2004 
Corn DCE 22 Sep 2004 
No. 2 soybean DCE 22 Dec 2004 
Sugar ZCE 6 Jan 2006 
Soybean oil DCE 9 Jan 2006 
PTA ZCE 18 Dec 2006 
Zinc SHFE 26 Mar 2007 
Rapeseed ZCE 8 Jun 2007 
LLDPE DCE 31 Jul2007 
Palm oil DCE 29 Oct 2007 
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Table 3.4 The ranking of world futures exchanges bv trading volume in 2006 
Top 40 Futures Exchanges 
{Volume figures do not include options on futures) 
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For over a decade, the scars from "event 327" made the CSRC extremely prudent 
about financial derivatives such as bond futures, index futures and options. In 2006, 
with the competitive pressure from Singapore and Hong Kong that these markets 
were interested to launch index futures products upon the stock markets of mainland 
China, the State Council and CSRC were finally willing to launch their own index 
futures within the domains of mainland China. On 8 Sep 2006, a new financial 
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exchange cal led the China Financial Futures Exchange (cp!~t~~Wt~~~.PJT, 
CFFEX) was founded in Shanghai. Former general manager ofDCE, Zhu Yuchen 
C*=.:E:..I.N), was appointed as its new general manager. At the time of writing (Dec 
2007), the CFFEX's first financial futures product, CSI 300 index futures, is in 
"coming-soon" status. It will be an index futures product on the stock markets of 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
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Methodology 
4 January 2008 
To conduct ethnography in China' s commodity futures markets, I was studying an 
"insider" community from the identity of an "outsider" (Merton 1972). Membership 
of the commodity futures industry of China is, to a large degree, achieved through 
work experience, training and social connections; inborn or ascribed attributes such 
as nationality, class and gender also had their influences (ibid: 15). In this research 
the insider/outsider boundary was three-fold: between academics and market people; 
between sociology and economics; and, between Europeans (where this thesis was 
formulated and assessed), mainland Chinese (where the field subjects worked and 
lived), and Hong Kong Chinese (where the researcher was born and brought up). 
Here discussion is focused on six issues surrounding the insider/outsider boundary: 
access, training, versions of disciplinary knowledge, orientalism, cultural 
essentialism, and power. The methodology discussion will then proceed to 
triangulation, ethical issues, and safety and health issues in fieldwork. 
4.1 Access 
Field access was the foremost challenge of this research, as the researcher did not 
have previous working experience in the industry, or any affiliated family 
background in China's political and business circles that could facilitate access. 
During Dec 2004- May 2005 five to six channels were explored for access. My 
letters and emails requesting for direct help from the futures exchanges and Chinese 
academic institutes ended up with very limited success -I was never formally 
received by the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences, and I never got a reply for my 
letter to the research department of exchange P. In the first three months of fieldwork, 
I had discussions with people through infom1al channels from personal 
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acquaintances and industry conferences, but never managed to get official interviews 
or visits arranged by a local institution. At first a regional university in finance and 
economics in city P had kindly offered accommodation and other support for two 
months in summer 2005. However, within days of my arrival, on request after I 
submitted my curriculum vitae to their international office, the host institute seemed 
to decide that the previously mentioned research support concerning futures 
exchange P was to be silently withdrawn. 19 Later on I found out from other field 
subjects the reason why I was not trusted: on my cun-iculum vitae, I did not hide the 
fact that I had worked as a Hong Kong newspaper journalist for seven years. Some 
people in exchange P suspected that I was a "commercial spy". With the amount of 
time and effo1t I spent, they never believed that my purpose was purely academic. As 
I had nothing substantial to offer, they were unwilling to take up potential political 
risks from an unknown outsider. There was one small episode that illustrated my 
relationship with exchange P. On the last evening of my stay in ci ty P, I attended a 
banquet for around 40 people as part of a five-day futures training course. To my 
surprise, a department head from exchange P took the initiative to sit next to me for 
dinner. She skilfully "appointed" me to toast on behalf of our table- which implied a 
considerable amount of alcohol intake, as most of my toasting counterparts were 
lofty men from the food and oils sector. After three rounds of heavy toasting, she 
smiled and asked me in a gentle voice, "Where do you come from, what are you 
actually doing here?'' Mellow but not drunk, I replied honestly, " I am trying to write 
a thesis. I want to get a PhD degree." She did not seem to be convinced. 
Fortunately, bottom-up access from industry conferences and training courses 
turned out to be very fruitful. In 2005 there were a variety of conferences and 
training activities organized by the China Futures Association, the three futures 
exchanges, the futures brokerage firms, and the media organizations, with themes 
19 I am still grateful to this university for providing me with safe and clean accommodation at a 
reasonable cost. 
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ranging from options on futures, risk management in the futures industry, and risks in 
the general financial industry Uointly organized with the banking sector). Most of 
these activities did not impose entry barriers on my identity. When I explained that I 
was a postgraduate student from the University of Edinburgh trying to learn about 
the commodity futures markets of China, most of these conferences readily accepted 
me as a participant, as long as I was able to pay a registration fee ranging from 300 to 
800 yuan (£20 to £52). My first contact with the field subjects was a two-day 
workshop in Beijing, where I saw on the website of the China Futures Association 
that they were jointly organising the workshop with one of the futures exchanges. 
Without much difficulty I registered for the event, booked my flights and hotel room 
for one week in Beijing, and booked for another two months of accommodation in 
the aforementioned university of city P afterwards. An odyssey of seven months in 
the futures circles of China started. (Afterwards I had also taken part in three other 
open industry conferences held in Beijing and Shenzhen.) 
The industry conference setting was an excellent starting point to gain access 
to the field. The 20,000 industry practitioners were a niche community 
geographically dispersed over the whole country. Unlike the stock people of 
Shanghai in 1992 (Hertz 1998), the futures people in 2005 could not be met in 
groups on the streets of Shanghai, Dalian or Zhengzhou. Conferences were good 
converging hubs to meet them, because these were occasions where the researcher 
could meet a mix of representatives from the public and private sectors, from 
different geographical regions, as well as brokers, traders and analysts specialising in 
different futures products. Better still, conference participants were a sample who 
were relatively keen to do networking, and curious to learn about new things around 
them. Under the conference setting, the researcher had ample opportunities to 
exchange business cards and initiate chats with other participants during tea breaks, 
over lunch, or after conference sessions. I got to know most of my 36 interviewees 
(see Appendix 1) in these conferences, including people working in futures 
exchanges, futures companies, industry associations, foreign banks, local journalists, 
and researchers in state statistic bureaus. Amongst all the interviewees, there were 
three particularly important "gatekeepers" (Whyte 1955) who gave me invaluable 
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help to make this research possible: Alpha, Beta and Gamma (pseudonyms). Each of 
them had widened my field access to a different dimension. 
Alpha had not completed her high school studies. but she was a smart person 
who relied on her sharp intuitions, strong will and flexible social skills to survive in 
the markets in two decades of economic transitions. She had worked in the futures 
industry as a floor representative on three different exchanges, as part of a corner 
trading team in the late 1990s, and as a risk control officer in a futures company in 
2005. r never figured out exactly why Alpha took interest in me. As an extrove11 
good at exploring new opportunities but never got a chance to travel outside the 
country, perhaps she was curious about my overseas and Hong Kong affiliations; 
perhaps she found me fun to chat with, or perhaps she was sympathetic about my 
odyssey status due to her own drifting life. Nonetheless in summer 2005, Alpha 
treated me as a friend and phoned me up from time to time. She was an energetic 
woman, often starting a phone call by telling me with zeal what was happening in the 
industry: market movements, new policies, upcoming conferences, and rumours 
about novel futures products. Sometimes she was in a nostalgic mood, and enjoyed 
telling me stories about her exciting past. During those months both of us roamed 
from cities to cities, and when we were in the same town we would meet up for 
meals and chats. I had learned a lot about the futures industry from her insider 
perspect ives. Although I could hardly get any formal access to exchange P, it was 
Alpha who used her personal connections at the lower levels to help me gain 
alternative, informal access. I was introduced as "a good friend of Alpha" to a group 
of red jackets working on the trading floor of exchange P, therefore received as a 
friend to have lunch with them for several times; some of them accepted my 
invitation to conduct follow-up interviews, and some of them were able to walk me 
around different sections of the exchange. Alpha was also able to persuade somebody 
working within the exchange to allow me some low level access. In late 2004 to mid 
2005, the exchange was running a mass education and marketing program called 
"Thousand Villages, Ten-thousand Doors" (-=ftfm.Fil~), which was a series of 
two-day workshops to promote introductory knowledge and the use of commodity 
futures amongst farmers, food and oils companies, grass-root state cadres, and 
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trading companies. The large-scale project involved nearly 1000 classes, each having 
40-60 participants. Owing to the help of Alpha, I was allowed to sit in these classes 
as a marginal member (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983:1 00), to conduct participant 
observation as many times as I liked. This gave me an invaluable opportunity to 
observe how members of the public (people outside the futures circles) reacted to the 
futures markets, and what kind of messages exchange P was trying to convey to the 
public. As I was never treated as a guest myself, this gave me more freedom to 
observe and move around from a more spontaneous, bottom-up perspective. 
Beta was a senior member of staff working at exchange Q. He was someone 
whose English skills had reached fluent level, and he was frequently dealing with 
overseas collaborates in the futures industry. He was also actively engaged in writing 
academic papers and some translation work. By June 2005 when I met Beta for the 
second time in Beijing, I was already certain that it was impossible for me to get an 
internship from exchange P. As an alternative attempt I asked Beta if he would 
accept me to work in exchange Q as a summer intern, and he said yes - I got an 
internship for one month. I was lucky because in summer 2005, China's futures 
industry was not yet officially open to foreign markets or foreign companies. Unlike 
the banking sector, English was never an essential criterion in recruitment; in city Q 
it was even more difficult to recruit people who could use English at a proficient 
level.20 Beta found that my language skills could be of some use, and in August 2005 
I became one of the junior assistants working at exchange Q- I got a large volume of 
translation tasks on trading rules, edited books, abstracts for research papers, press 
releases, invitation letters, notices, and speeches. Sometimes when foreign guests 
visited the exchange, I bad the opportunity to attend meetings, tours and banquets as 
a junior assistant. The internship was an invaluable ethnographic experience that 
20 The researcher is a competent translator and interpreter between Chinese and English. She has 
worked for two years fulltime translating international news in a Hong Kong daily newspaper, and 
two years pa1t-time in Scotland for the NI-lS, city councils, the Sheriff Court, the Crimina! Justice 
Department, and some whisky distilleries. 
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allowed me to explore the research department, meetings, the canteen, the trading 
floor, and the organisation culture of the exchange from the identity as a marginal 
member of staff. 
Gamma was a deputy general manager of a medium-sized fu tures company in 
Beijing, and one of the first few futures people I encountered on my first industry 
conference. As someone who has received higher education and working at the 
management level, compared with Alpha, Gamma could analyse the futures markets 
from a more comprehensive perspective from industry structure, policy changes, and 
macro market environment of China and abroad. On the second day of my fieldwork, 
Gamma gave me a long interview for four hours, which gave me a good foundation 
about the market environment. Through the referral of Gamma, I got another 
internship at a futures brokerage firm in Beijing for two and a half months. There I 
could learn more about the life in a futures company and the electronic trading 
interface; I also got to know more analysts, traders and chartists there. 
Before I started my fieldwork, I had prepared a document from the University 
of Edinburgh with my supervisor's references and signature, to prove my identity 
and the institutional background of my research if the need arises. The only instance 
that this document was inspected was when I was asking for an interview from a 
member of staff of exchange P. The document was inspected due to suspicion, and 
after examining it the attitude of my field subject did not change. On the contrary in 
situations where I was trusted, such as among the red jackets of exchange P, or 
during the internships in exchange Q and the Beij ing futures company, my field 
subjects never asked for my identification or documents. I asked my supervisor at the 
Beijing futures company why he never asked for my ID, and he replied, "You were 
referred by Gamma. That is good enough." In the markets, trust and discretion were 
established upon a system of personal ties, reputation and favours; far less upon 
written institutional documents and certificates. 
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4.2 Training 
A second problem from the insider/outsider boundary is, without undergoing the full 
training and socialisation process of insiders, is the researcher competent (Merton 
1972:20, Hammersley & Atkinson 1983:81) to understand the ongoing activities in 
the futures markets? Before setting out for fieldwork, the researcher had read 
fmancial textbooks such as Hull (2000), Telser (2000), materials such as Fallon 
( 1998), Yao (1998), CSRC (2004 ), DCE (2003 ), and newspaper articles to 
understand some basics of commodity futures and exchanges. After the start of 
fieldwork, the learning process continued as the researcher tried to read what the 
"locals" were reading: the Futures Daily, the Hexun futures portal 
(http://futures.hexun.comD, news delivered on the Webstock trading interface, and 
books such as Murphy (1994), China Futures Association (2007a and 2007b), Liu 
and Yan (1999), Xu (2004). 
As China' s modern futures markets only had a short history of 13 years (as in 
2005) and the market had a very limited variety in asset types and number of 
products, the range of professional knowledge varied widely amongst industry 
practitioners. Some senior analysts in leading futures companies, as well as the 
members of staff working in the research departments of the futures exchanges had a 
strong foundation of professional knowledge - some had doctorate degrees from 
China or abroad in finance and economics, some had working experience in foreign 
markets, and many were equipped with good knowledge of a full range of financial 
derivatives not yet allowed to be traded in China in 2005. However on the lower tiers, 
formal training was sometimes nearly absent. A young financial journalist 
specialized in futures reporting told me that, throughout his four-year undergraduate 
progran1me in economics in a good university in Beijing, there were only two pages 
of notes covering the topic of futures. Most of the time he had to learn everything 
from scratch in an ad hoc manner. Professional know-how was often circulated as a 
mixture oftips, heuristics, theories, rules of thumb, chartism graphics, folk 
knowledge, examination textbooks, and popular novels of market legends. The 
immersion in these materials was part of the ethnography, as well as part of the 
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training process that made the researcher a competent marginal member of the 
community. 
During the stay in city P in July 2005, I had enrolled in an intensive fi ve-day 
futures training course at a basic-to-inteimediate level. The course was jointly 
organised by exchange P and the information software company Webstock, with 
classes conducted by ten experienced traders, analysts. and staff members of 
exchange P. The course took place at a training facility owned by a state-owned 
energy enterpri se. Course topics included the basics of commodity futures, 
fundamental analysis, technical analysis, the commodity futures exchange, delivery, 
risk management, and trad ing heuristics. The course also included visiting tours to 
the trading floor of exchange P, as well as a designated delivery warehouse at 
Beiliang Port (~t~1{S). On the last day there was a hands-on session of simulation 
trading. and a banquet dinner offered by exchange P; all participants received a 
completion certificate. There were 30 students on the training course. 25 of them 
were managers from food and oi ls, animal feed, trading, or port logistics companies. 
The other four were retail investors, including a veteran soldier and a housewife. 
There were 20 males and 10 females. Participants came from dispersed geographical 
areas: P[7] , Q[2] , R[3],2 1 Heilongjiang[5], Jilin[2], Shandong[2], Inner Mongolia[2] , 
Jiangsu[l] , Jiangxi[l] , Sichuan[l ], Shaanxi[I] , Shenzhen(l], and Hong Kong[I , me]. 
Many food and oils company managers were males in their late forties or early fifties. 
We also had two fresh graduates who worked as young analysts in Shanghai, and a 
young lady who was the heir of a rich and politically influential family. Besides 
receiving the local version of futures training myself, the course was a good 
opportunity of participant-observation. Although the sample of fie ld subjects there 
were not a random sample fully representative of the overall markets, its demography 
reflected the heterogeneous make-up ofthe commodity futures markets in 2005. 
2 1 P, Q, Rare where the three futures exchanges were. 
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4.3 Disciplinary boundaries 
There is tension between the versions of knowledge in finance I economics and 
sociology I anthropology. Occasionally when some field subjects knew that I was 
doing a doctorate degree in a UK university "about futures", they expected that I 
should know a lot about quantitative finance and macroeconomics. To ease my 
embarrassment, sometimes I would tell them that I was studying "sociology of 
markets", which is "something similar to behavioural finance". That was a pragmatic 
answer that I could think of. 
The field subjects and the researcher had different frames of reference in 
terms of concepts, foci of interest, and symbols. For example in the Beijing futures 
company when I was trying to summarize the price movement of soybean futures in 
a morning, I was imitating the information sources, tones, terminology, and concerns 
of my field subjects. At the same time as an ethnographer, I was also aware of issues 
such as the collection, processing and propagation of information along specialized 
channels. Ifl fai led to understand the language of the locals, she could not 
understand what was going on. On the other hand if my viewpoints were totally 
"localized" (equivalent to an abductive research strategy, Blaikie 2000: Ch 4) with 
the analysts and traders, I might miss the initial objectives set out by the research 
topic. The challenge was to maintain a dual frame of reference, where the role of the 
researcher was more like a "mediator of languages" and a "dialogic faci litator" 
(Blaikie 2000:52). 
4.4 Orienta/ism 
This research originates from a theoretical standpoint of"social studies of finance" in 
a British University, while the target of study was China's futures industry. As a 
Sino-British cultural frontier is involved, the issue of orientalism (Said 1985) 
deserves some discussion here. Edward Said used the term orientalism to question 
how Asia has been studied, discussed, represented, and imagined by Eurocentric 
67 
Chapter 4 Methodology 4 January 2008 
discourses. The discourses were "a grid filtering the Orient into Western 
conciousness'' (Gran 1980) that was gradually accumulated over the 18th and 19th 
centuries, during an era when Europe had strong colonial and imperial interests in 
Asia. Most of the time Said referred to examples from the Middle East, but the Near 
East and the Far East were in a comparable position. Through this cognitive grid, 
Europeans see the Orient as a backward, docile and exotic land, carrying ethnic 
cultures and natural resources, awaiting the exploration and di scovery by the "more 
advanced" European civilizations. Said employed Michel Foucault's concept of"the 
Other" to p01tray this cultural projection: "the Orient is anyth ing that the Occident is 
not." By creating polarized cultural attributes, the Occident was actually establishing 
its own identity by talking about the Orient on the opposite end of the polarized 
cultural axis. This projected image of the Orient is a mixture of romantic imagination 
and hegemonic control; it was also a distorted picture from how Asians actually lived 
and worked on their own land. 
Asian Studies as a body of knowledge in western societies has its heritage 
from an older version that is closely associated with orientalism. While it was not 
practical to discard the whole body of knowledge solely due to issues of orientalism, 
it will certainly be helpful ifthe modem researcher is aware of potential problems. 
Area research from a western university should not be a hegemonic discourse that 
objectifies its fie ld subjects, pushing them to a status dispossessed of their own voice. 
When conducting market comparisons, are such comparisons done in a manner to 
achieve exploitation, control and wealth redistribution? The researcher should be 
aware that in the 21st century, such control is not necessarily imposed in the old form 
of political and military control. Such discourses are more likely to appear in a liberal 
economic front , for example, in the name of free market economy and globalisation. 
Since oriental ism resides in a body of knowledge over a prolonged period of time, its 
influence has diffused across racial, disciplinary and geographical boundaries. Both 
European and Asian researchers in modem times are prone to see society through 
this filtering grid (Gran 1980), regardless of the researcher's race and cultural origins. 
Being Asian does not necessarily exempt the researcher from its influence. 
68 
Chapter 4 Methodology 4 January 2008 
The researcher should be sensitive to questions like, are market attributes 
represented on a simplistic and polarized axis, exaggerating the Occident-Orient 
contrast?22 Is ethnography conducted in the form of "research tourism", only 
highlighting the exotic elements of the indigenous area that is different from the 
researcher's own environment, without addressing to more core issues ofthe 
research? When applying westem theoretical framework on Asian cases, attention 
should be drawn to the local context and the country's economic history. For 
example, Alkrich' s concept of technology transfer (Alkrich 1992) can be applied to 
China's introduction of futures markets from the Chicago model; but futures markets 
in China also had their own line of history from the Qing dynasty in the late 1800s, 
through communist times to post-communist times (see Chapter 3). The local context 
should not be totally ignored. Last but not least, the version of knowledge derived 
from research work should be compatible, and not distorted, from the factual reality 
how field subjects live and work in the markets. Kapp (1980) mentioned a test that 
could show whether the researcher is weaving some knowledge that purely exists in 
her orientalist imagination. If the research report is translated into the local language 
and read by the field subjects, at least the findings should be factually acceptable to 
the locals. It should not be a fabrication that is constructed solely to appease a 
western academic audience, with little substance that represents the actual market 
and people being studied. To carry out the test, the researcher intends to draw part of 
this submitted thesis and submit to some academic journals in Chinese. 
22 Examples of polarized, exaggerated attributes: Marcel Mauss ( 1954) portrayed gift economies in 
village societies (e.g. Melanesian societies) and commodity economies in western societies as two 
dualistic forms (Arkush 1997); Fei ( 1948) described differential mode of association as a "Chinese" 
property, while the organisational mode of association as a "western" attribute (see Chapter 2). 
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4.5 Cultural essentialism 
Another problem that arises from the Sino-European boundary was cultural 
essentialism. During fieldwork I often came across the discourse of ·'Chinese 
characteristics·· (Zhongguo l ese cp~~1S) and '·China factor'' (Zhongguo yinsu r:p~ 
~*). When the Financial Times writes about "China factor", the term basically 
refers to how the supply, demand, or capital flow factors associated with China exert 
influences on global market conditions such as freight derivatives, commodity prices, 
and stock prices (see Oakley 2007, Chung 2007, Bergsten 2006). In its simplest 
meaning, "China factor" recognizes the existence of local factors, which can differ 
from the overall global conditions. 
When used by domestic futures people, I found the term "Chinese 
characteristics" bundled with a mixture of ambiguous meanings that deserve some 
clarifications here. Sometimes the market people used the phrase "constructing 
futures markets with Chinese characteristics" (~~~rrm¥-t-ES!i9~UlC1:rn~) to 
express nationalistic sentiments and resentment against foreign imperialism. On 
private discussions, some field subjects related their attitude to the economic history 
of 1870-1945 (when domestic markets were heavily controlled by colonial powers, 
see chapter 3), or the hegemonic control of Third World economies by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in recent decades - from a perspective of 
political economy, this was a valid precaution grounded upon issues of power and 
national interests. The discourse could also be entangled with official political 
propaganda, as the verbatim was adopted from former state leader Deng Xiaoping's 
political directive in 1982: "to construct socialism with Chinese characteristics". In 
speeches in industry conferences, the phrase "construction of futures markets with 
Chinese characteristics" could be read as a supportive statement towards the state's 
economic directives. 
"Chinese characteristics" can also have a third meaning related to cultural 
essentialism - that Chinese markets are essentially different from markets elsewhere. 
Some field subjects adopted a strong form of essential ism and believed that it was 
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impossible for any foreigners to gain genuine understanding of China's markets. 
Some field subjects emphasized that "Chinese characteristics" and "situations of the 
country" (guoqing ~·I~) were beyond the grasp of outsiders. Only Chinese, by virtue 
of our ascribed identity, have the rights to claim for better understanding about 
Chinese markets. The first two meanings of "Chinese characteristics" are 
understandable in their respective context, but this third meaning is a problematic 
attitude that deters communication and understanding about markets. Merton ( 1972) 
has made a clear argument why such claims should not stand any for social groups in 
general. While outsiders are likely to be hindered by cultural gaps and foci of vested 
interests, it was also likely for insiders to be influenced by biases such as a myopic 
perspectives (ibid: 44), or the aggrandizement effect- that is, overestimating the 
prestige of one's own social group (ibid: 17; Caplow 1964: 213-216). Given enough 
training, exposure and insights, competent knowledge is attainable by both insiders 
and outsiders.23 "Chinese characteristics" indeed exist for Chinese markets, just like 
Russian, Indonesian, Italian, American, and French characteristics exist in the 
respective markets. Nonetheless local characteristics should still be eligible to the 
analysis, discussion, comparison and understanding by insiders and outsiders alike. 
In fact, fuller understanding is more likely to arise from the synthesis of the 
perspectives of both insiders and outsiders (Merton 1972: 36-44). The researcher is 
aware that, being racially Chinese does not guarantee a better understanding of 
Chinese markets. In the light of the diasporic paradigm when multiple Chinese 
markets (mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and overseas Chinese) 
are taken into account, what constitutes "Chineseness" is constantly shifting and 
drifting (Ang 1998). It is impossible to obtain a single orthodox definition of 
"Chinese characteristics" of "Chinese markets" based on cultural essentialism. 
23 During fieldwork, I had come across some foreign investment bankers who showed exceptional 
understanding about the commodity futures markets of China. 
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4.6 On the Margin: Hong Kong Identity 
On top of the Sino-British boundary issues discussed above, the researcher·s identity 
as someone born and brought up in Hong Kong introduced both convenience and 
disadvantages to tnis project. At the first instance, access to formal institutions 
seemed to be more difficult because I was never received as an academic from 
"overseas". After more than three decades of close interactions with Hong Kong and 
the city's handover back to China in 1997, mainlanders were no longer curious about 
I-l ong Kong people. Worse still, I was only a postgraduate student without any 
academic position or titles; hence I never got official receptions, briefings or 
arranged visits as an " international guest". As described in the Access section, I had 
to figure out how to improvise other access channels to the field by informal, bottom-
up ways. 
A Hong Kong identity had some merits for an ethnographer. I was entitled to 
travel in mainland China without having to apply for a visa. Unlike foreigners 
(especially whites) who could still attract a lot of attention and excitement in small 
and medium cities, the locals were far less conscious about my presence, and far less 
curious about what [ was doing. If I did not expose my southern accent, I could 
"blend in" amongst crowds, industry meetings and office settings (Hammersley & 
Atkinson 200 I :78-83), minimizing the an1ount of disruption (Hughes et al, 1994) and 
alarms. 
While I did not get the honourable treatment as a special guest, usually I was 
not cosily trusted as a real local either. There were remarkable differences between 
my field environments and Hong Kong ranging from spoken dialects, Mandarin 
accent, systems of written Chinese characters, Chinese keyboard input methods,24 
24 Mainland China has switched to a system of simplified Chinese characters since the 1950s, while 
Hong Kong is sti ll using traditional Chinese characters. Most Chinese typists in mainland China used 
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food and diet, to more subtle differences in social life and values- such as how to 
stand in a queue or how to use traffic lights. In the far north, the accent differed so 
much that I had been mistaken as a Korean for multiple times, and one colleague in 
the Beijing futures company who had never come across my keyboard input method 
thought that I could not type or write in Chinese. These differences may seem small 
compared with those faced by European ethnographers in China. Yet they were 
significant enough to give me a position where I could neither enjoy the benefits of a 
foreigner, nor the benefits of a "real" local - as compared with other interns who 
came from the local city. It was an identity that was grossly on the "inside" of the 
nation, yet never fully localized throughout my period of stay. During fieldwork, the 
intermediate status between insider and outsider was never a comfortable or relaxing 
position to be in; in self-taunt it is like the "valley of death" in marketing, where a 
product with bad market positioning strategy is unlikely to sell well. Nonetheless, 
looking back with hindsight, my peculiar position between insiders and outsiders was 
actually an ideal one to keep a balance between understanding the insiders' 
perspectives, and maintaining a reflective sensitivity to make enquiries about existing 
practices in the field. 
4. 7 Triangulation 
The data of this research is triangulated from ethnographic fieldwork of two 
internships, participant observation of four industry training courses I seminars, three 
industry conferences, 33 semi-structured interviews, and documentary analysis of 
industry publications. For a list of events and interviews, see Appendix 1. 
a keyboard input method based on alphabetical phonetics, while I type with the Taiwanese "Changjie" 
(~j!Jl) input system based on character strokes, which was not installed at my internship offices. 
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Ethnography: internships 
Ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in the form of internships at exchange Q and 
a futures company in Beijing. The researcher went to work in an office setting at 
normal working hours, and was immersed in the industry environment. By 
interacting with colleagues and taking up some work at the junior level, I had the 
opportunity to understand the futures people's nature of work, group interactions, 
identities, values, lifestyle, employed tools, code of dress, and etiquette in the 
profession in details. Field notes were recorded as early as possible on hardback 
fieldwork diary in chronological order, which were later on deve loped into actual 
chapters of the thesis. In addition to the text-based fieldwork diary, alternative forms 
of data such as photographs, floor plans, market charts and conference materials such 
as cartoons provided additional information (Payne 1996) about the markets. The 
ethnographic data was strong from the perspectives of institutions, culture and 
organizations. It was weaker in terms of the actual actions of trading, because from 
the physical sites of internship locations I could hardly observe how the actual 
trading took place. Nonetheless, up till now there are fewer than ten studies in the 
field of social studies of finance that have employed some form of market 
ethnography. This study will contribute to the field by providing scarce ethnographic 
field data. 
Participant observation: training courses and conferences 
Internships allowed in-depth interactions and understanding over a longer period of 
time, but they were constrained in terms of the scope of reach. The problem of 
representation could be partly complemented by conducting participant observation 
in industry conferences and training courses, because in these industry events a high 
volume of human interactions, information exchange and social networking took 
place within a condensed period oftime and physical location. By attending industry 
conferences, the researcher was able to grasp a wider scope of industry agenda, and 
be exposed to a wider circle of industry figures. As discussed in previous sections, 
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these events were the primary source of access channels and training opportunities 
for this research. 
Semi-structured interviews 
36 interviews were conducted in May - Dec 2005 in six cities: P, Q, Beijing, Tianjin, 
Hong Kong, and Shenzhen. As shown in Appendix 1, the interviewees included the 
following field subjects: members of staff of futures exchanges, futures brokers, 
futures analysts, futures traders, trading floor representatives, chartists, financial 
journalists, people working in the food and oils sector, representatives of an 
information and software company, member of staff of the industry association, and 
academics. Depending on their roles in the industry, the interviews were semi-
structured around the interviewees' personal career history, their knowledge about 
the markets, and their opinions about the industry. An interview lasted from 20 
minutes to 4 hours. Interview data were recorded as shorthand notes in steno 
notebooks, and some of them, when possible, were digitaLly recorded. The interview 
records were quoted in the later chapters. 
Documentary analysis 
Amongst various documentary data used in this study, the use of two "documentary 
fictions" about China's futures markets needs some discussion. Who is the 
Sweepstaker (Xu 2004) was written by a female futures broker based on stories 
surrounding the Suzhou futures markets,25 while The Epoch of China's Futures 
Markets (Liu and Yan 1999) was based on interviews with key persons surrounding 
the Zhengzhou markets. As fictions, the events and characters referred by these 
books were a mjxture of real and fabricated components, and they should not be 
taken literally as ethnographic field records for the purpose of academic research. 
However, the two books illustrated in great details how aggregates of dahu (big 
25 Closed down in 1998. 
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players) manipulated the futures markets in the 1990s, and some of my field subjects 
verified that they were accurate illustrations of the generic market environment 
during the 1990s. Another perspective to read the two books is that. the books were 
circulating in China·s futures markets as part of the discourse to construct a 
professional identity.26 While the authors may have introduced political, professional 
and personal standpoints in their narrations, such books were part of the discourse 
that futures practitioners in China perceived themselves and what the markets were 
about. The data complemented an earlier period of time before this research was 
conducted, and provided details about sensitive events (e.g. comer events) which was 
difficult fo r the researcher to witness. 
Other documentary data used in this study include government reports, 
analyst reports, training course materials, the Futures Daily, Hexun.com.cn and other 
Chinese futures websites, newsfeed from the Webstock software, and publications 
from futures exchanges, brokerage firms and live feed information providers. A 
number of useful reference items on the history and contextual background of 
China's futures markets (see chapter 3) were accessed from the Chinese academic 
journal portal Wanfang Suju G~:1JJ)(!Jit http://www.ilib.cn/), and by visiting the 
main library of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
4.8 Ethical issues 
Informed consent 
During seven months of fieldwork, the researcher was in contact with hundreds of 
field subjects. From a perspective of social science research ethics, it would be ideal 
to communicate with every field subject about the "purpose, methods and intended 
26 The books were introduced to me by colleagues during an internship, as well as by classmates on 
the five-day futures training course in city P. 
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uses" (Kent et al. 2002) of this research, so as not to constitute an element of 
deception (Babbie 1995). In reality, informed consent could only be sought within 
the limits of practical feasibility- for example, in a two-day conference with over 
400 participants, it was impossible to attain a high level of informed consent. For 
close and direct contacts such as gatekeepers, co-workers in the same unit, and most 
of the interviewees, I disclosed that I was a social science postgraduate student from 
the University of Edinburgh, who was trying to learn about the futures markets of 
China by diaoyan (~fiff, a generic term for social science research), and I was going 
to write a doctoral thesis about this. For those who were interested, I communicated 
more about my research questions and methodology. Usually I used the word 
diaoyan instead of "ethnography", because diaoyan was widely understood by the 
public. The term ethnography was used for those who had academic background. For 
casual and transient contacts (such as fellow attendees in a conference), or in 
situations where I would like to avoid causing alarms (such as the introductory 
futures classes for farmers and rural cadres), I had only explained that I was a 
postgraduate student who was studying the futures markets of China Since many of 
the field subjects were unaware of the data collection process, the researcher could 
cause harm if the subjects are embarrassed by the data at a later stage, or if the data 
lead to institutional sanctions. Potential damage could be reduced by carefully 
anonymizing the subjects in theses, papers and presentations. 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
To preserve the privacy, confidentiality and goodwill offield subjects, the names of 
individual persons and organisations had been anonymised. Not only names were 
concealed, but some details that lead to identifying the field subjects and their 
institutions (such as places and physical features) were also altered. The purpose is to 
give a generic and genuine portrayal of the commodity futures markets in China, 
without causing pressure or sanctions to particular field subjects. Meanwhile in order 
to protect the gatekeepers, the researcher has applied for restriction of access of this 
thesis from the university library. 
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Controversial practices 
Chapter 6 records the market making system of exchange Q, which lies in a 
controversial grey area without getting formal approval or disapproval from the 
regulatory body. There is a dilemma between wi thholding the materials from the 
thesis to protect the confidentiality and goodwill of the organisation, and to provide 
an honest record for the interest of the markets and a wider society. A compromise is 
made in this thesis: the name of the organisation and relevant parties were 
anonymised, but the practice was recorded, so as to illustrate the properties of 
network-based rationality in the field . 
4.9 Issues of health and safety 
For the second internship in Beijing, I was offered accommodation in the company's 
staff quarters, sharing an apartment with two male colleagues. For the sake of 
ethnography it was a good opportunity to inte ract with housemates and learn more 
about the lives of futures people. However, being exposed to field subjects 24 hours 
a day without any space of retreat could also cause considerable amount of stress. 
The flat was very dusty and filled with heaps of old computers and old clothing, 
which were beyond my cleaning abilities. After living there for three weeks (21 Sep 
to 11 Oct), I was suffering from allergic rhinitis, and found myself sneezing non-stop 
for four to six hours every day in the morning. Eventua ll y l decided to move out 
from the apartment and rented a private apartment instead. Although exposure to the 
field had been reduced, there were moments that the researcher simply had to admit 
one's own physical and psychological limitations. For prolonged periods of 
ethnographic fieldwork, to work in a sustainable way, issues of health and safety also 
have to be addressed. 
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Chapter 5 
Cadres: State Structures in the Markets 
5. 1 A Vertical Hierarchy 
Stepping into the futures markets of China in 2005, one could quickly identify four 
sectors: state regulatory officials, foreigners (industry counterparts and bankers), the 
brokerage firms, and investors. There was a clear sense of hierarchy according to the 
above order. In one industry conference I attended in Beijing, the four sectors were 
banded by seating plans and colour badges into groups A, B, C and D, where the first 
two groups got the premium seats. The order was usually observed when speakers 
addressed their audiences in speeches; when the media presented their news 
headlines; and when contributors' articles appeared in publications?7 A field subject 
from the Futures Industry Association of China once explained to me, "It took us a 
few years to get our market structure right - the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission) guans (~;' governs) the three exchanges; the three exchanges (and we 
the association to a certain extent) guan members of the exchanges; the member 
firms guan their clients." 
27 Foreigners might be placed before or after exchange staff, depending on company size and 
reputation. 
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Fig 5.1 : How brokers a nd industry associations of China's futures 





Fig 5.2: How the Hong Kong Stock Exchange presented their market 





Chapter 5 Cadres: State Structures in the Markets 4 January 2008 
While staff members from industry associations presented this vertical line of power 
and governance (see Fig 5.1) as an achievement,28 the same hierarchy could be 
observed in Exchange P from the organization of material space, income 
distributions, and the perception of identities. Walking around the building of 
Exchange P, one could quickly sense an air of status division embodied in the 
physical space. The building had two wings stretching in an arc running east and 
west from a central foyer (Fig 5.3). G/F and the foyers were open for public access. 
The rest was segregated into the lower floors (basement, 1/F, 2/F east wing) for 
around 300 red jackets of the member firms, and the upper floors (2/F west wing, 3/F) 
for 140 staff members of the exchange. On the lower floors, a typical red jacket who 
worked on the 1/F trading floor earned around RMB 800 - 1,400 (£53-93) a month. 
Her local manager, who might come to the 2/F east wing offices from time to time, 
earned around RMB 2500 - 8000 (£167- 533) a month. On the upper floors, a mid-
level exchange staff member working in marketing or research earned around RMB 
15,000-40,000 (£1 ,000-2,667) a month. Most of the time the two sectors worked is 
separate space/9 ate separately/0 used separate lavatories, and there was an immense 
social distance between them. The red jackets would have lunch at the basement fast 
28 Exchanges and regu lators in Hong Kong (e.g. in the finance and telecom industries) usually present 
their "market structure diagrams" with private firms occupying a central space where competition 
took place (Fig 5.2). The public and quasi public institutions tended to draw their own organizations 
modestly on the side, indicating that their job was to provide regulation and supporting infrastructure . 
They would use words like "partnersh ip" , "cooperation" "support", or "check and balance" on the 
public-private interface. As Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Chinese faction of Singaporean markets 
were Chinese societies with market perception different from Fig 5.1, I would argue against the 
cultural essentialist opinions that Fig 5.1 was " unique characteristic of Chinese markets" . 
29 They still got in touch and worked together in issues like margin maintainence, clearing and 
delivery. 
30 In the 1990s the red j ackets could also eat in the same canteen as the staff members ofthe exchange. 
The separation took place around the time when electronic trading took over the trading floor. More 
details in Chapter 8. 
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food shop, or order takeaway lunch boxes from nearby fast food shops. On the 
contrary, the exchange staff had an upper floor canteen which was out of bounds for 
most of the members, where the exchange staff was served with meals designed by 
dieticians. The social distance between the exchange staff and prominent brokerage 
firms' managers might be narrower than that of the red jackets, nonetheless the gap 
in social status still existed. 
Fig 5.3: G/ F foyer of Exchange P 
Occasionally J joined several red jackets for lunch in the basement canteen, and 
walked around the members' reading room and office area on 3/F east wing during 
lunch hours ( II :30am-l :30pm). It was an area where brokers, clients and red jackets 
hanged around, had chats, smoked, read newspapers, and took their afternoon naps. 
Once J asked a few red jackets: 
Siu: What is the job of the huangmajias (yellow jackets) on the trading floor? 
Red jacket: They are there to guan (govern over) us . 
... Red jacket (when asked if they could pick their own seats): No, the huangmajias 
won't allow that! Our locations are assigned by seat numbers. 
In the Chicago exchanges, members of the exchange like dealers and traders 
had higher status than the exchange staff. When the two came across each other, say 
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in the washrooms, members might not bother to speak to the exchange staff. Yet it 
was the opposite way round in China 's futures markets; the red jackets seemed to 
readily submit to the authority of the yellow jackets and other members of the 
exchange staff. I mentioned the Chicago piece to some red jackets, and they were 
pretty much bemused by the contrast. One red jacket said, "That's not too surprising. 
Officials in America are there to provide services (ij&~,fuwu); officials in China are 
here to govern(~, guan)." 
The jobs of the red jackets were experiencing a rapid decline in status in the 
2000s, due to the onset of electronic trading (see chapter 8). Yet the vocational shift 
(linked with technology and gender) could not account for all the differences in 
status. The public and quasi-public sectors in the Chinese markets seemed to possess 
extra forms of power lacked by their American counterparts. 
5.2 The Quasi-Public Layer 
Before we examine the origin of power of the Chinese futures exchanges, let us 
investigate the nature of ownershjp: who owned the three futures exchanges, were 
they public or private? Most field subjects knew that the exchanges operated upon 
cooperative membersrup (Wr ~*U, huiyuanzhi), where the members, namely the 
futw·es companies, were supposed to owe the exchange. Yet even experienced 
traders and brokers could not give a definite answer to the public/private question. A 
staff member of an exchange confirmed to me that futures exchanges used to be 
state-owed enterprises (SOEs, ~*it~, guojia qiye) in the past. In 2005 the state 
clarified the new status of the futures exchanges as vocational units, which was a 
surprise to some brokers and traders. One broker exclaimed, "Probably they [the 
exchanges] had the highest capacity of profit-making amongst all vocational units in 
the country!" 
The term vocational units ($-~~f}Z, shiye danwei, pronounced as shi-yea-
dan-wei) refer to a range of social organizations that were neither state-owed 
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enterprises (SOEs, ~~:LE:~, guojia qiye), private enterprises (.BC~:il:~, minying 
qiye), nor non-government organizations (NGOs). They are institutions that provide 
public services, like hospitals, schools, utilities, agricultural supporting services, and 
news media.31 The termed has been translated in some international conferences as 
'·public service units", yet domestic scholars suggested that the translation was 
inadequate to illustrate their full properties. Vocational units can carry out one or 
more of the following functions: execute governance functions (e.g. hospitals 
actively enforcing state policies of birth control); provide community services; and 
engage in profit-making activities (Fan 2004). These three functions are often 
intermingled, and the weighting between governance, community service and profit-
making in an organisation can fluctuate. The mix depends on policy shifts and the 
organisation's sources of income.32 Arguably, there is no clear boundary between the 
roles of governance, service and profit making; the organisations possess integrated 
properties in the quasi-public, quasi-private space in the market. 
31 By the end of2005, China had 1.25 million shiye damveis with a total of over 30.35 million 
employees. Over half of the employees worked in the education sector, and the education, healthcare 
and agricultural service sectors altogether comprised over three quarters of the employees (Pang and 
Tang 2007). 
32 The assets of shiye danweis are legally considered as state assets. State bureaus often appoint state 
officials (~~~g~, guojiaganbu) onto leading personnel positions of shiye danweis. 
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Fig 5.4: A morning exercise session for the staff members of Exchange P 
One feature of Exchange P as a quasi-public organisation was their morning exercise 
(iU~, chenlian) session on a huge public square before Sam on every trading day. 
With the staff members dressed in smart white uniforms (Fig 5.4), they did some 
stretching and bending exercises for I 0 minutes. Then one of the staff members 
would take his turn to talk about his recent work, or share some personal reflections. 
Around 20 staff members would choose to walk the lkm walkway leading to the 
seaside and back. Others would return into the building, get changed, and prepare for 
the day's work. When I talked to some members of the exchange staff. they said that 
they cherished the healthy practice, as it helped them to ··keep tit and foster a 
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company culture".33 This ritual of morning exercise reminded me of the collective 
state enterprise culture from older communist times. Physical exercise on a daily 
basis on a communal setting was a typical example of bodily discipline (Foucault 
1980). It could serve to reinforce the members of staff of their identity, loyalty and 
responsibilities to the organization. Meanwhile the "sharing" sessions could help to 
foster common values like organizational goals, staff morale and mutual support. The 
practice suggested that, the organizational culture of Exchange P emphasized the 
collective side of the staff members' vocations. 
Another incident during my fieldwork internship revealed interesting 
properties of quasi-public institutions. In autumn 2005, the China Futures 
Association organised a series of career talks called "Grand Lectures on Futures" CWJ 
~j(~1it, qihuo dajiangtang) as a roadshow event around major universities in the 
country. On each career talk there were a couple ofkey industry figures to give an 
introduction; a few brokerage companies were there to distribute company brochures 
and answer questions from students. 
Fig 5.5 "Grand Lectures on Futures" in Beijing 
As a brokerage fum intern, one evening I attended one of those career talks. The 
lecture hall was jam-packed with hundreds of eager graduates-to-be (Fig 5.5). 
Without giving much thought to it, at first I understood my role as a junior intern as 
33 The morning exercise sessions of Exchange P seemed to be unique in the global markets. Exchange 
Q and Exchange R did not have such practice, and to the best of my knowledge, no similar 
arrangements had been recorded in other modern markets. 
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doing marketing, recruitment (competing for potential talents) and brand-building 
work for my brokerage fi rm, which was a private company. 1 also understood the 
association as promoting awareness and understanding about the industry amongst 
university students, which was a public service to the whole industry. I started 
hand ing out company pamphlets to all the students I could reach at the back of the 
hall. But the act turned out to be inappropriate- I was quickl y stopped by a member 
of staff from the association. Later on a colleague explained to me that my act was 
embarrassing. It was less to do with disturbing the event's logistics, but rather 
because I got the real purpose of that event wrong: 
XX [name of our brokerage company] is already a great brand. We don't really need 
to do any marketing among the students; the graduates will eagerly compete for our 
vacancies. We went there just to show our support and give face to the 
Association ... Why do they organise the talks? By now most employees currently 
working in the industry have already passed the qualification exams. The Association 
is trying to get more fresh graduates to sit for this year's exams, reaping more exam 
fees. 
Fig 5.6: Number of examinees sitting for China's futures industry 
professional qualifications exams 
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I apologised to both my colleague and the association's member of staff. The 
incident was very interesting for the ethnographer: in this case the quasi-public 
industry association got engaged in profit-making activities (earning fee income), 
while the private brokerage companies were there to provide supportive community 
service as a favour, and for free. It was an example that vocational units could 
fl exibly merge the roles of governance, service and profit-making. When their 
income was decreasing (see Fig 5.6), it was possible for them to give a higher 
priority to profit-making activities. It was also possible for the roles of service and 
profit-making to swap and overflow across the public and private sectors. When the 
quasi-public sector (with a higher hierarchical power position) chose to focus on 
profit-making activities, sometimes the non-profitable role of service could overflow 
to the private sector through the exchange of favours, i.e. "giving face". 
The nature of :flexible quasi-public, quasi-private organization creates both 
benefits and problems. Compared with some Eastern European countries which took 
up Shock Therapy (see King 2007), I suspect such elastic institutions in China could 
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provide extra flexibility to cope with potential crises in post-Communist market 
reforms.34 When faced with disruptions like inflation or shortage of supply, flexible 
organisations in China might be able to summon creative ways to generate their own 
income streams, or create alternative channels of supply and demand to become 
relatively self-sufficient, ensuring that the functions of governance and public service 
would not grind to a total halt and failure when difficulties accumulated. 
However, in the process of market construction, this kind of quasi-public 
organisation also introduced extra uncertainties and risks in the market 
environment,35 and created problems of fairness. Unclear definit.ions of 
responsibilities and rights gave quasi-public organizations a possibility to cherry-pick, 
channeling more attention to profit-making activities, possibly leaving service and 
governance half-way neglected, or leave them behind for organizations lower in the 
power hierarchy (e.g. private firms) to complement part of those non-profit functions. 
As we would see in Chapter 6, this could sometimes consume the resources of the 
private sector, weakening their potential to build a strong private sector. Sometimes 
it would also be confusing for organizations to decide who should do what. 
34 One common problem was the vacuum left between a retreating state and a weak private sector in 
terms of management and obligations. See King and Selenzer (2005). See also King (2007) for the 
adverse effects of Shock Therapy in former Soviet states. 
35 Beunza and Stark (2005) gave a brilliant account of"what counts" - how traders select and screen 
their input signals. Ellen Hertz ( 1998) discovered that "political analysis" was a much more important 
category of input signals for stock investors in China in the mid 1990s than elsewhere. My tentative 
thought is, the properties of quasi-public institutions in Chinese markets are correlated with higher 
political risks that influenced market outcomes. Therefore political analysis gets a higher weighting in 
the traders' calculations. 
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5.3 On Commission Fees 





% Paid to 
Exchange Commodity by Brokers Fees charged 
Exchanges 






Shanghai Copper ¥70 *2.5 *2/10000 17-80% 
Futures 110000 
Exchange Aluminium ¥20 ¥10 *2/ 1 0000 25-50% 
(SHFE) + (¥5) 
Natural ¥20 ¥10 *1.5/1 0000 25-50% 
Rubber +(¥5) 
Fuel Oil ¥8 ¥4 *2110000 25-50% 
+(¥2) 
Dalian Com ¥8 ¥4 ¥2-3 25-75% 
Commodity Soybean ¥12 ¥6 ¥4 33-67% 
Exchange Soymeal ¥12 ¥5 ¥3 25-60% 
(DC E) Soy Oil ¥20 ¥10 ¥6 20-40% 
+(¥4) 
Zhengzhou Wheat ¥10 ¥4 ¥2 20-50% 
Commodity Cotton ¥20 ¥12 ¥8 30-50% 
Exchange +(¥6) 
(ZCE) White Sugar ¥40 ¥7 ¥4 10-57% 
PTA** No No ¥4 No data 
data data 
Sources: Field subjects, newspaper reports, regional industry associations and the three exchanges. 
Note: All commission fees were on "single-sided" transactions, e.g. opening OR closing of a position. 
* The Sl-IFE commissions were specified in fractions of current price. 
+ Some exchange offered discounted rates for specified periods of time 
** PTA was a new product listed in Dec 2006. 
The issue of commission fees illustrated that the market was dramatically 
"compartmentalized" across the public-private boundary. Commission fees were 
charged on a double-tier basis: Firstly, for every transaction conducted through its 
trading seat, the member paid a fixed commission to the exchange, as specified in the 
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standardized futures contract. Secondly, for every transaction conducted, a client 
paid a commission to his/her brokerage fum, as specified by the terms of agreement 
between them. 
Commission fees started to become a problem in 1998-2000, when policies 
towards futures trading were tightened.36 The futures markets were drastically 
shunned off from their formerly major sources of capital influx and client base, 
leaving existing brokerage firms to compete for a very Jean market that was drying 
up. The brokerage firms were in a very vulnerable position, as typicalJy 90% of their 
income depended on one single source: the commission fees in only a dozen of 
commodity futures products. Due to license restrictions, limited asset classes 
available in China, and limitations of the domestic banking sector, these futures 
brokerage companies were not able to conduct trading on their own account, margin 
financing, issue options, or carry out settlement. They were not able to bui ld 
portfolios or carry out arbitrage using equities and overseas futures products.37 They 
could offer professional analysis and advice to their clients, yet in China these 
36 The policies were induced by a number of cornering events in the 1990s, where state bureaus (and 
their affi liated para-governmental organisations) speculated on commodity futu res contracts. In some 
dramatic events, different cliques of state bureaus took up opposite positions on the same contract, 
mobilised massive funds (including public funds) and strong political base, and wrestled against the 
will of each other on " long" or "short" . E.g. Event 327 was a battle between organisations affiliated to 
the federal Finance Ministry and the Liaoning province, versus organisations affiliated to the Shanghai 
municipal government. To stop similar political scandals and prevent public funds from getting 
involved with high-risk speculations, top-level state officials like then Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (* 
~~)decided to tighten the policies, and strictly prohibited any Chinese banks or political bureaus 
from taking part in futures trading. The policies were executed by the CSRC and the National 
Development and Reform Commission (~C&~, Fagaiwet}. 
37 23 state owed enterprises were on an exemption list to allow hedging in overseas commodity futures 
products, as their core operations were closely involved with the spot commodities. 
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services were usually taken as customer-retention benefits, rather than a charged 
service per se. 
With fierce competition and very little room to differentiate,38 the 
commission fees went into a headlong dive in 2001. The <Temporary Rules on 
Futures Trading and Administration> C!Wffil3(~~£JPM1:f1'*~a, Qihuo Jiaoyi 
Guanli Zhanxing Tiaoli) in 2001 stated that brokerage firms should charge for a 
commission fee three times the one charged by exchanges (Mao 2001). The measure 
slowed down the drop, and in 2002-2003 robust markets and volatility brought better 
profits to the whole industry. Yet in 2004-05 the price cut started again, and by 2006 
all the bruk~rag~ firms were charging for fees far lower than the " 1 :3" level. 
Table 5.1 shows the commission fees in 2005-06. Notice that it is a simplified 
sketch only; in practice a number of factors could influence the level of commission 
fees charged by the brokerage fmns and by the exchanges. Commission fees charged 
by brokers depended on: Firstly, the client's size of capital, trading volume, and 
nature of trading. Volume traders, day traders and speculators enjoyed lower fees 
than small-scale, infrequent hedgers. Secondly, fees could differ across geographical 
regions. They were higher in the comparatively well-off southern provinces; or in 
remote provinces like Xinj iang C*JTYI), where brokerage service was a scarce 
resource. Competition could be very fierce in Beijing. Thirdly, brokerage firms from 
some regions (e.g. Shandong Ill*, Heilongjiang ~~~YI) had tried to negotiate 
cartel-like systems of floor rates. Some were able to uphold a floor price system for 
some time, but in many cases secret breaching of agreements made the agreements 
38 Global derivative brokerage firms could be categorized as FCM, IB, FT, FB, CPO and CTA. Yet in 
2005 futures exchange memberships in China only had two rather undifferentiated categories, with 
very limited types of services to offer. In 2006-07 the industry was developing the categories of FCM 
and IB to prepare for the launch of index futures. It was China's first financial future, and the product 
that linked up equity brokers and futures brokers. 
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useless. (4) The trading channels. Phone and floor trading were more expensive than 
electronic trading. 
Commission fees charged by the exchanges could also differ from the 
standardized futures contracts. In special time frames, for example when the 
exchanges wanted to attract trading volume when new products were introduced, 
discOLmts (marked by + in Table 5.1) were given in the form of circulars and 
announcements to their members. Starting from 2004 the three exchanges also 
employed a measure of rebates (~@,fanhui) to some member firms. Those member 
firms who reached the top few ranking positions in trading volume could receive an 
annual bonus ofRMB200,000 - 800,000 (£13,000-£53,000) from an exchange, 
significantly lowering their actual level of commission fees paid to the exchange. As 
a consequence, brokerage firms who were eager to secure these rebates were willing 
to give further commission discounts to their volume clients, or even have their 
commission fees waivered. Some field subjects argued that the practice of annual 
bonuses from the exchanges was in effect aggravating the price war in brokerage 
commission fees. 
Despite all the differentiating conditions and exceptions, nonetheless the 
general picture was that as most of the transactions came from volume clients, 
usually the brokerage firms were charging for commission fees more in the lower 
range. Hence usually more than half(50-85%) of their commission income went into 
the treasury of the exchanges. That ratio was remarkably high, as compared with the 
reported 1% in Japanese commodity futures exchanges (Lou 2007). Although the 
total number of staff members working in the three exchanges was less than 5% of 
those working in the futures brokerage firms,39 in 2001 the three exchanges made a 
total profit more than three times that of all the 180+ futures brokerage firms put 
39 Rough estimate only. Field subjects told me that around 20,000 people worked in China's futures 
industry. The DCE had 140 members of staff If the 3 exchanges had a total of 800 members of staff, 
that was only 4% of the private sector population. 
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together.40 The figures provided here are sketchy and schematic only, yet the picture 
matches closely with ethnographic observations on the income and status contrast 
between the two sectors. 
As shown above, there existed an uneven distribution of profit-making 
opportunities across the public-private boundary. The brokerage fim1s were exposed 
to fierce market competition and thin profit margins. On the contrary the three 
futures exchanges were relatively shielded from the rough waters, enjoying much 
higher profit margins. The two sectors were engaged in two separate compartments 
of the same market, and direct competition was impossible between them. Without 
legitimate means to conduct activities in settlement, margin financing, arbitrage in 
securities and overseas markets, or alternative channels like over-the counter (OTC), 
the market was segregated in terms of vertical services. There were no means for the 
brokerage fmns compete with the exchanges. 
5.4 The Question of Subjectivity 
Most brokers considered the current system unfair, as the private sector had to 
shoulder most of the impact from the lack of capital inflow, yet their efforts of client 
recruitment and risk management were not adequately rewarded. However, the 
quasi-public sector saw the problem the other way round: the whole industry should 
be able to enjoy healthier profit margins if the brokerage firms followed the 
recommended 1 :3 commission ratio. An exchange official was quote by the media: 
"There are too many futures company out there, and the competition is negatively 
40 According to a news report by Song (2002), the three futu res exchanges made a total profit of¥300 
million (£20 million) in 200 I. The 180+ futures brokerage firms made a total profit of¥50 million 
(£3.33 million) in the second half of200 I, and made a total loss of¥52 million (£3.47 million) in the 
first half of2002. For comparison purpose, a rough projection was that the 180+ futures brokerage 
firms would have made a total profit of¥100 million (£6.67 million) in 2001. 
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fierce. Every time when the exchanges lower the commission fees or give members 
rebates, the futures companies immediately lower the commission fees or give 
rebates to their clients. Commission fees are spiraling down. and the throat-cutting 
competition gets more and more severe" (Song 2002). 
From the rhetorics ofboth sectors, it seemed that the public-private boundary 
was shielding the exchanges from the force of market competition, and at the same 
time, the planned administrative targets (the recommended 1:3 commission ratio) 
could not get across to be effectively implemented in the private sector. 25 years 
after China started its market transition, the public-private boundary here acutely 
illustrated the tension between the reasoning of a planned economy and a market 
economy. Nonetheless, regardless of ideological reasoning, the actual distribution of 
wealth and status was vividly uneven. 
Another point to note was the organisational structure of the exchanges. 
Apparently the three Chinese commodity futures exchanges adopted a system of 
cooperative membership (Wf ~ftU, huiyuanzhi), operated on a set of trading rules, and 
were subject to the regulation of the CSRC. If one stays within the text of the trading 
rules, the formal institution seemed to be comparable with other conventional futures 
exchanges in the world.41 However, leading personnel of the exchanges (general 
managers, party secretaries, deputy managers and board directors) were actually 
cadre positions of the State and the Communist Party, and these personnel were seen 
as an extension of the state regulatory system. Any personnel changes in these 
positions were announced by the CSRC, alongside the appointment of central and 
provincial CSRC positions. 
41 By conventional futures exchanges I refer to future exchanges before the global wave of 
demutualization in the 1990s The Stockholm Stock Exchange was the first exchange to be 
demutualized in 1993. Then two large exchanges: CME and NYM EX started considering about 
demutualization (Hart and Moore 1996). In East Asia, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and Futures 
Exchange underwent merger and demutualization in 1999 (He, Suen and Guan 2005). 
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There was an agency problem between the futures exchanges and their 
members. In the rules the annual general meeting was the highest decision body in 
the institution, yet in practice members could rarely exert an influence on personnel, 
budgeting or general governance. Some institutional economists in China held the 
view that the Chinese futures exchanges were not implementing cooperative 
membership in its genuine sense. Instead they had formed a monopolistic bracket in 
terms of the market' s vertical integration. In name these exchanges adopted 
cooperative memberships, but the actual stmcture of governance resembles that of an 
outside ownership by the state. Competition between exchanges did not occur only 
by market mechanisms, but the listing of products were approved by the CSRC 
according to the balance of regional interests and political interests: 
... The result of the lack of market competition is that, the exchanges would make 
use of their monopolistic market positions to obtain monopolistic, windfall profits. 
This is also why Chinese futures exchanges, up till the time of writing, have not 
actualized cooperative membership in a genuine sense. 
He, Suen and Guan (2005) P.86; translation by Siu 
Domestic industry critics and academics quite often used the term "subjectivity" Ct . 
'fli'I~E, zhutixing)42 to describe the futures markets (for example, Ju 2006, Ouyang 
2006:80). The public sector was said to "have a strong subjectivity" in the markets, 
meaning that as a more established social unit, it was able to take initiatives, make 
decisions, draw resources, and play a more active role on the markets. The private 
sector was described as having "a weak subjectivity", being weaker in terms of 
financial strength, social and political resources, and having a fragmented market 
42 The Chinese term j:fs:Ji (zhutixing) carried a translated Marxist sense, and was possibly ascribed 
from the term "revolutionary subjectivity" . 
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structure that was difficult to mobilize. Private entrepreneurs complained that 
'·futures companies have now fallen to the status of laboring for the exchanges".43 
fn 2006 the China Futures Association elected a new executive committee. A 
number of veteran representatives such asTian Yuan (ll!WR) and Chang Qing (~mf) 
stepped down, and many ofthe major positions were taken up by leading executives 
of the four exchanges, especially those in charge of the fourth futures exchange and 
the first financial futures exchange, China Financial Futures Exchange (cp~sjzf\M!WJ 
~3(~.Pfr, CFFEX). Industry news described the situation as the association getting 
a "thickening scent of officials" ('§"*i®frn1D (Zhu K.-d. 2006). If industry 
representatives shifted from the private sector to the quasi-public sector, it seemingly 
indicated that the quasi-public sector, rather than the private sector, was the core 
subject of China' s futures industry. 
The viewpoints of monopolistic profits, asymmetric subjectivity, and 
deviation from conventional cooperative membership were in line with the fieldwork 
data in sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. How did such properties come into being? What do 
we understand about the Chinese commodity futures markets? Were "Chinese 
characteristics" the signs of a transient hybrid market that would eventually finish its 
migration path to converge with other global capitalist markets (Nee 1983, 1999; 
Friedman 2006), or is market construction a path-dependant and contingent process 
that could eventually lead to divergent outcomes (Calion 2007 chapter 11 , Wank 
2002, Gray 1998)? 
5.5 Political Agencement at Local Levels 
In China historically the prices of agricultural grains had been embedded within 
political and communal contexts. Notice that usually it was the local government that 
43 Hong (2007) quoting Zhang YuanPei, managing director of a Shanghai futures brokerage firm. 
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took the lead to align a consortium of regional state-owed structures (like the food 
and oils distribution system, state reserve bureau, economic bureaus and telecom 
bureaus) to establish a local commodity exchange.44 The early 1990s was the time 
when local governments had "increased responsibilities, less centrally allocated 
resources to achieve them, and greater autonomy to devise solutions" (Wank 
2002: 101). From the local government' s points of view, a commodity futures 
exchange was an attractive project because firstly, it brought business opportunities 
to the local state bureau, and helped to stimulate the local economy. Benefits 
included the accumulation of capital (as membership fees, commission fees and 
margins), the initial construction works and services, plus business opportunities to 
local enterprises; secondly, it could become a favourable item on the local official's 
political resume. Success would produce a political showcase of "socialist economic 
reform"; thirdly, federal regulation and entry barrier were nearly non-existent in 92-
93, enabling the local governments to take things in their own hands. 
Local governments were in a much better position than the private sector to 
take up the role as principal initiator of the organising committee. It was them who 
were able to mobi lize highly heterogeneous local (:l:fu:Jj, difang) resources to form 
the agencement needed for a commodity futures exchange. Such resources included 
land use, construction works, government permits, public utilities, 
telecommunication infrastructure, banking, suppliers and consumers ofthe 
agricultural or industrial commodity (in the form of large state-owed enterprises), 
ports and logistics, state reserve, and delivery warehouses. Many of the above 
elements were partially controlled or redistributed by state cadres (Guthrie 2002, 
Wank 2002). The local governments could be highly flexible and creative in utilizing 
their resources. For example, when Exchange P first started its simulated trading in 
44 The paradigm of a group of merchants forming an early exchange like the Chicago Board of Trade 
did not appear in mainland China in the 1990s, although the paradigm once appeared in Hong Kong 
( 1891 for stocks, 1910 for precious metals; Fung 2002) and Shanghai ( 1920, commodities and stocks). 
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and Iong-tetm forward contract trading in autumn 1993, Exchange P was a humble 
organisation with only 6 members of staff, a budget ofRMB 60,000 (4,000 pounds), 
and 700 square metres of office space (Exchange P website 2003). The original site 
was a building rented from the local branch of the Ministry of Information Industry 
(see Fig 5.7), with the extra benefit of good infrasttuctural support on a major local 
telecom exchange hub. This was a wonderful resource as in the early 1990s, some 
small private companies in mainland China could still wait for months to get a 
telephone line installed. On the contrary, for the private sector to access comparable 
resources, sometimes non-state agents had to undergo sophisticated open procedures 
or private guanxi connections, both involving high transaction costs. Some items 
might be unavailable to the private sector altogether. 
Fig 5.7 The first rented location of Exchange P in the early 90s 
When we study the construction of exchanges, a theory of the finn applicable here is 
to define a finn by its non-human assets (Hart and Moore 1996). Tangible assets 
relevant to exchanges were the physical location and equipments; important 
intangible assets were things like reputation for honesty, enforceable trading rules, 
and above all , market depth (Hart and Moore 1996:55). My tentative hypothesis is, 
since modem mainland Chinese society had a rather weak basis of credit, mutual 
trust and legalism, political authority was a possible substitute when it came to issues 
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of trust. That was also why exchanges fully initiated and supported by a local 
government could gain better trust from investors and traders, and kick-start its 
market depth. 
Fig 5.8: The photos of state leaders displayed outside the trading floor 
of Exchange P 
One fieldwork observation could help to support this argument. In the time of my 
fieldwork, Exchange P launched a large-scale education and marketing project. It 
was a series of two-day workshops organized for farmers, retailers, wholesalers and 
state enterprise employees, most of who came from the northeast provinces Liaoning 
(~$), Jilin (5~\f) and Heilongjiang (~fjgyi). The project ran on for hundreds of 
classes for a few months, targeting at tens of thousands of people. With the help of 
some field subjects, I managed to slip into a few fanner classes and attended their 
workshop programme. In each workshop programme there was a session when 
participants had a walk around a glass hallway sunounding the 2/F trading floor. 
Before the entrance to the trading floors, there was a stately hall to display over a 
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dozen of photographs when high-ranking state officials (~~15i~A, guojia 
Lingdaoren) visited the exchange over the years (Fig 5.8).45 In domestic political 
jargon, such visits were typically described as '·affectionate care'' (~Jlf;J]mt.J'I'~, qinqie 
guanhuai) from the communist officials, and each picture was magnified to a size 
like 6 feet x 4 feet and di splayed in luxury frames. The first time I saw this dazzling 
marble hall, I used to dismiss it as mere ornamental flamboyance, possibly related to 
the personal taste of some bosses of the exchange. But later on when I listened to 
how other visitors talked about it, I realized that I was very wrong. For example, in 
the final feedback session after a two-day workshop in July 2005 (Fig 5.9), one 
farmer participant said: 
Fig 5.9: Feedback session of a futures training class for fat·rners 
Being here, seeing the photographs of so many state officials visiting [Exchange P], 
I was excited to learn that... we the northeast region had built such an advanced 
and important facility for the whole country. 
During the trading floor visits, many workshop par1icipants were eager to ask people 
to take pictures ofthemselves in front of the officials' giant pictures. These halls and 
45 Political figures displayed in large fi·ames in exchange P included Hu Jintao (~-if:J~'j}~~), Jiang Zemin 
(iT?~.§!: ), Zhu Rongji C*jfi~), Li Ruihuan ($.fiMF.itt), Li Peng ($1m). Li Lanqing ($iffil.i¥f), and 
provincial leading officials. A similar hall also existed at exchange Q. 
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pictures were useful artefacts that had actual impacts on how visitors perceived the 
exchange, and could effectively contribute to the exchange' s status, reputation and 
trust-worthiness. Similar pictures also appeared in conspicuous positions in exchange 
publications and websites. Such display of state political support was an important 
e lement of agencement to strengthen public trust towards the exchange. The 
heterogeneous agencement involved human and non-human components, like the 
involvement of municipal cadres, and the telecom infrastructure of Huaxin Building. 
It also involved tangible assets like the physical building, and intangible assets like 
trust. In the case of the pictures of state leaders, they were an intangible component 
of political support and trust, embodied in the material form of frames and pictures. 
Care should be taken to distinguish between the actual use of political power 
in market agencement (e.g. mobilizing local land and telecom resources), and the 
perception of political power in market agencement (e.g. to display pictures of 
political leaders in a hall). While the former directly contributed to tangible assets, 
the latter had more to do with intangible assets like public trust and reputation. 
Nonetheless both were essential components for market construction. 
The discussion in 5.5 shows that firstly, agents from the public sector were 
providing scarce and essential resources for market construction, namely political 
power and other people's perception of it. Secondly, the state agents ' important 
contributions in market construction could at least partially explain why they enjoyed 
a superior status in a later stage in China's futures market structure. The monopoly of 
political power (relative to non state agents) was later on converted into monopolised 
trading platforms and high profit margins in commission fees. Instead of migrating 
from a planned economy to an open free market where privileges of bureaucratic 
cadres simply withered away (Nee 1993), here the theory of power conversion 
(Rona-Tas 1994) was more valid. Thirdly, market construction, in this case study, 
was far from the idealized disentanglement between state and market as described by 
neoliberalists. Politics was an important building block of the agencement here. 
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5.6 Penetration and control- what was said and 
what was done? 
State penetration in modem Chinese society could be so pervasive that scholars 
sometimes argued whether any formal social organizations could exist without being 
penetrated by the State (Yang 1994, Wank: 1998). Party representatives (usually in 
the form of party secretaries) were appointed by the Communist Party in all public 
and vocational units (W/.{}l., danwei), and sometimes in "mass organizations"46 as 
well (Burns 1994). These representatives were directly reporting to the State and 
responsible for implementing state policies. These positions at national and 
provincial levels had to be informed and approved by the central party bureaucracy. 
For example, in <Job title list of cadres managed by the PRC central government> 
(cp~cf:l:9c~:f!ftj~$~~:gffi~. Zhonggong zhongyang guanlide ganbu zhiwu 
mingchengbiao) in 1990, the leading positions of state-owed banks belonged to the 
same appointment category as those of the State Council, the police, and diplomats. 
These state cadre positions were resident in the regional CSRC bureaus, all the 
exchanges, and all the state-owed brokerage companies. 
These institutions had dual properties: they were both an integral part of the 
market structure, and part of the communist political structure. Occasionally such 
duality led to dramatic scenarios in the eyes of an ethnographer. For example, a 
nationwide poli tical movement called "On Preserving the Advancedness of the 
Communist'"'7 (f*}.¥~.i!li~~)b1Mi, baochi gongcandangyuan xianjinxing, 
abbreviation 1*:9'[; baoxian) was launched by the Party between January 2005 and 
June 2006. The movement was aimed at party members to tighten up on corruption, 
46 Institutions and organizations in culture, media, technology, youth, gender, disability, union, 
industry associations, and religious groups. 
47 English translation according to the baoxian movement's official website. 
110 
Chapter 5 Cadres: State Structures in the Markets 4 January 2008 
and to promote "Three Represents" ( 001i;~, sange daibiao )48 proposed by former 
PRC President Jiang Zemin (¥I¥i~, Jiang Zemin) in 2002. Political workshops and 
weekend political retreat camps were organized throughout the country across 
industries in government bureaus, vocational units and state-owed enterprises. 
Baoxian booklets were disseminated for free to these organizations, and party 
members were required to write reports about their personal political reflections. 
When I was serving my internship in futures Exchange P, one Friday I heard 
a colleague in my department ringing up the departments of the exchange one by one, 
reminding them about a baoxian workshop after the market closed at 3pm. Similar 
workshops were held in state-owed futures brokerage firms, where communist-
traders and communist-brokers attended the political classes. My colleague, as a 
promising and aspiring cadre, told me that usually being a party member was helpful 
for one's career development. But another younger colleague (whom I knew much 
better) privately told me that those meetings were "such a waste of time" and boring. 
Sometimes they just had to attend as a compulsory requirement. I understood that on 
one of those Friday baoxian meetings, some pragmatic-minded field subjects took 
market reports and finance textbooks into the venue, and read them quietly on the 
back benches. On another occasion, a field subject took me home and showed me a 
baoxian booklet in mockery: "Look at all this party cliche(;~)\~, dangbagu). 
Horrible." 
Apart from political movements, the market people in 2005 (in state 
enterprises and vocational units) sometimes still had their private lives under the 
ambivalent "care" (~~l'l~, guanhuai) of their party secretaries. Once a field subject 
• 
48 English translation according to the baoxian movement's official website. Based on "The Three 
Represents", the Party must always represent: firstly, the requirements to develop China's advanced 
productive forces; secondly, the orientation to develop China's advanced culture; and thirdly, the 
primary interests of the people. Although the principles were sometimes obscure, a concrete effect 
was, capitalists were formally and openly allowed to become members of the Communist Party. 
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told me that she ran into some marriage problems. The party secretary in her 
brokerage company called her for a private talk, and tried to act as a mediator 
between the couple. She had to answer extremely carefully as such incidents could 
possibly be helpful, patronizing, a form of political surveillance, and influenced her 
career at the same time. These episodes were commonly seen in many state-owed 
enterprises in China and not limited to the futures and securities industries. Yet these 
incidents reminded the reader that market institutions (like exchanges and brokerage 
firms) in China were far from being disentangled from state penetration and political 
responsibilities. Most of them were stiU part of the state political machinery when the 
need arose. 
Care should be taken to distinguish between actual state control and political 
rhetoric (Burns 1994). As Shue (1988) suggested, the reader should not overestimate 
the Communist Party's penetration power and control over civi lian life. The private 
sneer and mockery, the silent backbench reading, and the careful answers all showed 
that in 2005, the Chinese Communist Party's explicit penetration of civil life was less 
effective than a few decades ago- the market people were extremely pragmatic, and 
the communist ideals seemed to have undergone erosion (Walder 1995). 
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Chapter 6 
Gangs: Network-based Cognition 
This chapter is focused on social connectivity within the investor community of 
China's commodity futures. Fieldwork data illustrates how futures investors form 
flexible social aggregates in various shapes and forms. These market structures are 
built upon existing social relationships, remain in continuous flux, and are deeply 
embedded within political, economic, geographical, professional and kinship 
affiliations (Granovetter 1992). Connectivity and embeddedness matter, because they 
determine one's position and social capital (Bourdieu 1977) in the markets; they also 
contribute to the overall pattern of market price movements (Baker 1984). 
Conversely, the markets confer new meanings to existing social relationships, 
solidifying some ties and antagonizing others. This chapter will start from a 
background introduction to comer events in the brief but rocky history of China's 
commodity futures markets. The characteristics of compact "battle teams", larger 
capital factions and charismatic leaders will be discussed. Field records include a 
special case of exchange Q - how clientelist networks (Wank 1999) are formed 
across the public-private boundary to form growth coalitions (Davis 1990). The 
chapter closes with a discussion on rule-based and network-based rationality (Qu 
1961, F ei 1992, Hutchins 1996, Hardie and MacKenzie 2006), and some of the 
challenges faced by China's society when it embraces the market economy. 
The stronger forms of social connectivity can sometimes be seen as 
associated with market collusion. Understandably, only on rare occasions would field 
subjects be willing to talk about their own experience in this area. However, rich 
sources of indirect evidence such as narrations about other people, events recaJied 
from a long time ago, media reports, and "documentary novels" written by industry 
practitioners are available from the field. Such field evidence shows that capital 
factions are an active form of social structure in the markets running upon network-
based rationality, especially in the 1990s. Interestingly, they also reveal 
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characteristics that resemble a much older social structure ca1Jed bang (gangs ~' 
pronounced as "boung"'), as described by Fei (1948: 176) and Zhang L. (200 1:105-
1 07). To protect the informants, the personal particulars of some field subjects have 
been changed in this chapter. 
6. 1 Corner Events 
In 2005, China's futures industry was still under tight regulatory control in response 
to a series of alleged market manipulation and collusion in the 1990s. In the markets 
sometimes people gossiped about co1Jusion and market manipulation by big players 
(dahu -:*]5). Those futures people with working experience in the 1990s could 
readily reca11 dramatic corner (bicang il!!~) events on various exchanges, and they 
considered corner events as a core feature of China's futures markets at that time. 
"Cornering the market", in its classical sense, means buying up a significant 
amount of a commodity futures contract and/or contro11ing the spot supply to inflate 
the price. The cornering party wi11 then settle their long position futures contract, 
and/or sell off the spot stock at high price for profits. Classical examples in the US 
include the Great Salad Oil Swindle of soy oil by Tino De Angel is in 1962, the 
attempted cornering of the silver market by Nelson Bunker Hunt and Herbert Hunt in 
1980, and the British energy firm BP being accused of attempting to corner the US 
propane market in 2004. It is also possible to initiate market comer events from the 
short side, where the incident is called a bear raid. A party can bui ld up vast short 
futures positions, create a sudden surge of spot supply to push prices down, and then 
reap profits from their short positions (Xu 2004 pp27-30). 
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Table 6.1. Incidents of Corner Events in China's futures markets49 
Time Product I Futures Exchange Remarks 
Contracts 
2004 Natural rubber 0407 Shanghai Futures Corner 
Exchange (SHFE) 
Oct 98- Jan 99 Mung bean Zhengzhou Corner 
9903, 9905,9907 Commodity Exchange 
Summer 1997 Natural rubber China Commodity Corner 
R708 Futures Exchange, Inc 
of 1-Iainan (CCFE) 
1996-1997 Coffee Ch ina Commodity Corner 
F605, F607, F609, Futures Exchange, l nc 
F703 of Hainan (CCFE) 
Jun 1996 Plywood 9607 Shanghai Futures Corner 
Exchange (SHFE) Settlement on 
negotiated price 
Jan-Mar 1996 Red bean Suzhou Commodity Corner 
Exchange 
Oct-Nov 1995 Soymeal Guangdong United Corner 
9601 , 9607, 9708 Futures Exchange 
(GUFE) 
Oct 1995 Sticky rice Guangdong United Corner 
9511 Futures Exchange 
(GUFE) 
May-Jun 1995 Red bean Tianjin Commodity Comer 
507 Exchange 
1995 3-year T-bond Shanghai Securities Corner [short] 
314,327 Exchange (SHSE) Insider trading [long] 
Mar 1995 Palm Oil China Commodity Corner (short) 
M506 Futures Exchange, Inc 
of Hainan (CCFE) 
1995 Com Dalian Commodity Futures inflation 
C511 Exchange (DCE) derailed from spot 
1994-1995 Steel wire Suzhou Commodity Corner 
Exchange 
Jui-Oct 1994 Japonica rice Shanghai Food and Oil Corner 
Exchange 
Sources: Dang, Huang, Wang and Xu (200 I) <China Futures Risk Review Series>, 13 Oct 
200 I, hexun.com; plus 3 interviews with brokers and analysts. 
49 This list is not exhaustive. 
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There are a number of historical review articles circulating on the Internet on major 
corner events during the 1990s, like Dang, Huang, Wang and Xu (2001 ). The major 
events. alongside with a couple of corner events mentioned by my interviewees, are 
listed in Table 6.1. Cornering was never a phenomenon unique to Chinese markets, 
but its frequency of occurrence in the 1990s was alarmingly high - notice that Table 
6.1 was not an exhaustive list. The local terminology often referred to corners as 
" risk events" (fengxian shijian J~U>~lWf:). Such a polite synonym masked the 
intentional human actions less visible. Regulators in China often openly condemn 
cornering, or bicang, as violating the public good of the markets. Yet in a pragmatic 
light, the industry saw corners as a form of recurring systemic risk that needed to be 
managed and addressed to. Domestic economic researchers even tried to build 
mathematical models on these corner events based on game theory and information 
asymmetry (see Zhang, Tien and He 2001). 
Why did China's futures markets have a high rate of corner events in the 
1990s? It was true that by then the domestic regulatory body was too inexperienced 
to prevent acts of cornering effectively. Yet the formation of corners showed 
interesting inherent properties of the markets. 
A methodology precaution should be stated here: there was a time gap of7-
11 years between my actual fieldwork (2005) and the period when dahu collusion 
was at its peak (1994-98). I had never witnessed a corner event on-site, and it was 
extremely difficult to find someone willing to admit and describe their own 
participation in collusion and corners. The fie ld data in this section is combined from 
the retrospective account of field subjects, as well as from archival data. Personal and 
company particulars have been altered to protect certain fie ld subjects. 
6.2 Organised Battle Teams 
During my fieldwork, veteran trader W is the only person who is willing to talk 
about his participation in a trading team that took part in cornering. Once he puts me 
on the rear end of his bicycle, and gives me a ride pedalling through his city. He then 
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walks me through a three-star hotel. In a nostalgic mood, he recalls his life there as 
part of a trading team in the late 1990s. He verifies the existence of futures trading 
teams in concealed hotel rooms: 
"Look, this is room 319 where I have lived for one full year ... Three adjacent rooms 
were rented to us on quarterly basis, and all the hotel staff could recognise us. We 
moved our computers in, and there was no phone in the rooms. This is the lounge, 
where we used to sip drinks in the evenings after an intense trading day ... We had a 
dozen of people working here. In the name of XXX (a futures brokerage company), 
we were trading on behalf of the provincial and municipal food and oils sector. Most 
of the time we went [for the] short [position] . " 
His experience is a strong form of deliberate market intervention, where corner plans 
are executed by a single organised team. The group has quasi-military properties. 
There is a hierarchical structure and lines of command; the team leaders' personal 
qualities of calmness and charisma are cherished. The traders have some form of 
division of labour, such as having different traders responsible for the contracts with 
different expiry dates, or having different traders responsible for longs and shorts. In 
order to get around the regulatory constraints of position limits, they have tofencang 
(?}~) -divide and disguise their funds and trading orders under different accounts, 
brokerage firms and trading seats. Yet as a "battle team", they are sitting within close 
reach of each other, so as to maintain closely integrated cooperation. 
Before initiating a corner, usually the team has to prepare all the funds and 
reserves they need, and draw up a "battle plan". Their strategies employed include 
duobikong (~~~), kongbiduo (~~~)and ruanbicang (J!!X:@.:~l), depending on 
whether they are going for long or short, whether they were mobilising ·spot 
commodities, the pace they want to go, and the financial strength of their opponent 
camp - if that piece of knowledge can be estimated. Since the price of a particular 
futures contract can only go up or down, the corner team sees a price as a war-zone 
frontier, where the long and short camps are engaged in a fierce struggle of strategy, 
will, financial strength and teamwork. Prices can be "pulled up" (TILt3K) or "shot 
down" (}Tf '*). 
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In a half-documentary, half-fiction novel on China's futures markets in the 
1990s, Liu and Yan wrote about how a battle team planned to manipulate mung bean 
futures in Zhengzhou: 
The plan quickly materialised. They will use part of the funds to support the prices 
of 1994 Jan, Mar and May contracts, prevent them from falling any further. Use 
most of the funds to operate on the Nov contract. Operate in two phases: phase one, 
quiet position build-up at the bottom price ranges. Phase two, launch a sudden 
attack, ambush upwards on the Nov contract, until those who held the Nov shorts 
collapsed . 
... lOth Sep, the plan was fully launched. 'B, llD, 20, 23200, Open!'50 [The team 
leader] issued standardised instructions to red jackets on the trading floor. 'Done? 
Good, continue. B, llD, 20, 23160, Open!' The price was still sliding, good, nobody 
notices. 'B, llD, 20, 23000, open!' 
Liu and Yan (1999) p.77-78, my translation 
The compact size and nimble flexibility of these trading teams could be compared 
with hedge funds in global markets. Given the limited number and categories of 
financial tools available in the domestic markets, the portfolios of these dahu teams 
were unimpressively simplistic. Nonetheless, their battle plans could be shrewd and 
complicated, and they had the additional advantage of guanxi networks to influence 
political decisions, as well as to control the supply and di stribution of the spot 
commodity. For example, in "event 327" in 1995, the long side was accused of 
insider trading, in which they deciphered the Finance Ministry's intent to raise the 
coupon payout rate of a 3-year state treasury bond. As another example, in 1994 one 
trading team exercised a bear raid on steel wire futures in the Suzhou Commodity 
Exchange (~miffi£5(~pfi) . Through social and political ties, the team was able to 
mobilize state-owed factories in the region to operate in full-swing productivity, 
50 The instruction means " buy 20 lots ofNovember mung bean futures at the price of23200, open 
position". 
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flooding the designated delivery warehouses with an unexpected level of spot supply 
in a surprise ambush. 51 In some futures contracts where the total market capital was 
low enough, these dahu trading teams were able to shape the pattern of price 
movements to reap windfall profits. 
6.3 Capital Factions and Proximity Cliques 
Organized battle teams were structures on a micro level. On a meso level, market 
movements were often comprehended in terms of "capital factions" (zijin paixi, ~~ 
¥JN~). Tn times of volatile market movements, it was common for the industry 
discourse to identify who the "main force" (zhuli, ±JJ) behind the longs (duotou, :g; 
:®i) and the shorts (kongtou, ~RJi) were. These capital factions could be identified by 
geographical locations, like Sichuan faction(} II~), Zhej iang bang (#JT1I~'), 
Shanghai faction (~~), or Henan province (Y"oJi¥l~l); by state-owed industry 
enterprises, like food and oils, animal feed, or nonferrous metals; or, by the brand 
names of powerful organizations, like CEDTIC52 (owned by the Ministry of Finance) 
and SISC053 (the showcase of Shanghai' s municipal financial strength in the mid 
1990s ). During the 1990s, capital factions used to carry strong tones of regionalism 
or personal heroism, and they clashed violently in the futures markets, especially 
51 See Xu (2004: 28-30, 46-47) for a dramatic description. See SHFE (2005a) and SHFE (2005b) for 
analytical reports on why steel futures were vulnerable to comer events in 1992-94. 
52 China Economic Development Trust and Investment Corp cp~*~~!Jf.l~1a~t§tj1(0~ (cp*~tffl), 
abolished in 2002. 
53;%~~~. Shanghai International Securities Co. Ltd .. After Event 327, it underwent a merger with 
Shenyin Securities to become Shenyin and Wanguo Securities Co. $~N~~f~~ in 1996. 
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during corner events. 54 By looking at the list of ·'most active" trading seats, 
announced by the exchanges for each futures product at the end of each trading day, 
experienced traders and brokers usually knew which capital factions were active. 
These factions showed some characteristics of proximity cliques. as described 
under the framework of social network analysis (for example, see Scott (2000: 114-
120] and Burt [ 1995, 2005]). Agents from the same geographical location or within 
the same industry in the same faction tended to stay in frequent contact with each 
other. They had mutual common contacts, shared overlapping information sources, 
and created a mini social environment that tended to produce similar viewpoints. 
Such informal structures could be recognized by the high density of social 
connections within a local subnet. Sometimes cliques also showed features of 
centrality, as the capital factions were aligned around charismatic leaders (see section 
6.6). 
Jingmou Li <**~~), the founding director of Zhengzhou Commodity 
Exchange, was quoted by Liu and Y an ( 1999). His words could be understood in the 
light of the aggregation of proximity cliques and consensus: 
"Take the example of the collusion between dahl/3. We hear rumours all the time, 
but it is difficult to find evidence ... These people are all old friends, old alumni and 
old colleagues, and they are just getting together for a meal. You cannot set up a 
trading rule that prohibits futures people from seeing each other. You cannot forbid 
them from talking about market trends, or sharing their trading experience. But very 
often consensus is achieved in these 'talks' and 'sharing'. Don't underestimate the 
issue of collusion. It is a characteristic feature of our futures markets." 
Liu and Yan (1999) p.141, my translation 
54 During the 1920s-1930s under the regime of the Republic of China, similar capital factions were 
also extremely active. In the late 1920s, there were over 100 futures exchanges in Shanghai and 
southern China (Chen and Zuo 1994, Xiao 1986, Zhu 1998, Ma and Meng 2005, Liu 2007). 
120 
Chapter 6 Gangs: Network-based Cognition 4 January 2008 
A broker in Beijing describes to me in an interview: 
It is difficult for any dahu to control the price of a futures product on long-term 
basis, but it is possible to do it on small products for short periods of time. In the 
1990s, we had witnessed fierce manipulation on small products like coffee and 
cocoa. Prices could rise to the market-halt limit for 7-8 consecutive days; fall to the 
market-halt limit for another consecutive 7-8 days; then rise to the market-halt limit 
for another 7-8 trading days again. No matter how you trade, once you step into 
these markets you're doomed. 
6.4 Passive Discovery, or Active Battle? 
I have attended 4-5 beginners' futures training workshops in China; all of them 
started with textbook definitions of hedgers and speculators. Hedgers were described 
as spot traders who tried to avoid the risks of price fluctuations; speculators were 
opportunistic investors who tried to gain from price fluctuations. The purpose of 
futures markets, according to my workshop instructors, was to serve as a tool for 
price discovery and risk management. Risks were supposed to be transferred from 
hedgers to speculators. 
The markets in reality were far from such an innocent picture. Field subjects 
kept telling me that real hedgers hardly ever existed in China. Whether traders came 
from spot-trading enterprises or cash-based investment companies, whether they 
went for long or short positions, nearly all futures traders in China were opportunistic 
risks seekers. When traders were asked to describe their own actions, nobody ever 
described themselves as being hedgers or speculators, nor did they perceive 
themselves as conducting " transfer of risks". Instead, they described themselves as 
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"longs" or '"shorts", who were exercising "game theory" (t\g~ boyi)55 against other 
capital fact ions on the markets. It was other factions' actions that had immediate, 
direct impact on prices. On the other hand, fundamentals, '·intrinsic price" or 
" rational price' · were something that they would consider on the long-run, but such 
considerations were quite often treated as secondary references, or nearly ignored by 
day traders. (See also Siu [2002] for the influence of fundamentals and market 
perceptions on prices.) 
From time to time, the three exchanges promoted "price di scovery" (~fj!.~ 
f~,faxianjiage) as a positive, justifying function of futures markets. They also used 
the argument to lobby regulators for launching new futures products (as I had seen 
on a lobby document prepared by exchange Q in 2005). However, market traders and 
analysts sometimes made ironic mockeries about the phrase' s implied passivity and 
objectivity. Mockery was made by those who were about to initiate a battle plan, "I 
am going to 'discover' the price at XXX." Or, after violent comer events, traders 
made sarcastic comments, "Look, the market has ' discovered' the price at XXX!" 
Although traders did not use the terminology of epistemology, they were the people 
keeping a close eye on prices on an hourly basis. These traders were aware that price 
movements were a collective result of the purposeful actions of the market people 
themselves, not some latent information waiting to be "discovered" outside the 
human world. 
There was one significant difference between futures markets and equity 
markets. Since futures trading did not create net economic value in the futures 
products themselves, it was a zero-sum game. The profits of the winners, plus the 
commission fees received by the exchanges, all directly came from the loss of the 
55 The word tt!f~ (boyi) is the academic direct translation for "game theory" . When used in a game of 
chess, it also means "calculating the logics of one' s opponent" . In Chinese, the term got diffused into 
non-academic language for common daily use. 
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losers. (Whereas in the equity markets, it was possible fo r everyone to gain profits at 
the same time if there was a net growth in fundamental values of the underlying 
companies.) Traders understood that to obtain X yuan of profits from their own 
position, somebody on the opposite position had to lose X yuan, plus the commission 
fees for both sides. It was a fierce and competitive game. In practice, usually the 
traders used a language with battlefield metaphors, such as "an1bush" (~-), 
"entice" (~~), "trapped" (~$), "besiege" (!II) and "crash" (Uiffi). Especially when 
they talked about the 1990s when the leaders of the long and short factions could be 
clearly recognized, traders perceived themselves as being engaged in a battle with a 
recognizable collective opponent. When the markets developed into a corner event, 
both sides were pushing the same price in opposite directions. Just like a tug of war, 
if one side fai led to sustain the capital, guanxi and will power to match one's 
opponent, prices could swing to extreme levels in a single direction, allowing the 
remaining side to reap the profits. 
On the futures training workshops that I had attended, some instructors talked 
about a "war-like mentality" and "psychological quality" ({j':Eli!.*~) as essential to 
the success of futures trading. Interestingly, I had also come across a large mm1ber of 
veteran soldiers from the People' s Liberation Army (PLA), who had newly switched 
to full-time or amateur futures trading. In a few cases, I had the rough impression 
that these people often did better than the average novices in simulation trading 
sessions. Although my sample set was too small to draw any statistically significant 
conclusions, it was possible that those personnel redundant from the military were 
used to high-risk, war-like environments, which enabled them to fit in easily into 
commodity futures trading. It was also possible that these veteran soldiers were on 
the verge of falling into marginal social classes; as they had less at risk, they might 
be more inclined to undertake high-risk investment activities. 
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6.5 Spot Factions and Spot-less Factions 
From the 1990s onwards and persisting into 2005 when I was doing the fieldwork, 
spot-trading factions did differ from those with non-spot backgrounds. According to 
some traders and brokers, spot-trading factions were usually state enterprises in 
charge of national or provincial grain and metal supply. They had large quantities of 
the spot commodity at hand, and they went for short positions more often than long 
ones. When prices fell, they could close out their positions and reap cash; when 
prices rose, they could still opt for physical delivery, and the loss was less 
conspicuous. Sometimes these state enterprises were given the nickname "short 
forces" (~Jtr, kongjun, which rhymed with "air forces"). They had the following 
properties: firstly, due to their large scale of inventory and turnover, their futures 
trading volumes could reach bulk levels, making them the inherent dahus of grain 
and metal futures. Secondly, due to their geographjcal proximity to production areas 
(e.g. soybean in the northeast provinces, wheat in Henan province, or white sugar in 
Guangxi province) and regular presence in spot trading business, they had good 
connections with regional state officials. 56 Thirdly, they were loyal and regular 
traders on the relevant futures exchange(s). Fourthly, as large state enterprises, 
getting loans from state-owed banks was comparatively easier. These traders were 
less interest-rate sensitive. Fifth, as "hedgers" in principle, they occupied a moral 
high ground versus the "speculators". Differential treatment between "hedgers" and 
"speculators" could be detected in the draft set of trading rules that I had translated 
for exchange Q. In case if the exchange took actions to reduce overall market risks in 
56 Online blog articles like Burned Account (2007) and a few brokers believed that the high-ranking 
policy bureau National Development and Refonn Commission ((i;~BJlUZ.~ifl:~~"\t, ~~~' 
Fagaiwet) was keen to keep the inflation of major commodities prices under control. They believed 
that Fagaiwei was like ly to produce policies in favour of the short factions, and there was a policy 
skew on prices. Without direct contact witl1 any representatives from Fagaiwei, I am in no position to 
confirm or refute such allegations. 
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a comer event, those classified as "hedgers" would face a gentler margin increase. In 
the case of compulsory position close-outs, those classified as speculators were 
usually targeted first, while those classified as hedgers usually stood at the back of 
the close-out sequence. 
On the other end of the markets, the spot-less factions were much more 
fragmented. Overseas financial institutions and domestic banks were banned from 
China's futures markets. Private-sector investment organizations were yet to be 
developed, and domestic mutual ftmds, pension funds or insurance companies were 
underdeveloped. Some leading futures companies in first-tier cities such as Shanghai 
or Beijing were starting to launch primitive forms of mutual funds as innovative, 
experimental products, yet futures brokers described their presence in the commodity 
futures markets as "negligible". The typical long factions were people who managed 
to accumulate some wealth from the stock markets, real estates, and a mixture of 
civilian and para-governmental sources. These were people who had cash in hand but 
not the spot commodities. A frequently way of thinking from this camp was, " there is 
always more money than spot" (~:7J<Jitcjl~ ). Some newcomers on the futures 
markets might also have "habits of thinking" Ct.l'['i}iS~*iE guanxing siwei) like "buy-
and-hold" inherited from the stock markets. 
The typical long factions had the following properties: firstly, many of these 
"investment funds" were loosely formed between a few friends (jige dakuan couhe 
~@*ffX~-Ef). The scale of capital was around hundred-thousands to ten-millions 
yuans, or £30,000 - £500,000, which was within the means of large retail investors 
(~F sanhu). Secondly, sometimes cohesion and consensus could be formed around 
charismatic faction leaders, or by a strong sense of geographical identity. Such bang-
like proximity cliques might be unstable and transient, yet sometimes it was possible 
for them to produce aggregate market forces strong enough to compete with the spot 
trading fact ions. Thirdly, since they were cash-based factions, their funds had a 
higher degree of mobility compared with than the spot trading factions. The funds 
would flow in and out of various futures products and futures exchanges, as well as 
on other asset classes like stocks, real estates, and other businesses. Fourthly, their 
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gucmxi with banks, government authorities, and the futures exchanges varied greatly, 
depending on personal ties. Usually they were more sensitive to changes in interest 
rates. Fifth. in general, the futures exchanges and regulators welcomed these 
investors to bring liquidity to the markets. Yet in the eyes of regulators and 
exchanges, they did not have the degree of perceived loyalty or regular trading 
volumes as the spot trading factions. They were more often classified as 
"speculators", which implied that they were likely to face s teeper margin 
requirements and more stringent compulsory position close-outs when regulatory 
actions were taken. 
In actual trading, factions from both categories execute a combination of 
longs and shorts; in the case of corner events, different regional and industry factions 
would form and break coalitions in flexible manners. Nonetheless, understanding a 
capital faction's leadership, origins of capital and geographical location helped to 
understand their market actions. Besides the ability to access and mobilize a certain 
size of funds, the identities and affiliations of these factions made a difference to how 
the funds could be used. It was the combination of monetary, social and political 
resources that enable the factions to make an impact on market events. 
6.6 Gangs (Bang) and Charismatic Leaders 
As well as proximity, capital factions in China's futures markets showed properties 
of gangs, or bang. Gangs were built upon sworn brotherhood, loyalty (yiqi ~~), 
extended kinship networks, and shared locality (Zhang L. 2001:105-1 07). Cohesion 
was achieved by mutual obligations between members. To attain personal spheres of 
power (shili ~jJ) within the bang, reputation (mingqi, ~~~)was established by acts 
of risk-taking, demonstration of masculinity, and loyalty to fellow members (Zhang 
L. 2001). 
The trader who told me about his comer team experience clearly cherished 
the value of loyalty and mutual obligations; he despised defection from one's clique. 
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"When placing orders, cooperation and unity was essential. Once we were all going 
short, but one guy placed two long contracts on his own behalf. He was deeply 
trapped. When we discovered that, it took us so much effort to rescue him ... we 
earned 300,000 yuan less." 
The futures people looked up upon faction leaders as heroic figures. For a dahu (big 
player, :7;:p), their reputation could amplify the effects of their capital. Other 
investors in the same proximity clique would follow the leader's actions, and 
aggregate a greater stream of capital flowing in the same direction. Although official 
regulatory spokespersons often condemned synchronized actions and comer events 
as "disrupting the order of the markets", unofficial industry discourse would rather 
give tribute to the masculinity and risk-taking acts of comer leaders. Take the 
example of Guan Jinsheng (~~~), leader of the short side factions in one dramatic 
market episode known as Event 327 in 1995. To struggle against rising futures prices 
against his faction caused by the Ministry of Finance's increase in T-bond coupon 
payout rate, within the last 8 minutes ofthe trading day on 25 Feb 1995, Guan's 
faction shorted bond futures worth I ,460 bi llion yuan (about US$180 billion), which 
was one-third of China's GDP in 1994. 57 Guan threw 7.3 million 58 short contracts 
onto the market. Prices were pushed from 155.75 down to 147.4, turning the position 
of Guan' s faction from a 6-million-yuan loss to a 1-billion-yuan profit. However, the 
regulators decided to roll back all the trades made during the last 7.5 minutes of the 
trading day, exercising a compulsory position close-out at the fixed price of 151.3 
(Yao 1998:103-106; Zhang J. 2001; Li 2004; Wu 2006). Guan was sentenced to a 
17-year jail sentence in 1997.59 
57 Another version says 211 billion yuan, US$26 billion. 
58 Another version says ll million short contracts. 
59 Guan Jinsheng was accused of corruption charges that appeared to be irrelevant to Event 327. He 
was released on bail in 2003 for medical treatment, which was a disguised form of exile or amnesty 
sometimes prescribed by the PRC to political prisoners. According to Yuan (2002), CEDTIC, as the 
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Despite the jail sentence Guan received, the industry and media still saw 
Guan's battle on Treasury bond futures as a heroic epic rather than a criminal offence. 
He did not lose the respect of the securities industry by serving his sentence in jail. 
One executive of a security firm says, "His achievements were remarkable. We are 
all trying to live out his former glory in our business." A female former member of 
SISCO staff said, "In the past I thought he was ruthless. Now I think he is the most 
perfect man!" 
Li (2004) The broken wings of Guan Jinsheng, the king of securities (my translation) 
In May 2007, an Internet search using the Google search engine on the Chinese 
words "~31Z~" (Guan Jinsheng) returned 18,800 results. Amongst the 18,800 
articles, 23% ( 4,320) of them also contained the word "~X:" (Godfather); 19% 
(3,520) contained the word "~t:{t" (hero); 8% (1,550) contained the word "1W~" 
(epic); 3% (572) contained the word '·~~B" (criminal). Apparently behind the 
official discourse about financial order and stability, more internet users saw Guan as 
a heroic leader rather than a criminal. 
Gangs in the wider society usually arose from the lower strata of society, 
where wealth, social status and kinship were inadequate to protect people from 
hostile or adverse environments, such as rural migrants in urban environments 
(Zhang L. 2001:105-1 07); or when they undertook risky activities, such as criminal 
triads. By appealing to loyalty and sworn brotherhood, gang members could obtain 
the much needed support and protection from each other. It was true that capital 
factions in the futures markets were not full-version of gangs, for they did not 
exercise rituals, hierarchies and organizational control to the extent of the Sicilian 
leader of the long factions, should have made approximately 7 billion yuan of profits in Event 327. 
However, CEDTIC had rolled up a debt of over 7.6 billion yuan instead. Yuan and a few trader blogs 
believed that the actual profits were reaped by someone working in CEDTIC through " rat trading"(~ 
il:Et laoshucang). 
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mafia or Hong Kong triads ( - -@!~) (Zhang S. 1979), and the social bonding within 
capital factions was weaker. Nonetheless, it was intriguing that futures investors, as 
owners of capital, would form a social structure that resembled the marginal groups 
of society. 
One plausible reason was that money could not provide all the protection they 
needed. Without the formal institutional umbrella of investment banks or fund 
houses, small-scale investors actually felt insecure and powerless in front of 
regulators, exchanges, and spot-based state enterprises. Once I talked to a broker 
about gambling: 
Siu: Would the regulators see futures trading as a social vice to be restricted, 
something similar to gambling? 
Broker: Not really. The truth is the CSRC is the real casino owner! The three 
exchanges are just "tiger machines" (~JJE~ one-armed bandits) ... they eat 
us. They feed on traders and brokers. 
6. 7 Trading Rules and Appendices 
My field subjects kept telling me that the futures market was a game in both money 
and power. They emphasized that "dumb capital" was no match for political power -
power could readily bring money, but at least in the case of China, it was much more 
difficult for money to be converted into useful forms of power. For lay investors who 
had some money but little political capital, gang-like capital factions were a possible 
way to aggregate funds, obtain useful clientelist ties, and provide mutual support. 
Capital is far from being disentangled from political institutions. Instead, both capital 
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and political power have entered the market mechanism, and both are commodified 
for intense exchange.60 
In summer 2005 I come across a vivid case that illustrates the formation of 
clientelist network across the private and quasi-public sectors. I am granted an 
internship at futures exchange Q. As a temporary member of staff in department G, 
my main responsibili ty is to translate a draft set of trading rules for a "coming-soon., 
commodity derivative product from Chinese into English. The product has already 
passed its first phase of product design, yet it is caught in a long and uncertain 
process, pending for the approval by the CSRC. The set of trading rules has concrete 
mechanisms covering issues in contract specification, risk management, and hedging. 
Yet when it comes to the section on market mak ing, the rules become intriguingly 
abstract and vague. The clauses state principles such as "equivalence in rights and 
obligations" and "for the market's liquidity and efficiency". However, the actual 
obligations and benefits for market makers are left open, to be specified between the 
exchange and individual market makers in individual agreements. A sample of such 
an agreement is included in the appendix of the draft document of the rules, with 
most of the clauses subject to modifications, and all the numerical parameters left 
blank. The blank items include the minjmum transaction volume a market maker has 
to fulfi.ll , the maximum response time for giving bid/ask quotes, and the discount on 
commission fees. The main text of the rules carries an explanatory clause, stating that 
such an arrangement can "contribute to the stabili ty of the trading rules, whlle 
leaving flexibility against market changes". 
This appears to be an extreme form of interpretative flexibility. "Rules" are 
left as a stable but empty husk, while the judgement between legitimate and 
transgressing behaviours is passed on to the appendix and individual agreements, 
subject to a constantly shlfting framework on a case-by-case basis. Four brokers and 
60 See also Wank ( 1999). Zhang L. (200 I: I 07- I I 0), Kipnis ( 1997), Yan ( 1996) and Yang ( 1994) for 
clientelism in post-Communist China. 
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analysts have voiced out their discontent and distrust against exchange Q in separate 
interviews. Some excerpts are quoted here: 
Take the example of exchange Q. Now it has such a bad reputation that some of us 
would avoid trading there altogether. A significant proportion of their trading 
volumes on E and F (futures products) were fabricated by market makers, who were 
aligned by the exchange itself. When the exchange and its market makers got into a 
close pact, outsiders found it extremely unfavourable to trade there. You cannot 
peer through the volume of "real" transactions ... Once you step in, you get eaten. 
We rarely trade products E and F. Those people just draw their own funds to do it 
[produce trading volume]. Their prices are not linked up with international levels, 
and pricing is not a self-initiated market mechanism. You know what we say? People 
from province Q are fraudsters. They've let their markets go so rotten that the state 
can do nothing to it. 
Exchange Pis much better, but we still hear occasional cases. In 200X the long side 
pushed up the prices of product G. The exchange did not allow the short side to 
increase their open position, claiming that delivery warehouses had reached their 
full capacity. The short side was forced to close-out their positions instead. We know 
there had been some affiliated internal interests there. 
The investigative newspaper report by Luo (2005) gave an in-depth and critical 
review on the market making system in China's futures market, verifying that a 
problematic situation indeed existed on exchange Q on products E and F.61 
According to Luo, the market making arrangement of exchange Q has not been 
formally approved by the CSRC, yet the new practice is silently endorsed in 2002 
when the trading volume of products E and F fall to dangerously low levels. Some 
designated market makers enjoy extremely low commission fees on exchange Q that 
61 There is no evidence to assume that the same condition applied to the whole Chinese futures market 
in general, i.e. other futures products at exchanges P, Q and R. In fact in 2006, exchange Q has 
launched other commodity futures products, which are gaining better industry trust and liquidity. 
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literally approach to zero. I asked an executive of exchange Q in a private 
conversation: 
Siu: I don't understand this market making system. Yes you get transient trading 
volume, but the exchange loses its reputation and public trust in the long 
run ... it's like quenching thirst by drinking poison. Why does the exchange still 
do it? 
Executive: We don't want to, but we have no better ways. Look, how many people 
are on payroll here? We need the liquidity. 
Local cluster 
Fig 6.1 The relationship between Exchange 0 and its members 
I 
Case-by-case 
"aggreements" in appendix 
I~ Universal Trading Rules 
I 
All Other Traders I Members 
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The relationship between Exchange Q, its market makers and its members can be 
summarized by Fig 6.1. The relationship between the exchange and most of its 
members is defined by a set of trading mles equally applicable to all members-
represented by the thick dotted line. Meanwhile, the market making system of 
products E and F is a temporary add-on feature devised by Exchange Q. A handful of 
market makers (denoted by "MM" in the diagram) enter into individual agreements 
with Exchange Q. Each individual agreement may be different - represented by the 
thin Jines of variable lengths. This market segment is spanned by the flexible and 
contingent association between Exchange Q and the market makers. 
The links have the following properties: Firstly, each particular relationship is 
uniquely negotiated and established. The content of each relationship depends on the 
network position, social distance from the exchange, financial and social capital , plus 
track records of a market maker. Secondly, the content of these agreements 
(including commission fee, trading volumes to fulfil, and margin deposits) is subject 
to flexible change. Thirdly, there is an element of mutual exchange: the market 
makers bring trading volumes to the exchange, while their commission fees are 
marked down by the exchange. Fourth, the add-on feature is a contingent 
arrangement in response to declining trading volumes of Exchange Q after the close-
down of a major product by regulatory orders. The exchange knows that the 
arrangement is sub-optimal, and is never high-key about these arrangements in 
promotional materials. Fifth, the arrangements are not transparent or made public. 
Sixth, there is an attempt to make these links look more formalised. Each 
"agreement'' takes the form of a contract. The contract is based on a template 
specified by an appendix of the trading rules, yet the important parameters are filled 
in on a case-by-case basis. Seventh, in effect the agreements can serve as a potential 
shortcut that pre-empts the general trading rules, forming a cluster of market makers 
above other members. Eighth, other members and traders are aware of the market 
making arrangements, which dan1age their trust in exchange Q, and their willingness 
to participate in this marketplace. Ninth, staff members of Exchange Q see such 
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arrangement as an ad-hoc solution to the immediate danger of survival and low 
liquidity. 
Figure 6.1 can be understood as a dual structure between two modes of social 
organisation. The bulk segment of the market was operating based on legalism, 
where a set of universal trading rules was applicable. Members were subject to the 
same rights and obl igations defined by codified rules and procedures. In the words of 
Fei ( 1948, 2004 ), this was the "organisational mode of association" (see chapter 2); 
thi s part of the market was the official version how capitalist futures exchanges were 
supposed to operate. 
The ring of market makers can be understood as an exceptional mode of 
market mechanism, initiated by the exchange as an "exception handling" mechanjsm 
to deal with the survival crisis of low liquidity. The market makers are also happy to 
accept their exceptional status, as the result of case-by-case negotiation enables them 
to take advantage of their special status to enjoy lower commission fees. Notice that 
in this exceptional mode, the actors are actively establishing a ring of relationshlps62 
around themselves based on regional clientelism (Wank 1998). Such a ring was 
formed in order to obtain protection, benefits, better judgement in calculation, to 
achieve their goals, and for future prospects. Both sides enter the symbiotic 
relationship for survival purpose, which is less profitable than the "growth coalition" 
in Los Angeles described by Davies (1990). Nonetheless the case of exchange Q is 
still a regionalised coalition fom1ed across the public-private boundary for local 
benefits, where outsiders find it difficult and unfair to compete, and it is not a 
susta inable way of development on a long run. 
62 The counterparts of relationships could be social institutions, individual humans, technological 
artefacts, or cogn itive artefacts ( like information, data, and algorithms). See chapter 7. 
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6.8 Reflections at a Crossroads 
Fig 6.2 The busy Beijing crossroads with traffic lights 
During fieldwork, another observation in urban Beijing helps me to think further 
behind the market making system of Exchange Q. There is a busy crossroads outside 
the futures brokerage company where I served my internship. Each driving direction 
has 3 parallel lanes, such that the crossroads is a hub of 24 Janes (Fig 6.2). By 
crossing the road every day, I quickly learn that a pedestrian green light in Beijing 
means something quite different from places I grew up with. On that crossroads, the 
pedestrian's right of crossing under a green light can be pre-empted by emergency 
vehicles (ambulances, police cars and fire engines); anything that turns right against 
a red light (~l~jft[ij!W., hongdeng youzhuan); anything with two wheels (e.g. bicycles, 
mopeds and motorcycles); anything with three wheels (e.g. rickshaws); sometimes, 
veh icles of high-ranking officials; and sometimes, vehicles with a milita1y car plate. 
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Often by the time all the exceptional vehicles go clear, the pedestrian green light is 
already over, and on the next pedestrian green light all the exceptional vehicles will 
appear again. Sometimes the pedestrian has no choice but to cross the road against a 
red light. 
Exceptions are a set of cases, to which the formal rules are seen by the 
participants as not applying. According to existing traffic laws in Beijing, exception 
1 is a valid course of action; exception 2 is legitimate, but the driver should give way 
to the pedestrians first. Exceptions 3, 4, 5 and 6 are not explicitly defined by laws at 
all. Yet in practice all the six categories of exceptions are exercised, and there is a 
considerable gap between actual social practice and the traffic rules. The exercise of 
exceptions actually serves to redistribute the rights of crossing from some agents to 
others: from non-urgent users to urgent users (exception I); from pedestrians to 
drivers (exception 2); from regular cars and trucks to alternative forms of vehicles 
(exceptions 3 and 4); and, from lay people to state officials (exceptions 5 and 6). 
Behind the informal redistribution of crossing rights, we can notice the elements of 
class (exception 2) and social status (exceptions 3-6) at work. 63 
If we consider rules as a semi-processed form of distributed cognition 
(Hutchins 1995; Hatherly, Leung and MacKenzie 2005; MacKenzie 2006 chapter 2), 
the cognition process does not end within the rule-making process itself. Instead it 
proceeds onwards in every instance of application, when the rules are matched and 
applied against each individual scenario to complete the process. The traffic lights 
example shows that in a rule-following system, how a community perceives, enacts 
and creates exceptions from the rules can lie outside the text of the rules. However it 
influences the overall outcome and performance of the system- for example in this 
case, how the opportunities for crossing were actually distributed. Social agents do 
63 For exceptions 3 and 4, alternative vehicles are sometimes treated as non-entities. For exceptions 5-
6, vehicle owners with higher status get the priority to cross first. 
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not follow the rules blindly, but sometimes they take the initiative and manipulate the 
rules to their own advantage. 
Exceptions are the products of negotiation between social agents and the 
existing rules. Such negotiations can be obvious during a time of social change. In 
our Beijing crossroads, the right-tum drivers are ruthlessly pre-empting the crossing 
rights of pedestrians, partly because they are gaining a new and rapidly rising class 
status- namely as car owners in contemporary urban China. The pride and 
confidence of this "rapidly rising" group is confirmed by some car salesmen I met in 
Beijing. In fact in the first half of2005 in Beijing, the sales of private automobi les 
increased 22.56% from the previous year (Tao 2005). The superior feeling of car 
owners is further embodied by their physical speed and relative safety over 
pedestrians, which enable the drivers to seize an upper hand on the rights of crossing. 
In the times when the interests, status and values of different social groups are on 
rapid shift, new exceptions are formed. 
A second perspective on exceptions is from a systemic design approach: 
exceptions are set up to handle danger. Here exceptions mean handling 
unanticipated events, especially those related to risk and damage, so as to improve 
the overall system resilience. The term exceptions is borrowed from "exception 
handling" in computer science- the occurrence of conditions that change the normal 
flow of programme execution. The term refers to error conditions, such as the 
unexpected encounter of invalid input, hardware failure, and dangerous emergency. 
In mechanical control systems when a passenger is stuck between closing train doors, 
or when a power failure occurs on a crane, even the most routine mechanical system 
has to follow some interrupt subroutines or failsafe procedures. Such exceptions are 
the subversion of the usual programmed logic in order to handle the immediate 
situation. In this sense, exceptions can equip a system of pre-determined logical 
procedures with some limited capacity to react to open inputs and critical changes in 
the surroundings. In our Beijing crossroads example, the first exception belongs to 
this type: emergency vehicles were allowed to override the rules. Their priority came 
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from the fact that they were handling something linked with danger and critical 
damage. 
6.9 Network-based Cognition 
How do investors behave? This chapter has portrayed how financial strength, 
charisma, loyalty, teamwork, political capital, and embedded identities (e.g. spot and 
spotless identities; industrial, provincial, municipal identities) produce capital 
factions. When capital factions interact with each other, external contingent factors 
such as interest rates, policies and weather can exert variable influences on market 
outcomes. Investors are connected as flexible, loosely formed social units, 
continuously in flux. The markets are bound to be unstable and uncertain, because 
the subject matter - social aggregates formed by market agents - has unstable and 
uncertain properties, and these aggregates are subject to frequent reconfiguration. 
From this perspective, we can see that the view of the investors as standalone 
and rational individuals, as assumed by neoclassical economists, is unrealistic. It is 
also simplistic to think that investors act like thoughtless herds or crowds, where 
imitation and contagion easily spread across the community. Some researchers in 
finance have built quantitative models of markets, taking a more reali stic view of 
markets as interdependent social aggregates with conditional, variable and contingent 
properties.64 Under the view of markets as an assemblage of unstable social 
aggregates, a market is less like an economic unit acting under some calculable 
scripts. It is more like groups of investors as interdependent, flexible socio-economic 
aggregates, interacting with each other, and subject to the influence of contingent 
inputs. For the market as a whole, part of the cognitive properties and rationality 
resides in the morphology of social connections, the group dynamics, charismatic 
64 For example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) studies contagion of regional markets in financial crises. 
They find that the markets are better described as interdependent under conditional inputs. 
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leaders, and political capital possessed; part of it resides in the ideology and 
knowledge tools employed (see Hutchins 1996, Hardie and MacKenzie 2006. For 
knowledge tools. see Chapter 6). Distributed cognition contains open-ended 
uncertain properties that cannot be sealed up in a closed script. 
The concepts of Fei (1948) and Qu (1961) on network-based rationality are 
helpful in understanding market connectivity discussed in this chapter. Fei's concept 
of"differential association" (.i.f,¥;f~rni) and Qu's concept of rule of Li (if:mw±~) 
were initially used to analyse social order under Confucianism.65 Under a network-
based rationality, whether a social action is appropriate or not largely depends on the 
relative network positions ofthe actors involved. No universal code or rule is 
applicable to fathers and sons, masters and servants, or winters and summers alike. 
Ethics and values should be calculated according to social di stance and hierarchy; 
differential treatment by network positions is expected. 
The commodity futures markets' capital factions, Exchange Q, and the 
Beijing crossroads are displaying properties of distributed cognition and network-
based rationality. The circuits of cognition largely reside across the relative positions 
of the social network, not only within individual human actors or pre-written rules 
and scripts. The implications of this chapter are two-fold. In the study of markets, 
more emphasis should be given to flexible social connections in market aggregates, 
and how network-based rationality is actually distributed over the markets. This may 
serve as a correction to the earlier over-focus on mathematical precision, certainty 
and predictability, and yield a more realistic understanding of markets. In recent 
years Chinese regulatory officials emphasize that they would like to cherish the 
"characteristics of Chinese markets", and express their concerns over the lack of self 
stabilizing mechanisms (as presented in public speeches, such as Zhou 2007). In 
modem markets under the influence of globalization, typical network-based 
65 Cu ltural essentialism should be avoided in applying these concepts. For details see Chapter 2. 
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rationality systems such as Exchange Q will have difficulties in transparency, 
fairness and scalability, especially when they need to integrate with global markets. 
Tension is likely to arise between the art of guanxi (social relations) and the cultural 
heritage of network-based calculations as "Chinese characteristics of market 
development" on one side, against rule-based rationality, public trust, fairness and 
transparency of public organisation governance. As the markets of China migrates 
towards larger scale, more sophisticated financial products and integration with 
global markets, the tension between rule-based rationality and network-based 
rationality remains a major challenge to be resolved in the nation's development of 
modern markets. 
141 
Chapter 6 Gangs: Network-based Cognition 4 January 2008 
142 
Chapter 7 Prophets: Knowledge Tools 4 January 2008 
Chapter 7 
Priests and Prophets: Knowledge Tools in 
the Markets 
7. 1 A morning in a brokerage firm66 
Commodity futures analyst A starts his day at 7:30am in Beijing. He logs on to an 
English web site called futurcsourcc.com. A dozen of overnight news on soybean 
around the globe pops up: the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
expects the volume of soybean exports to go up to 500-600 thousand tonnes in the 
coming week. Rainfall in Brazil's soybean production zones is heavy. Shipping ports 
in Florida are resuming service after hurricane Katrina. The US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) advises investors not to overreact to the hurricane. 
Then he quickly switches to Webstock ( Wenhua Caijing, :X~~;f*~ ) , a futures 
trading software that was used by over two-thirds of the industry. 67 He opens a 
candlestick chart (see Fig 7.1) on domestic soybean futures; then he draws a few 
lines on screen, finds the intersection, and types a quick paragraph. He summarizes 
the overseas news and gives the day's advice on soybean futures: "Narrow-range 
zhendang (vibrations 2"~) expected today. May gradually build up short position. 
Resistance at 2600, stop loss at 2645, flexible operation." He presses "send" and 
66 Th is section is drawn from my field notes while working as an intern in a futures brokerage firm in 
Beijing. Events happening in this "single morning" are a condensed summary of my participant-
observation over a number of days, across a number of physical locations. 
67 The English name "Webstock" comes from an earlier time when the software company was trying 
to develop software for the stock markets of China. Later on the company specialized into futures, and 
became the mainstream software being used there. 
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before 7:50am, his paragraph will appear on a list of news items on Webstock, 
amongst 5-1 0 soybean commentaries fi·om several major brokerage firms. These 
news items are ready to be clicked and read by thousands of futures traders and 
brokers throughout China. 
Fig 7.1: A typical trading screen ofthe Webstock in terface. 
The top panel shows the live quotes of selected futures contracts; the lower left window shows the 
candlestick chart of the highlighted contract. and its trading volume. All transaction activities on that 
contract keep scrolling up in the lower right panel. 
Trader Breaches his brokerage firm at 7:45am. He walks straight to his room at the 
comer of the office, turns on two screens, and browses through the news. He is in 
charge of a closed fund which started from RMB 500,000, and with increasing 
clients putting their money in, the fund has now grown I 00 times to RMB 50 million. 
He would classify himself as a medium- or long-term trader, whose trading strategies 
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usually have a time frame in terms of weeks or months. For the day his focus lies 
mainly on Shanghai copper. Copper has been rising for over two months. He likes 
the return but now it looks like caution is appropriate. His closed fund gives a 
performance report every 3 months; and he has to put the bulk of his own funds in. 
On top of return from his own share, he can get a 30% ofprofits earned for clients' 
capital, plus part of a 5% management fee. 
Outside his dahushi (big client room), there are 7 cubicles in the office "pool 
area" where the brokers and analysts sit. Young broker C has just returned from his 
client recruitment seminar in a nearby town yesterday. At 8:00am, he opened his 
Webstock interface. He checks for 5 technical analysis indicators. The rise in copper 
is likely to continue. He places a few orders on his simulation account, hoping that 
one day he' ll be ready for real trading. Legal secretary D also arrives at the office 
and gets herself a cup of tea. She is ready to continue her work on a new draft of 
rules and agreement terms for a new closed fund, to be launched in a month's time. 
Back in the brokerage firm's national headquarters a few hours' train away, 
risk controller E was checking her screen for all the margin call demands she made 
yesterday. Accounts with red, yellow and green indicator lights appear, showing the 
assessed level of risk and leverage associated with each account. She picks a few 
accounts and goes on making phone calls to clients. Usually these clients will 
increase their margins or reduce the positions (on futures) they hold, although in 
some cases she can enforce a compulsory close-out of the client' s positions. 
At 9:00am, a long red candlestick appears on the screens of B, C, D and E for 
copper. The market opens. On the bottom-right comer of their screens, lines of 
transaction prices and volumes scroll up. Someone places a 200-lot order and the red 
line jumps up. Trader B, broker C and risk controller E are keeping close watch over 
their screens. As the red line lengthens and shortens, the net values of their various 
portfolios change in real time. A 300-lot transaction occurs, pulling the first minute 
candlestick to the green side (falling prices). The candlestick immediately bounces 
back to the red side as more trades appear. The first minute is over, the first 
candlestick remains red. 
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On the screens of analyst A, trader B, broker C, legal secretary 0 and risk 
controller E, they use instant messenger software like MSN, QQ68 or WenWenTong 
(3t3tif11) to stay in touch with a list of contacts. These contacts cover relatives, 
college friends, former colleagues and business contacts, fe llow traders, brokers, 
clients, analysts, staff in food and oils companies, people working in manufacturing 
companies, and bankers. Broker C types on his QQ: "Copper is still rising." His 
counterpart "Shenzhen Falcon" types back: "I won't hold overnight. Day trade 
should be ok though." Trader B types to banker F, "Heard anything about renminbi 
rate?" Banker F types back, "No." 
7.2 Classrooms in the Markets 
The futures analyst, trader, broker (such as A, Band C) or more generally the 
"futures investor" do not arise spontaneously out of 1.3 bill ion people. Instead, basic 
concepts have to be inaugurated, skills have to be learned, terminology and tools 
have to be familiarized, and values have to be promoted, to create and maintain a 
market community that works. I was surprised by how much time the futures people 
spend in classroom settings and training. The three exchanges, the China Futures 
Association, larger brokerage firms, and trading interface software companies 
frequently organise training sessions for various target groups. 
Those training session given by futures brokerage firms carry a mixed 
purpose of marketing, education and evangelism. In summer 2005, the futures 
markets had too many service providers chasing after too li ttle capita l.69 Most futures 
companies were under pressure to acquire new clients (kaifa kehu rm~~p), and 
68 The most popular instant messenger software used in China, as in 2005. 
69 According to figures from China's Bank Regulatory Comm ission, in 2004 China's futures 
companies held total assets of2 1.2 billion RMB. 
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young brokers often had to travel to smaller or faraway towns, for example, from 
Beijing and Tianjin to peripheral areas in Hebei, or around Shijiazhuang, to conduct 
client acquisition seminars. In a geographically dispersed country, the need to invest 
is partially stimulated, if not totally created, by these brokers-evangelists who 
infiltrate to places further away from commercial urban hubs. These recruitment 
sessions usually include introduction to commodity futures, demonstration of online 
trading and chartist tools, market outlook discussion, and onsite registration. Once I 
also heard a field subject appealing to urban-rural and gender identities in a seminar, 
"since I started working on futures, girls in Beijing look at me with new admiration 
and respect." 
When non-clients become clients, other seminars are held to shape their 
futures trading behaviours. My Beijing brokerage firm held a series of Saturday 
seminars like "introduction to soybean trading" and "programmed trading" for 
clients. These classroom activities have the mixed purpose of client retention, 
boosting trading volumes, and building a more sustainable client base. A manager in 
city P associates the rise of classroom activities with better professional ethics of the 
futures brokerage industry: 
In the past, brokerage houses had a bad practice known as "harvesting green 
veggies" (~HHR). They just acquire new clients, suck their money, let the clients go 
broke, and then find new clients as replacement. But as the futures market has 
developed for 15 years, this is not sustainable now. It is more and more difficult to 
get new clients. Better brokerage houses are now trying our best to retain existing 
clients: give them sensible advice, keep them informed about news and useful skills, 
hoping that they can stay alive and, in return, keep us alive. That's a win-win 
situation. 
Futures exchanges are also involved in providing training sessions. Take the example 
of the mass scale two-day training workshops run by Exchange P (see Chapter 4). In 
summer 2005, Most of the farmers and rural officials are familiar with spot trading of 
soybeans. When the introductory classes explain the basic concepts of hedging and 
speculation, many participants were extremely familiar with the price range of spot, 
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the weight and yield of soybean and com, as well as seasonal fluctuations. Yet many 
had never heard about commodity futures before. 
Fig 7.2 Video snapshot from training course: 
farmer counting piles of cash 
What interests me is how the course materials attempted to shape the identity of rural 
officials, farmers and spot trading companies as "hedgers''. In a ten-minute video 
display, participants were shown a video containing a China Central Television 
(CCTY) news clip. The clip showed fatmers happily counting piles ofbanknotes at 
the end of their harvest seasons (Fig 7 .2), because they had "exercised hedging". 
Furthermore, the "Thousand Village Ten-thousand Doors" participants were also 
given a comic booklet in their training pack. In the booklet a young urban man in a 
blue suit and tie told an old farmer in a white vest and conical straw hat (" Uncle 
Cow'' L!=-* 18) what commodity futures were (Fig 7.3). Speculation was presented as 
the risky sport of surfing, which required very nigh skills - demonstrated by the 
urban young man riding the tides in the comics. The class instructor explained to the 
participants, .. as long as you have spot in your hands, you will not lose money. Do 
hedging, don ' t speculate." 
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Fig 7.3 Urban guy and Uncle Cow: Identities of hedgers and speculators 
The 2-day training courses include a simulated trading session (Fig 7.4), in which 
participants were given a computer terminal to simulate the online trading interface 
of the Webstock software. The onscreen windows of candlestick chatts, news feed, 
and live quotes were synchronized with those in the actual market's trading interface 
(Fig 7.1 ); the only difference is that the transactions made under simulation would 
not exert an influence on the real market. Each participant started with a simulated 
account of one million renminbi. With a leverage ratio, she was free to trade on any 
Chinese commodity futures products for one hour. The patticipant can monitor her 
margin and account balance through a small window on screen (Fig 7.5), and the 
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Fig 7.4: A simulated trading session 
Fig 7.5: Screen snapshot during simulated trading. 
The charts on the left show the price and trading volume: the panel on the right shows all the 
transactions on the contract "Soybean one 051 1"'. The window at the bottom shows the outstanding 
profi t/ loss of my virtual account. 
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class instructor could have an overall view of the outstanding balance of all 
participants. At the end of the session, awards were given to the top three traders in 
class. 
Once the instructor said "start", the candlestick charts on screen started to 
move. I was staring at the 0601 contract of soybean 1, and quickly shorted 100,000 
renrninbi . A transaction window on the right, scrolling up line by line, showed the 
price and volume of individual transactions (Fig 7.4). Rising prices gave red lines, 
and falling ones were green. The current 1-minute candlestick was also flickering, 
red for prices above the opening price and green for those below. When prices are 
linked up with my account' s virtual balance, the speed, the colours, the rhythms, and 
emotional response suddenly became very vivid. Green was going well, red was the 
market against me, and the simulation trader was fully immersed in colours, numbers, 
and shapes of the candlestick charts. After a few flip-flops, finally the first 
candlestick stood as a red one, and another new candlestick started to flicker. The 
time dimension seemed to change - with all the ups and downs, only one minute has 
passed. As a novice I was trying to exercise "stop-loss", which means when the 
market moved against me from 2912 to my target limit of3057, I had to close my 
positions to limit the loss. But again I experienced that it was more easily said than 
done. With all the visual stimulations and emotional excitement, it took a calm mind 
to stick to one's initial trading plan. I changed my plans a few times, increased and 
closed my positions for a few times, and meanwhile started trading copper instead ... 
which was definitely not the sign of what was considered as a good trader. 
Eventually after one hour, my virtual account had a 3% loss. My classmates had 
results ranging from +30% to -60%. 
Amongst all the participants, a small number of people on the "Thousand 
Villages, Ten-thousand Doors" course were already trading some soybean futures for 
soybean farms in Heilongjiang; most participants on the 5-day intermediate futures 
course had some experience in futures trading. However, around one-third of the 
"Thousand Villages and Ten-thousand Doors" participants had barely been using the 
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computer at all , and some had to start by learning how to use a mouse and the 
windows interface. Many of these participants could only sit through the simulation 
session idly, as they were not able to trade on their virtual accounts. In the age of 
online trad ing, basic computer literacy, amongst other skills, is essential to turn "non-
traders" into commodity futures traders. 
Sometimes when conflicting interests and industry practices coexist, training 
activities can become the frontline of negotiation. Exchange Q had a long-term 
attempt trying to win CSRC approval for rolling out options; in 2005 Exchange P 
also attempted to launch weather derivatives. Both exchanges organised industry 
seminars and training courses on the corresponding novel products in May 2005. 
Although both initiatives have not succeeded (not at least at the time of writing), 
such training activities were possible bottom-up channels of policy negotiation. The 
aggregation of industry support was a possible way to "talk back" to the state's 
regulatory grip. 
7.3 Authorities in the Markets 
Besides attending training classes and seminars, the market people actively seek for 
mentors and role models in the markets. During fieldwork, I came across a daily 
five-minute stock market analysis program on China Central Television (CCTV) at 
llpm. The program hosts addressed the guest analyst as "teacher"(laoshi ~ElrP) in 
high respect, and the analyst talked for five minutes every night. Usually the analyst 
showed a candlestick chart blinking with brightly-coloured dots, lines and circles, 
and he (always a male) talked in tones of authority, precision and confidence. 
In the upcoming three days, prices of the Shanghai 'A' shares index will bounce 
within this zone. [yellow lines blinking on a dark screen] We should pay attention to 
the support line here, at XXXX. [pink line blinking] Once the support line is broken, 
prices will slide down to another level of XXXX ... 
After switching off the television, I found that the image of a solemn expert and the 
blinking yellow and pink lines mesmerising. Those days whenever I thought of the 
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Shanghai 'A' shares index, those yellow and pink lines came up as a mental picture. 
Especially when I was not too familiar with the index, the blinking coloured lines 
provided by an expert seemed to be handy reference points against unknowns and 
uncertainties. 
In modern China, it seems that traditional manners and respect -like giving 
seats, pushing doors for others, or waiting patiently in queues- were quickly 
disappearing in urban cities. 70 Yet in the futures markets, people have a high respect 
for experienced traders, brokers and analysts. On industry seminars and internet 
forums, people usually call each other "teacher" (laoshi ~!fr!j, usually used for 
analysts and former academics), "master" (gaoshou rEb~, a term borrowed from 
Chinese martial arts fictions, usually used to address experienced traders), and 
"expert" (zhuanjia W*, a respectful way to address any experienced industry 
personnel). 
Speakers of industry training seminars are often suiTounded by members of 
the audience for their instant messenger (such as MSN, QQ and Wenwentong) 
contacts. Lay investors were eager to keep in touch with experienced traders for 
information, insights and advice. With an instant messenger box placed next to their 
online trading screens, the cost of maintaining ties with other market people is lower. 
Most traders keep their instant messengers connected during trading hours. 
They keep tuning their trading strategies according to the experts they trust. It is 
through such communication that learning and imitation become a continuous 
process. Jargons, procedures, paradigms and attitudes are passed on, while the 
learners take hands-on practices upon the current market situations. The following is 
a sample extract from a ''sharing" section of a futures website, describing how novice 
A gets advice from experienced trader Bat the end of a trading day. 
70 This is a general impression in 2005 living in the five fieldwork cities, as compared to other 
Chinese societies in Hong Kong, Taiwan or Singapore. 
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A: May I consult for your opinions .. . If I give you my analysis on today's a0309 
candlestick chart, can you point out my mistakes? 
B: OK. 
A: Today a0309 is rolling down with a zig-zag. Combined with yesterday's 
candlesticks it's gloomy clouds all over. A fall is expected. But the midpoints of 
the candlesticks seem to move up and contradicts the falling trend. The 5-day 
MA [moving average line] is spiking through the 10-day MA. The 10-day MA 
goes down, but the 20-day and 30-day MAs go mildly upwards. In the recent 
future the market is still seeking for a direction. It's just bouncing to and fro. 
B: That's correct but not complete. You also need to devise a strategy. 
A: What have I missed, what kind of strategy do I need? 
B: Each candlestick is not a standalone entity. It should be analysed in the light of 
patterns. What's the pattern from 4 Mar to 11 Mar? 
A:??? 
B: It's a reversed island, implying strong support at this position. 
A: Reversed island on a high price range? I don't believe it. Reversed islands should 
be at lower ranges! 
B: High and low are relative. The value nexus is rising, and the price takes in all 
factors. You should also take a look at the charts of US soybean. If US soybean 
form a big triangular breakthrough, it will reach 630-650 US cents. 
A: Yes, that's right. 
[WJ.A.MJJJ. http://www. funuo. com/newg/qhsj/xta/F utures life/Life data028. html 
Accessed 30 Sep 2007, my translation] 
Besides trusted experts that they can talk to, the futures people like to talk about 
legendary figures out of their own reach. Take the example of Zhang Wenjun (~:5( 
1fl), who got the nickname "number one futures trader" (M:£-~31!-m-~!l!i=.f.) and 
"number one futures killer" (WliT.I~-~=.f.) in China' s futures circles. I did not have 
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the opportunity to meet him personally, but a number of brokers and traders often 
mentioned his name. Zhang rarely gave interviews to the media, and Yang (2006) in 
the Futures Daily was the only full interview I could get hold of- the article got 
widely cross-posted on futures blogs and forums. The report describes Zhang as "a 
calm and refined" (~3Z:ft) man. Zhang came from Dalian, and he started working 
in Dalian's hotel Furama in 1988. In 1992 he started trading bank-issued bonds, and 
in 1993 he joined Dalian's first brokerage firm. He moved from a futures broker to 
an investment adviser, then became a trader (caopanshou f*fi=f.). In 1996 he started 
trading for himself as an individual. Some field subjects told me that it is impossible 
for me to talk to Zhang, as he is a low-key person and he keeps a distance from all 
forms of spotlight. People marvel at his experience of going bankrupt for four times, 
each time being able to start from scratch again and climb back to the heights of 
wealth. People talk about his fast and intense style of day-trading, his legendary 
transaction volume, his emphasis in intuition, his principles of investment, his 
personal philosophy, and quote his words. They also gossip about his ranking in 
trading volume, how the DCE rebated commission fees to him as an award, his 
marriage problems during one of his bankruptcies, how he managed to make novel 
profits from trading although he had to be hospitalized for two weeks, and how he 
managed to turn around from one particular adverse position by soliciting money 
from "old ladies' accounts". The more they talk about Zhang Wenjun as an industry 
legend, the more they project their hopes and imagination of what a successful 
person in the markets should be. 
Foreign role models of success like Jim Rogers, Leo Melamed, George Soros, 
and Warren Buffett were frequently quoted in talks, magazines and newspapers. 
Take the example of Leo Melamed, who was the former chairman of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME), and he was well-known in China as the "father of 
financial futures" by his leading active role in the development of financial futures in 
the 1970s-80s. On 30 Sep 2005, Leo Melamed went to Zhengzhou to launch a 
Chinese version of his book Leo Melamed on Markets, and I had the opportunity to 
sit among an audience of two hundred people. Only 3-4 local journalists struggled to 
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talk to him after the event. The rest of the audience were from the futures industry, 
but they only watched him in awe from afar, silently taking notes with admiration. At 
the end of the event when Melamed took a souvenir red jacket from the Zhengzhou 
Commodity Exchange, he wore it immediately with glee. The action left some of my 
field subjects bemused and startled, as this friendly gesture was not expected from a 
high powered figure like Melamed. 
Sometimes these foreign investment gurus were treated with a dedication that 
was nearly re ligious. In a large conference room of one futures company in Beijing, I 
found a quote from George Soros etched on a wall of mirror in a gigantic font, 
overlooking the whole office from a central position, " I come to this world as a 
penniless pauper, but I will not leave it empty handed." [Original Engl ish source 
unknown; my reverse translation from Chinese into English]. The company's 
manager proudly presented it to me as the motto and spirit of the firm, '·Our 
members of staff bear this in mind every day. It reminds us about the zeal to chase 
after our dreams." The rise of investment gurus as role models seems to reflect a 
simultaneous, deeper shift of values. A young financial journalist in Beijing told me 
that starting from the 2000s, the young generation of China has fina lly discarded the 
last trace of moral burdens against the pursuit for material wealth. Getting rich had 
once been associated with corruption of character in the 80s or early 90s, but that 
was no longer true for graduates in the 2000s. "Our classic belief was that a 
gentleman with respectable character should lead a modest li fe (:#5-T-ll!fl~) ... nobody 
believes in that anymore. Now we can blatantly say that we want to earn a lot of 
money, and it's totally ok. As long as what I earn are normal profits from the markets, 
no one would say anything against that." 
7.4 Fundamental and Political Analysis 
When Ellen Hertz (Hertz 1998) did her ethnography on Shanghai's stock market in 
the mid 90s, she listed fundamental analysis, technical analysis and political analysis 
as the three major forms of analysis in the stock markets. Fundamenta l analysis is the 
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prediction of commodity prices by supply and demand factors: production, 
consumption and inventory. The analysis of factors such as changes in consumer 
market trends, weather and natural disasters for agricultural commodities, currency 
exchange rate, export and import forecasts belong to fundamental analysis. 
In a pragmatic light, most field subjects who practise fundamental analysis in 
China' s commodity futures market are aware that the statistics and figures they use 
are incomplete, contain errors, and are viable to human manipulation (see also Didier 
2007 and Holm 2007). While practitioners of fundamental analysis still use such 
knowledge intermediaries to estimate the "intrinsic value" of prices, they are aware 
of possible discrepancies between statistical representation and the world "out there", 
and are willing to make adjustments on the figures from time to time. 
On the five-day training workshop in City P, a soybean analyst talked about 
how to use fundamentals by giving an example of the floods in 1998. Indigenous 
knowledge in farming was needed to translate seemingly apparent news into useful 
expectations of supply and demand. However, not many market participants had the 
adequate expertise in soybean farming. 
"In that spring and summer, the news said that Heilongjiang (~~g'{I), 
Nunjiang (~ri) and Songhuajiang (f01€7I)71 were having very bad floods ... Harbin 
(ng-m79iff 2 could only be reached by planes. When we heard about the floods, many 
traders just took a long position. The prices of soybean rose from 2400 on 11 May 
up to 2700 on 24 Aug, but they were proved to be wrong. The harvest was not bad 
at all! In autumn, prices quickly rolled down to 1800, and tumbled all the way down 
until June next year ... " 
"To find out why, I went to a soybean farm, got up at 3 :30 in the morning, 
and squatted by the fields with soybean farmers at 4:30, smoking. The guys said, 
7 1 Rivers in northeast China. 
72 A major city in the northeast. 
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'Douzi[beans] are growing well this year.' I asked them about the floods. They said 
that water from the floods stayed in the troughs of the fields, while douziand corn 
grew on ridges. They taught me the folk idiom, 'Floods move in thin lines, but 
draughts arrive in big batches c 7JOI~-~ft,1 • .!f..*- J;:J-1· l .'The effect of floods on 
soybean was limited." 
The use of fundamentals was impeded by a low level of trust in statistical figures in 
China. There were cases of government bureaus at various levels tampering with 
statistics, with motivations in tax evasion, financial subsidies, competing with 
neighbouring bureaus, or gaining political favours (See Didier 2007 for issues of 
performativity in agricultural statistics.) For example in Santai village c= t:J;ff), 
Maiwang town GMcfff.~'!i), Hubei province, in 2004 the village council had inflated 
the annual income of the village's private sector enterprises from RMB 80 million to 
RMB 1.009 billion in 2004. As the newspaper investigative report shows, the 92% 
fabrication could be dated back to the 1980s. Despite a gradual decline in the town's 
local economy, Maiwang town occupied an important position in the local political 
hierarchy. The town council officiaLs needed positive figures to maintain political 
favours; reporting the truth would give a seemingly abrupt drop in economic figures, 
and a big minus on one's political career profile (Zhu H.-j. and Rao 2005). 
The dramatic case is only the tip of the iceberg for China's economic 
statistics. On the futures training course in City P, a soybean analyst describes how 
difficult it is to get a realistic picture of the fundamentals out of official figures. After 
a tax cut carried out by the state to provide subsidies to soybean farmers in 2003, the 
official area of soybean farmland suddenly leapfrogged to a +40% increase from 
2003 to 2004. In the same year, the official figure of "wasteland" (1i}f(Jfu, 
wuhuangdi) suddenly decreased by -89%. Seemingly previous figures had been 
seriously distorted for the sake of tax evasion. He also tells a story how he had tried 
to obtain more realistic estimates from a soybean farm, using extraordinary means: 
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"The person in charge told me that they had 40 thousand acres of soybean farmland, 
as reported to bureaus above. 73 Then we started drinking baijiu [a strong alcohol, 
40-60% mool] . After the second glass, the figure jumped to 80 thousand acres. 
Third glass, 150 thousand. I didn't know how many glasses we had. When both of 
us were throwing up, he said, 'hey you're a good brother. I'll let you know, hie, it's 
220 thousand.' We kept drinking until we were lying on the road outside my hotel. 
He told me the figure was 320 thousand acres ... Other crops were planted on the 
rims of their fields as a decoy, but the real crops in most of the fields were soybean. 
The last sentence I remembered before a black-out was, 'Sometimes corn is difficult 
to sell, but you can always sell your soybean. We plant soybean like cash. "' 
Figure 7.6: A state reserve grana r·y (photo taken d ur ing one of the training class 
visit sessions to a designated delivery warehouse of Exchange P) 
Political decisions are involved in what kind of data is publicly available. The China 
Foods and Oils Infotmation Centre ( cp~~~;j!iyffi{8,~,cp {,') is a national statistics 
unit that compiles various "composite livestock indices" (e.g. live pigs, li ve cattle 
etc.) on a reeul ::tr basis, and disseminate the indices as ptice references throughout 
the country. However, the state withholds state reserve inventory figures (kucun Jlf-i'J) 
for grains, posing extra challenges to fundamentals analysis. Expetienced analysts do 
make estimates of the state reserve inventory based on the public fi&rures of 
73 Many large soybean farms in nottheast China had a quasi-military background. In the 1950-60s, 
wasteland in the area was cul tivated by stationed troops as a defence buffer area against the then 
Soviet Uniott. Many such farms were located in the area known as Beidahuang (~t*:WD, an area 
where pol itical dissidents were sent to labour on the farms during the Cultural Revolution. 
165 

Chapter 7 Prophets: Knowledge Tools 4 January 2008 
production, imports, exports, and consumptions. Yet figures like losses through 
mould (meibian ~}~)are never made public. Therefore after accumulated years, 
there may be a wide margin of error carried over in the estimated figures of analysts. 
In an interview, an analyst says that with the memory of famines in 1959-60, it is 
understandable why a populous country like China still treats grain inventory in state 
reserves (Fig 7.6) as strategic state secrets in the 2000s. Yet he thinks that by making 
fewer data publicly available, China is not exerting its full potential to influence 
global grain prices, and domestic prices are more vulnerable to fluctuations from 
abroad. 
In 2005 in China's commodity futures markets, people were highly sensitive 
to political news and their implications for investment. People talk about politics all 
the time- what are the state leaders talking about in the National People's Congress 
this year? Would the government intervene with the overheated property markets? 
Would Fagaiwei (the National Development and Reform Commission, ~c)(~) 
launch a new round of price control measures? Which futures exchange is getting 
better political favours from the central regulatory bodies and has a chance to launch 
novel products? When would China's futures industry be open to foreign investment? 
People read political news, talk about politics, and make trading decisions based on 
politics all the time. Yet "political analysis" appears to be something spontaneous 
and informal to my field subjects. Nobody in the industry would actually list 
"political analysis" as a separate session in a futures training workshop alongside 
fundamental analysis and technical analysis. Nor is it listed as a separate item in the 
professional qualification examinations. Yet their political sensitivity appears to be 
so spontaneous that they are immersed in it, like fish swimming in water. A number 
of field subjects tell me that they take political analysis as part of fundamental 
analysis, and the two cannot be easily separated. 
Perhaps in China, it is difficult to have a clear-cut boundary between politics 
and the states of supply and demand. The two are closely intermingled and 
influenced by each other, such that politics is an integral part of the state of economic 
reality. A broker once told me, "Politics is just like futures. Long or short, you'd 
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gotta get the direction right. Things will go against you if you get in the reverse 
direction (}Jrtt/ifit& ? )." Most field subjects can tell a number of stories about 
policy risks in the futures markets. From operating a brokerage firm to running a 
private fund, sometimes it is wise to invite some government bureaus or para-
governmental enterprises to become minority shareholder(s), so as to get infonnation, 
support, and protection from the official side. However, getting the support of one 
governmental body may not guarantee safety, because political risks can come fi·om 
the national , provincial , municipal , or industry level. Once a broker showed me 
around the city ofTianjin, where in the middle of busiest district, I saw a 50-floor 
skyscraper standing there, half-built but abandoned. (Fig 7. 7) ·'Look, this is the 
Fig 7.7 The abandoned construction site of the former Tianjin Commodity 
Exchange 
infamous lanweilou (;lf:#J~{J, abandoned construction project) of the futures 
industry.'· According to the broker, the late Tianjin Commodity Exchange was got 
the support of the municipal government. It used to have around I 00 members, and 
by 1998 each member had put in around I 00,000 renminbi into the building project. 
Then the CSRC suddenly announced that the whole Tianjin Commodity Exchange, 
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together with ten futures exchanges in other provinces, were to be abolished. 
Members abruptly withdrew their seats, the price ofTianjin red bean futures 
plummeted, and there was no further money to continue the construction project. The 
building was just left here, half-way done, for seven years to rust. 
Sometime the same policy news can lead to opposite interpretations (see also 
Abola:fia 2005). Between May 2001 and January 2002, the Chinese government 
announced a series of new policies concerning genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs). In March 2002, the Dalian Commodity Exchange changed the contract 
specifications for "soybean 1 ": delivery can only be made with domestic, genetically 
unmodified soybean; it cannot be substituted by imported, genetically modified 
products. The longs thought that since the use of imported soybean would be limited, 
prices of domestic non-GMO products should rise. Conversely, the shorts thought 
that past reference prices should still hold, because the food and livestock industry 
would still heavily rely on imported GMO soybeans, and prices were likely to be 
overheated by the longs. The two sides got engaged into a heated struggle, and the 
number of outstanding contracts rose steadily in 2002. In May 2001 to August 2001 
the longs were on the winning side, pushing prices from 1900 to 21 00 renminbi per 
tonne. From August 2001 to January 2002 the shorts were having a better say, and 
prices slided back to 1900. Throughout 2002 prices rose all the way up to 2700 
around December, until most of the shorts surrendered and cancelled out their 
positions. Some online futures blog entries (for example, www.cnfol.com) mention 
about the activities of gang-like factions on both sides as the main reason behind 
price movements. However, news on GMO policies served as the major trigger that 
attracted the attention of both sides on soybean futures at the first instance (21 CN 
2004). 
Due to the limitations in what kinds of fundamental data are availability, and 
a general scepticism towards those fundamental figures available (statistics, kucun), 
fundamentals analysts are aware of the possible gap between reality (statutes of 
supply and demand), and the representation form of knowledge (statistics and prices). 
Fundamental analysis emphasizes that signs (prices) and representations (statistics 
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and figures) should be ultimately grounded upon the real world (material, political 
and social) situation of supply and demand. Yet when analysts have limited access to 
trustworthy supply and demand statistics, political analysis and technical analysis 
become more practical tools for traders and analysts. 
7.5 Chartism 
Chartism, or technical analysis, is the analytical tool most widely adopted by my 
field subjects in 2005. With price levels (y-axis) plotted against time (x-axis), the 
chart is a visual representation of prices, volume, momentum and historical data, 
condensed in an easy-to-comprehend and intuitive glance. While the validity of using 
charts for prediction is controversial, field observations show that charts have an 
extra basic purpose to fulfil: as a medium for the market participants to "know" the 
market, and as a common visual vocabulary to communicate (see Preda 2007). 
The candlestick chart is the most popular type of chart used in China's 
markets. It originated from Japanese rice futures traders in Osaka in the 17th century. 
Within each time interval (a "candlestick"), the high and low are plotted by two thin 
vertical lines protruding up and down, while a bulk rectangular box in the middle 
marks the opening and closing price. Candlesticks that close higher than the open are 
coloured red, and those that close lower are marked green. The information 
illustrated by a candlestick chart is identical to that of a bar chart. However, a 
candlestick gives more visual emphasis to the open and close (by the bulk volume in 
the middle), and to the direction of price movement (by the colour scheme). 
7.5.1 Communication 
The following is a dialogue between ten staff members of Exchange Q, and a global 
futures brokerage fmn executive who visited the exchange. Although all of them 
were professional practitioners in the futures industry, the use of different epistemic 
tools led to surprisingly wide gaps of communication. 
172 
Chapter 7 Prophets: Knowledge Tools 4 January 2008 
Exchange official: What kind of charts (OW, Tu) do you read? 
Overseas executive: We don't read charts ... We calculate. We have mathematical 
models programmed on our systems, and we use them to calculate if a derivative is 
a bargain or not. When we find a bargain, we trade. 
His words were met with stunned faces. Most of the representatives from Exchange 
Q are accustomed to comprehend the markets by candlestick charts. They are 
prepared to learn about new forms of charts, but market movements without charts 
seem incomprehensible. Conversely from the overseas executive's experience in 
global financial derivatives, mathematical models similar to the Black-Scholes model 
are widely employed on a day-to-day basis. "Calculation" is grounded on the 
assumption that there is a theoretical intrinsic value. When there is a wide gap 
between this theoretical intrinsic value and the empirical price, a "bargain" can be 
identified. Such bargains may be revealed as colours and blinks on the user interface, 
but graphical charts are not necessary. On the meeting, the "chart people" and the 
"calculation people" seemed to have difficulties understanding each other. 
Similarly on another seminar about programmed trading (held by my 
brokerage company during the Beijing internship), a speaker with over ten years' 
experience in programmed trading on Wall Street introduced how computer 
programs could be set up to execute parallel, automatic trading "agents" on hundreds 
of contracts. A question from the audience shows how the understanding of some 
chartists can be framed by their epistemic tools. 
Q [from chartist]: I don't understand trading without charts. can you show us the 
chart? When you were de~onstrating the eight simultaneous trading windows just a 
moment ago, oh tell me, what is actually happening on the charts? 
A [programmed trading specialist]: The chart is for human perception only ... When 
it's automatic, the program will estimate the risks, conduct analysis, and launch 
trading instructions automatically. The program is an extension of the strategy in 
your brain. We don't need the charts. 
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7.5.2 Diffusion 
Technical analysis is largely diffused across the futures community through trading 
software companies and futures brokerage firms. Both provide tools and information 
for technical analysis and fundamental analysis to their clients as value-added 
packages. Take the example of the software Webstock. By offering a custornizable 
graphical interface and bundling dozens of"technical indicators" (such as moving 
average, MACD, RSI, waterfall etc.) into the software package, the software 
company can expand its user base, retain existing clients, and build a continuous 
product upgrade pathway. Brokerage firms help to disseminate the chartist's tools 
and techniques from professionals and amateurs by offering analyst reports, online 
advice and seminars. 
When futures were introduced to China in the early 1990s, technical analysis 
quickly followed. In the early days only a limited number of foreign reference books 
were translated into Chinese, and the choices available to industry practitioners were 
very limited. An influential one is Technical Analysis of the Futures Markets - a 
Comprehensive Guide to Trading Methods and Applications by John Murphy. It has 
successfully diffused across the industry. The book appears on most futures training 
workshops, and analysts told me that to understand futures I must have my own copy 
of it. 
John Murphy was the director of futures technical research with Merrill 
Lynch, and a former technical analyst for CNBC-TV. The English version of the 
book was first published in 1986, and according to a preface he wrote in a later 
version (Technical Analysis of the Financial Markets, 1999: xxvii-xxix), he claims 
that the book "has been referred to by many in the field as the 'Bible' of technical 
analysis", is used by the Market Technicians Association as a primary source in their 
testing process for the Chartered Market Technician program, cited by the Federal 
Reserve (US), and translated into eight languages. The Chinese version was 
translated by Shengyuan Ding (T~JG) and first published by Earthquake 
Publishing, Beijing in 1994. The copy I bought in 2005 was already its ll 1h print. 
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Earthquake Publishing is the publishing arm ofthe state seismology bureau, 
China Earthquake Administration (cp~tllif.l'}ijj). As China proceeds along economic 
reforms, the publisher has broadened its book catalogue from seismology and applied 
science to more popular titles in investment and business management, including a 
number of"classics" in technical analysis. These books are widely used by industry 
practitioners, but among China's academics of finance and economics they never get 
higher regards than mere folk knowledge. When I showed John Murphy's book to a 
finance academic in Beijing from a prestigious research institute, he shrugged his 
shoulders, "Earthquake? Don't waste your time on it." 
The official study guidebook for China's National Futures practitioner 
qualifications examinations (China Futures Association 2007) attempts to strike a 
careful position on chartism. In the "fundamental futures knowledge" study 
guidebook, 4 1 out of 597 pages are dedicated to various techniques in technical 
analysis. The most popular techniques employed by the industry in China are 
incorporated: Elliot wave theory (three pages, see also Murphy 1999:Chapter 13), 
cycle theory (one page), and Gann's theory (three pages)- which sometimes carries 
a bad name like "financial astrology" (see below). Nine other pages cover a harsh 
critique on chartism from an academic point of view. By incorporating the 
viewpoints from both camps, the official qualification exam authority appears to 
recognize both the orthodox knowledge claims from academia, as well as the current 
pragmatic practice of the industry. 
7.5.3 Gann's theory: Magic and Mystery? 
Amongst various schools of chartism, the branch called Gann's theory by William D. 
Gann (1878-1955, New York trader since 1908) is sometimes taught with an air of 
mystery, and an aura of cosmic awe. For example on the "Sacred Science Institute" 
internet website, Gann's theories are classified under "cosmo-economics" 
(http://www.sacredscience.com/gannl, accessed 18 Aug 2007), and the website 's 
front page carries the subtitle "a mystical magical cosmological portal". On the 
English Wikipedia online dictionary's entry "financial astrology" (defined as "the 
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practice of relating/correlating the movements of celestial bodies to events in 
financial markets"), William Gann is listed as a "financial astrologer of note'· (as 
accessed Aug 2007). 
The cycle theory of William Gann became popular in China from the mid 
1990s on. Representative published titles include Gann 's Theories OIJI~IJj[IDf!f ) in 
1995 by Bozhong Huang (:Ji.fljcp) (also published by Earthquake), Uncovering the 
Secrets of Gann 's Predictions - an analysis of China's stock market cycles { ¥IJi~t~tl 
mr~.fk:,- cp~~ifj-fl§~ffl]:t{Jj,J¥;fjf) in 200 1 by Ming Feng (13J.J;{I\), and others. 
Some Gann chartists in China also run workshops charging for expensive training 
fees since the mid 1990s. 
Fig 7.8 Gann's cycle theory: (Left) the special numbers are chosen from a spiral 
path in concentric circles. (Right) Graphical illustration ofwhy the numbers 45, 
90, 120, 135 etc. are chosen as turning points 
According to Gann's cycle theory, the price and time dimensions of the market can 
be mapped into a circle. Divide 360 degrees of a circle by 3, 4 and 8 to obtain the 
"magic numbers": 120,240 and 360 (divisions by three); 90, 180,270 and 360 
(divisions by four); 45, 90, 135, 180, 225,270, 315 and 360 (divisions by eight). 
Unfold the circle into a linear scale. By choosing a starting point and an interval 
width, the unfolded circle can be mapped along both time and price axes on the 
market chart. The school ofGann believes that when market activities on the chart 
come across the "magic numbers", the market is likely to be at its peak or trough (i.e., 
trend reversal point). Especially when both time and the price run into magic 
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numbers. ·' resonance" between time and price will occur, and there is li kely to be an 
acute trend reversal (seminar notes from Ming Feng, 2005; Fig. 7.8). 
Fig 7.9 Training session conducted by Ming Feng on chartism and Gann 's 
theory, July 2005, City P 
ln my five-day training course in city P, the organisers invited Ming Feng from 
Shenzhen, from where he took a four-hour flight to reach City P to give a full day ' s 
talk on the cycle theory ofGann. During the whole day, Ming Feng showed us 54 
charts on powerpoints, illustrating graphical examples of such cycles on various 
market products (Fig 7.9). The time span of examples he takes ranges from two 
months to 35 years. To illustrate the validity of cycles, time segments with the 
duration of a ··magic number" are marked on the charts, with peaks and troughs of 
prices highlighted by colour circles. The charts include prices of the Shenzhen equity 
index, Shanghai equity index, London copper, the GOP of China, US dollar 
exchange rate, Japanese natural rubber, Hong Kong' s l-Iang Seng index (an equity 
index), the CRB index (from the Commodity Research Bureau in the US), the Nikkei 
index, Zhengzhou wheat futures, Shanghai copper futures, Dalian soybean, Shanghai 
natural rubber, US soybean, and US cotton. 
The number 180 means that, market t rends tend to pause every half year. 90, 180 
and 360 are also likely reversal points. How do we decide which one is a trustworthy 
pattern? First we have to find a starting point on the t imeline, and decide what the 
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interval is. Then we can make predictions .. . beware sometimes a peak may be 
confused with a t rough. 
Some Gann chartists would justify the theory by loosely relating it to natural 
phenomena, such as seasonal, tidal and astronomical cycles as parallel patterns of 
"cosmic order'', or the "golden ratio" in the structures of sea shells. Ming Feng had a 
rather reflective outlook. He was less inclined to explain things simply by drawing 
parallels with cosmic causes; he admitted that the logical validity of Gann's cycle 
theory remains unclear, and the choice of starting points and intervals in the cycle 
theory can only be verified by hindsight. 
What does this circle actually mean? Gann's theories carry a weakness that, these 
things are never made clear. You cannot explain why we have a circular diagram ... 
but after we get the circular diagram, we can verify it by empirical evidence on the 
markets. 
On that evening some classmates talked about the class, and the reactions were 
mixed. Some classmates were skeptical that Gann's theory is complete voodoo. 
Others withheld the theory in awe and wonder, being amazed at the accuracy of cycle 
times on the powerpoint charts. Some others found parallel traits between Gann's 
theories and Chinese classics in cosmology, philosophy and mathematics, such as!-
Ching(~*~), and they believe that Gann's theory "has some significance". For 
those who believed in Gann' s theory, they could not explain actually why the cycles 
occur, yet they nearly all held an attitude of humble divination. 
7.5.4 Template for Action 
Besides representation, communication and diffusion of knowledge, chartism can 
also serve as a 'template for action' (Bray 2007:73). A chartist in Beijing told me 
that when China first started to have futures markets in the early 1990s, most people 
used to rely on an earlier software system called Shihua (i:!t~). It was an interface 
built upon the DOS platform. People had to remember short-cut keys, in contrast to 
the point-and-click, mouse-based windows platform of the later Webstock (3(-~::f 
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*-i~D system. Candlestick charts were not available then, and to some extent traders' 
actions were framed by the charts available to them. The amount of detail in the 
charts and how they are augmented provide some cues to the actions that may be 
taken next. 
[On the Shihua system] We could only see one simple line out there. We long when 
it rises; we short when it falls! Now the tools are much better, and we can devise 
more sophisticated analysis based on patterns of the candlesticks. 
He showed me how to use the candlestick charts. Switching quickly from 1-minute, 
3-minute, 5-minute, 1 0-minute, 1-hour, 1-day, 1-week and 1-month candlestick 
charts, one gets a "three-dimensional perception" from short-term to long-term scale 
about the market movements. He suggested that the exercise is helpful for 
developing pang an (i.§i~), which means intuitive feelings about market directions. 
He demonstrated to me how to draw support and resistance lines, so as to set up stop-
loss limits and trading strategies. These actions were made possible with candlestick 
charts, but not on the early version of Shihua systems where traders could only see a 
simple price line. The graphical representations available to traders tum out to 
influence how they think and act. This is consistent with Bray (2007:73) on tu (Ill 
image) in the context of technical images in the history of China: tu is an encoding of 
knowledge that serves as a template for action. 
Like other typical chartists, my field subject beLieved that "the chart 
incorporates all the vital information from the market." He gave me the impression 
that he was really fond of using the candlestick chart, and he relied on it heavily in 
his trading operations. However on further discussion, he indicated that his choice 
was mainly utilitarian. He felt no particular ideological conviction or emotional 
attachment to chartism. He may readily be converted or "reconfigured" to other 
forms of knowledge tools, ifbetter investment returns seem more likely. 
Siu: In the future if everybody in the market switch to another tool, will you still 
stick to candlestick charts? 
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Chartist: Whatsoever tool helps me to earn money, I'll use it! If we have a better 
tool one day, I 'll switch. 
7.6 Frames and Consensus 
This chapter is a record of the subtle fabrics of the futures markets: how knowledge 
is encoded and diffused across the market. In the risky and uncertain life of futures 
traders, market participants are seeking for a "meaningful totality" to make sense of 
the market world. What kind of roles and identities do they have? How to 
comprehend and react to the market? How to devise winning trading strategies? 
From field observations, we can identity traits of roles similar to what Weber 
(1968:439-451) describes as "priests and prophets" in a religious society. The staff 
members of brokerage firms, trading software companies and futures exchanges are 
intermediaries quite similar to priests. They occupy formal office positions in the 
market hierarchy. It is their vocation to take an active role to diffuse knowledge and 
values in futures trading to different geographical areas and social strata. They seek 
to expand the boundaries of the futures markets, so as to sustain fluidi ty in market 
operations. They provide rules, procedures, public meetings and communication 
channels for traders to participate in the market community. Through classroom 
activities and media contents, grass-root traders acquire vocabulary, skills and 
identities (such as "futures people", "hedgers", or caopanshou) for futures trading. 
On the other hand, analysts serve as an intermediary between the investor and 
the revelation of uncertain and risky events. Some practices of the market analyst are 
comparable to that of the prophet - that is, to predict future events and to provide 
guidelines for appropriate actions. These practices demonstrate how framing tools 
(Beunza and Stark 2004), such as chartism and fundamentals, can be used to derive 
appropriate action plans. In the case of Gann ' s theories, some of the framing models 
carry conspicuous elements of mystic magic, which - in apparent paradox -tightly 
fits into a futures community that relies heavily on computers, precision and numbers. 
Grass-root traders also look up to a few top traders (such as Zhang Wenjun, Guan 
181 
Chapter 7 Prophets: Knowledge Tools 4 January 2008 
Jinsheng and Leo Melamed) as morale icons, authority figures and role models. 
Common traders tend to follow their trading advice, as well as look up to them as 
examples of values and good trading practices. These authorities show traits of 
exemplary prophets as discussed by Weber (1968:447-450). 
Besides the priests and the prophets, the role of non-human objects as market 
intermediaries should not be overlooked. As shown by the migration from simple 
line charts on the Shihua system to candlestick charts on the Webstock system, charts 
(and other forms of knowledge encoding) do shape the traders' understanding of the 
market world, and influences their trading actions. The priests, the prophets, and the 
non-human intermediary artefacts are crucial fabrics of the markets. Without these 
intermediaries of perception, knowledge and communication, it is unlikely that 
trading activities can easily arise "spontaneously" from potential supply and demand. 
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Chapter 8 Technology-linked Gender Shift 
8. 1 Women on the Trading Floor 
Fig S.l a, 8.1 b, S.lc, S.td: Female red jackets working at Exchange P 
In Exchange P, the trading floor had 288 physical seats arranged along nine rows of 
semi-circular benches. There one can see the trading floor representatives, striking 
their tenninal keyboards, talking over the phone, browsing technical charts and 
reading newspapers. Floor representatives are also known as " red jackets'· 
(hongmajia *)I.~EJ3 ), because they had to wear red jackets showing the trading seat 
numbers on their backs. With the help of some field subjects, 1 was able to join the 
"Thousand Villages, Ten-thousand Doors'" training classes to visit the trading floor 
several times. Visitors were allowed to walk through a semi-circular con·idor on the 
outer rim of the back of the trading floor and take pictures. As the trading floor was 
separated from the visitor conidor by a glass wall , to the visitor's eyes the trading 
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floor slightly resembles an exhibition glass bowl. Peering through the glass wall, the 
trading floor was relatively quiet as compared to the tense, masculine, fast-moving 
and noisy manual trading pits of Chicago described by other researchers (such as 
Greising and Morse 1991, MacKenzie and Millo 2003, and Zaloom 2006), or the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) trading floor as I witnessed in 2000 as a tourist. 
This is understandable, as markets that mainly trade by electronic channels do not 
rely heavily on traders' physical movement and body language, and Exchange Pis a 
young and specialized market which should not be compared with the NYSE. Yet 
Exchange P's trading floor had one striking feature: about 90% ofthe red jackets 
working there were female. 
Later with the help of field subjects, I got to know a group of female red 
jackets working on Exchange P's trading floor and joined them for lunch and 
discussion for several times. According to what they told me, eight years ago they 
used to have a male to female ratio around 6:4. In less than a decade, the ratio 
gradually shifted to 1:9. The gender shift was so significant that earlier in 2005, the 
exchange had to renovate some of the male lavatories into female ones to 
accommodate for the actual needs of the red jackets. Likewise in summer 2005, I 
also found out from red jackets of Exchange Q that they had experienced a similar 
gender shift, with male to female ratio changed from 7:3 to 3:7 around the same 
period of time. All the red jackets I talked to were well aware that a gender shift had 
been going on. 
One veteran red jacket attributed the gender shift to technological changes in 
broadband internet and online trading. Back in the 1990s trading orders were mainly 
placed by making phone calls. All or most of the trading orders were placed through 
red jackets on the trading floor. At that earlier time, the red jackets held themselves 
and their work in a high esteem. They enjoyed the excitement of the busy trading 
floor, and their pay was better. 
Veteran female red jacket: 8 years ago working as a majia (jacket) was a much 
better job. The clients had to trade through you, and I got so many phone 
calls. I used to put on a headphone connected to two phones, sometimes 
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with a third mobile phone under my chin. My ten fingers were always 
tapping on the keyboard, making thousands of taps every day. I spoke 
concisely, "Sud' (speak), "dotf' (bean), "tong(copper), how much". I 
never said "nihad' (hello). Nihao? After saying nihao the prices will roll 
two further ticks down! 
Back in the 1990s, member firms with high trading volumes used to set up additional 
floor seats (for a small fee to the exchange), and station a number of red jackets on 
the floor to take in simultaneous trading orders. Traders used to befriend their 
favourite red jackets to ensure a high priority in order placing; additional tips, such as 
feedback about trading floor atmosphere or rumours circulating on the floor, were 
treasured by traders and brokers alike. In the 1990s when corner events occurred 
more frequently, red jackets on the floor were an integral part of the " battle team" -
the gang-like capital factions (see chapter 6) - to exercise effective trading plans. A 
few red jackets said that, the most fulfilling part of their jobs in the 1990s that gave 
them most of their job satisfaction was, as one put it, " to execute the client's trading 
plan successfully", exerting significant influences on the markets through the orders 
they placed. 
In city P when a primarily female group of red jackets were having lunch in a 
relaxed and friendly "sisterhood" atmosphere, they talked about what was deemed as 
the skills of a good red jacket: fast keyboard fingering, multi-tasked mediation, and 
keen observation. Four red jackets in city P told me in unison that they do derive 
physical pleasures and self assertion from "feminine", proficient fingering skills. 
Siu: What is the most fulfilling part of your job? 
Female red jacket S: To know that I am fast and accurate, sending those orders in, 
one by one, launched on the market, exerting important influences. That's exciting. 
(While S spoke, she moved her right hand fingers as if she was stroking round and 
round on some invisible string instruments. All the four red jackets in the group 
picked up the same action in silence, moving their fast and dexterous fingers. They 
looked at each other, smiled with a shared sisterhood and understanding.] 
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One red jacket told me about her sisterhood network of trust on the trading floor in 
the 1990s. When her trading seat reaches the trading limit, sometimes she would 
place some of the overflowing orders through "good friends on the other end ofthe 
trading floor". She would exchange valuable market information with trusted friends. 
Sometimes you befriend other red jackets sitting next to you. Sometimes your best 
friends may be sitting on another bench quite far away, like me and XXX. But it 
doesn't matter; even if she's located at the other end of the trading floor, a friend is 
still a friend. You exchange information and help each other. On weekends we do 
face masks together. After 911 we were betting on the upcoming market trends, 
and it turned out that we were both wrong, hahaha. We are good friends. 
In ethnographic accounts of Zaloom (2006) or Abolafia (1996), physical prowess, 
"playing tough" or daring to take risks are "masculine" versions of trading skills and 
qualities commonly recognized in the markets. The case of red jackets in Exchange P 
shows that in the rare case of a primarily female market environment, skills and 
qualities attributed as feminine (such as dexterous fingers, keen observation, and 
sisterhood networks of trust) surface as positive assets within this female market 
segment. The female practitioners have some ways of asserting themselves that are 
different from their male counterparts. 
Various market segments require a combination of multiple skills. 
Nonetheless, in the presence ofboth genders in the overall market, skill types 
attributed as feminine such as dexterous fingering or telephone skills are dismissed 
as "handy work''. They are often assigned to supportive roles with lower pay and 
occupational status. When employers and employees made decisions about internal 
transfer and recruitment, gender filters came into play in a language of competency 
(see also Levin 2001 ), dedication and character traits. Qualities like risk-taking, 
resilience, and calmness in the face of huge losses were attributed to masculinity, as 
agreed by both male and female field subjects at different levels. A few female 
traders and red jackets believed that males are really better than females in trading, 
because they are more "resilient", more "daring", or more "aggressive". There were 
circulating market legends about how male star traders lost astronomical sums in 
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their positions, kept calm, stopped loss and turned their losses into gains. Such 
manifestations of masculinity were rewarded by high status and salary. 
8.2 Types of Trading Seats 
One wing on the third floor was partitioned into small rooms for member 
organizations, serving as trading and meeting rooms for traders/clients, as well as a 
resting place for red jackets. The rest of the third and fourth floors were office space 
for the exchange staff responsible for administration, trading operation, settlement, 
marketing, research and information technology. 
In 2006 Exchange P had 180 brokerage members and 14 self-trading 
members. The former were licensed brokerage companies, who could only place 
orders on behalf of their clients; the latter were companies related to soy products, 
and they could only trade for their own accounts.74 Each member firm was assigned a 
unique "trading seat number" C9: ..J£rff;{fl_,jiaoyi xiwei), which was an authorized 
identity to trade at the exchange. 
74 The capital requirement was RMB 30 million (£2 million) for Exchange P's brokerage 
memberships, and RMB 5 million (£333,000) for self-trading memberships. The 2 categories of 
Exchange P memberships were relatively simple, compared with 7 categories of memberships at the 
London Metal Exchange (LME): ring dealing, associate broker clearing, associate trader clearing, 
associate broker, associate trader. individual, and honorary. Each LME category had different rights in 
terms of floor/electronic markets, clearing, and brokerage. In 2006 the futures industry of China had 
extensive discussions on whether more tiers of exchange memberships should be established in terms 
of dealing and c learing, yet no action was taken by early 2007. 
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Fig 8.2: Electronic screens and gong on Exchange P's trading floor 
There were 5 types of trading seats at Exchange P: primary tloor seats, additional 
floor seats, ordinary remote seats, remote seats within the exchange building, and 
remote seats in add itional trading halls. The traditional version of a trading seat was a 
·'floor seat" (;l;~r*JJf!i!;{iL, changnei xiwei). It was one of the 288 seats aligned along 
rows of arc-shaped benches in a round trading hall of 2,000 square meters on the 1/F 
trading floor (Fig 8.1 d). In the middle of the circular structure, two huge electronic 
screens showed real-time quotes of various futures contracts, and a gong was 
occasionally struck when special guests visited the trading floor (Fig 8.2). Each floor 
seat was equipped with computer screens and phones (Fig 8. 1 c). A member firm 
would appoint and station a floor representative there to execute trading orders from 
clients and/or traders. The orders were placed via a standardized computer interface 
provided by Exchange P; the floor representatives were responsible only for 
executing trading instructions from their clients and traders, not negotiating with 
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their trading counterpar1s or makjng major trading decisions. 75 Occasionally some 
red jackets dealt with other tasks, like handling procedures of physical delivery76 
between their c1 ients and the exchange. 
Trading seats could be "remote seats" (~l~ffl!J{ll, yuancheng xiwei). By 
trading through remote seats, traders and clients could directly place their orders 
from their own computer screens across the country. The orders went through the 
member firms ' gateways and servers, and reached the exchange's order matching 
system to be executed. A member firm still exercised control by monitoring the 
aggregate margins and exposed risks of all the accounts under the umbrella of its 
"trading seat", taking floor and remote activities into overall consideration. Actions 
like margin calls and clearing were handled at the member firm's risk controller and 
finance offices, bypassing the trading floor and the physical "floor seat" of the red 
jackets altogether. 
A third type of trading seats was "remote seats within the exchange building" 
(frrP'.!~l~~{ll, suonei yuancheng xiwei). These were computer terminals located in 
3/F east wing, where some member firms had rented office space along two arc-
shaped corridors. The computers were equipped with a standardized software 
interface provided by the exchange, with stamped seals forbidd ing the member firms 
to tamper with the software. Here brokerage managers and power traders could 
exercise direct control of their trading seats without stepping into the trading floor-
a place with much less privacy and lower status, which was increasingly being turned 
into a service-based call centre. 
75 Their roles were much less important than floor dealers or specialists in markets like the CBOT. 
76 Physical delivery: traders who held open futures contracts on the contract's expiry date bad to 
provide (for short positions) or accept (for long positions) a qualified amount of the qualified 
commodity, at one of the designated delivery warehouses. Physicals of Exchange P were things like 
tonnes of grain A, bushels of grain B, or tonnes of grain product C. 
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With the onset of upgraded electronic trading platforms and broadband 
internet in the early 2000s, more clients chose to place trading orders directly from 
their personal computers from home or office instead. Each order still bore the 
"trading seat number" of the associated brokerage firm or self-trading firm registered 
at the exchange. Yet the agency role of the human red jacket has been largely taken 
over by software interface and broadband networks. More and more of the 
transaction orders come in through the remote seats. 
8.3 Technology Shift 
The shift in gender ratio on Exchange P's trading floor is part of a bigger paradigm 
shift. Technological change and the reduced costs of broadband internet led to a new 
model of brokerage and mediation. Eventually it brought significant occupational 
changes to the trading floor that integrates with a significant shift in gender ratio. 
The changes started from the technical trading interface and costs. Back in 
the 1990s, one terminal that provided real-time trading, quotes and charts for futures 
in China cost about RMB 10,000-20,000 (around £667-1 ,335).77 Such terminals were 
out of the affordable range for most retail futures traders. Instead of setting up their 
own trading systems at home or in the office, retail traders went to brokerage firms to 
use the terminals. They colloquially called this "to see the charts"- showing that 
these investors heavi ly rely on chartism. The brokerage firms often provide terminals 
in open areas for the clients in general. Additional closed rooms equipped with 
terminals called "big player rooms" (dahu shi * .Frl) were provided for VIP clients. 
77 The cost refers to using one of the two domestic software systems, at first running on DOS systems 
and using satellite links. Foreign software systems like Reuters contained more comprehensive 
information, but they were more expensive. Those were more often used by banks or stock traders, but 
due to costs and user habits, they were rarely used by the typical China futures trader. 
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A marketing manager of the futures trading software company, Webstock Ltd. 
(3(~~<1"*~), described the futures brokerage industry before 2001: 
In the past, brokerage firms used to encircle their clients in designated trading 
rooms to "watch the markets". Customer service meant the provision of lunch, tea 
and refreshment for the clients ... That kind of work was called "working on the 
clients" (zuokehu{ttJ..~JS). 
Not only lunch and refreshment, but sometimes cigarettes, karaoke and even 
accommodation were provided. The close client-broker interactions helped to create 
an enclosed living space that consisted of"futures people": they talked about market 
news, they shared the excitement and tear, and their attention was fixated on the 
markets. Brokers were not only the intermediary channels of trading, but also an 
environment of analysis, information input, morale and personal support while the 
clients were taking risks. 
I visited one informal accommodation quarters of a brokerage firm during 
fieldwork. The apartment used to be the company's office more than ten years ago. 
The place was flexibly used to accommodate staff members and clients. In the past, 
clients from far-away towns used to stay in these quarters for a few months while 
they performed intense futures trading. There used to be a high turnover of client 
residents living there- as those who lost all their money, as well as those who gained 
substantial sums from the markets, would move out from the apartment. I was told 
that at peak times there were more than eight clients occupying three rooms and one 
lounge. Residential conditions were less than ideal, as around 40 obsolete computer 
consoles and rows of dusty file cabinets were piled at the corner of some rooms, and 
some of the beds were broken. By 2005 it was rather unlikely to have clients living in 
these quarters for months. But I could still see around ten sets of personal bedding 
left behind by former occupants. 
2001-02 was a critical period when futures traders in China switched from a 
system centered around telephones and brokerage offices to electronic online trading. 
Before 2001 Webstock used to have around 50,000 subscribers using individual 
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terminals connected by satellite links. The company saw the opportunity in the 
growth of broadband internet. 78 Instead of selling their packages to individual traders 
and investors, they started to target the 130-140 futures brokerage firms who were 
active in the markets instead. These companies in tum gave away the software to 
their own clients for free. This move proved to be a great success for Webstock. As 
most of the futures brokerage firms were in keen competition with each other, any 
move that helped to attract clients (like giving away seemingly free software) was 
quickly known within the industry, and quickly imitated by others. In a short time 
120 out of the 140 active brokerage firms became customers of Webstock, making 
their software the mainstream platform for futures trading in China. It was 
understood that by selling collective licenses to brokerage firms instead of individual 
investors, issues like software piracy and technical support could be better dealt with 
on a business-to-business basis, and Webstock managed to get a more stable stream 
of income. Targeting the brokerage firms helped them to extend their client base 
effectively amongst the futures investor community. The move meant that it is less 
likely for the clients to go to their futures company to "see the charts", or call up 
brokers and red jackets to place orders by phone. They can place orders directly from 
terminals at home or in office across the country via broadband internet. Trading 
orders still have to bear the seat number of a member organization, but many clients 
may bypass the human contact with brokers and red jackets altogether. In 2005 a 
brokerage firm manager showed me their two VIP trading rooms, "These are our 
dahu shis (VIP trading rooms), but nowadays the VIP clients no longer trade here." 
The marketing manager of Webstock thought that the futures brokerage 
industry was undergoing a transition to more "professional" practices. 
78 In 2005 in Beijing, the month subscription fee for a residential broadband internet connection was 
RMB 2 16 (£14.4) per month. 
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Now with the internet, the clients were directly trading from their homes and 
offices ... brokers were more often expected to provide advice, guidance and chats 
through online channels. 
Advice and guidance are becoming more important than the provision of physical 
space and refreshment. Now clients are more likely to focus on investment advice, 
analysis, and financial performance. Webstock has bundled an instant messenger 
interface called Wenwentong ()<:)<:ill[) with its online quotes and chart system as a 
popup box on the side. The interface facilitates futures brokerage firms to organize 
their online customer support around user groups, staff teams and broadcast lists. 
Once a client logs on to Webstock through the brokerage firm's server to access the 
online quotes, she can access the brokerage firm's online advisers and notifications. 
Simultaneous changes occurred in the qualifications of the staff of futures 
firms. The China Futures Association was founded in December 2000, and started to 
organize training courses to upgrade the level of professional knowledge in the 
industry. In 2002-2003, the CSRC announced several policy papers to monitor the 
qualifications of senior staff members and staff members of futures companies. Full-
time industry practitioners had to pass two examinations, one for basic knowledge in 
futures and one for legal knowledge, to continue working in registered futures 
companies. While in the 1990s a lot of veteran soldiers, farmers and housewives 
could enter the industry, in the 2000s nearly all the fresh entrants had to be at least 
university graduates. The existing practitioners had to take make-up classes to pass 
the two professional exams. The upward move in academic background is mainly 
associated with the policy requirements for professional qualifications, but also 
associated with the change in mediation patterns triggered by technology. 
Brokering still demands a combination of people skills and financial skills. 
Once I heard a manager giving an instruction session to his staff: 
To acquire clients and to retain them, you need to form cooperating teams. For 
example you can analyze copper, but you can't drink. If you have a client who 
trades copper and who loves drinking, you'd better get help from a colleague who 
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can drink, and go to see the client together. When we combine different skills, we 
work better as a winning team. 
Nonetheless, old timers with over ten years' experience without a university degree 
find that it is more difficult to get into big brokerage companies in the mid 2000s. 
Apart from intuition, instincts and bravery to take risks, the industry is increasingly 
demanding for a higher education background and more knowledge content in 
market analysis and portfolio management. 
8.4 Occupational Changes on the Floor 
The red jackets on the trading floor were no longer a vital part of the trading chain, 
as their old functional roles of relaying clients' trading orders into the central trading 
space had been largely replaced by the trading software and the central order-
matching system. Gradually the red jacket positions have less responsibility, a lower 
payro ll, and a lower occupational status. Things like documents for physical delivery 
sti ll have to go through the red jackets, but their tasks are support activities rather 
than at the centre of exciting market movement. The trading activities actually take 
place on computer systems, bypassing the trading floor. 
Current female red jacket: In the past our job demanded physical, resilient and 
emotional strength. Now it becomes simply manual operation, like a 
handicraft ... After they introduced the automatic systems, I felt empty 
idleness in my daily work. 
The "empty idleness" could be confirmed by the lunchtime chats and field 
observations. The red jackets had to stay on the trading floor during trading hours, 
which were 9:00am-1 0:15am, 1 0:30am-11 :30am, and 1:30pm-3:OOpm. But at other 
times not many of them showed much dedication to the markets. Some young red 
jackets were studying part-time university programmes; older red jackets talked 
about their families and children. During the two-hour lunch break, the only amenity 
in the exchange building for the red jackets was a small reading room on 3/F. It was 
usually packed with red jackets, but only roughly l 0% of them were reading 
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materials related to the markets, finance or economics. More often I found them 
reading newspapers and magazines on entertainment, lifestyle, gardening and home 
decoration. By 4pm, most ofthem had already left work. It was not a demanding job. 
In response to occupational changes in the red jacket position, many member 
firms exercised a gender-linked pattern of internal transfer and recruitment. The red 
jacket position was considered more figurative than functional. More males than 
females were promoted away from the trading floor, while more "young and pretty" 
females rather than males were sent to work on the trading floor, and their merits 
were partly defined as objects to be looked at (Mulvey 1975). 
Siu: Where have the males gone? 
Current female red jacket P: Most of them are promoted to manager positions, and 
sent back to work from company offices. Others just left the industry. 
Current female red jacket Q: Most companies tend to send pretty young girls to the 
trading floor now. They are pleasant to look at (ffif{/~§ ). 
Starting from the end of the 1990s, the old-time red jackets made choices between 
between staying and moving away from the trading floor. In general, those who were 
more ambitious and aggressive tend to move away; those who stayed are rather 
content with a stable life, want to dedicate more time to family roles, studying, part-
time jobs, or they have no better alternatives. The combined effect of the actions 
taken by employers and employees over a few years is that the trading floor of 
Exchange P gradually became a feminized space. 
Veteran female red jacket: The trading floor is no longer important. In 2003 I sat 
there all day, having too much free time to myself. I didn't want to waste 
my life away like that! I quit the job and moved back to [another city]. .. 
Now I got a new job in a futures brokerage firm at their headquarters, 
doing management work. 
Exchange P had been renting nearly all its office space from a convention and 
exhibition centre since the end of 1996. In 2005 there was another new building 
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being constructed next door. The new building was owed and built by the exchange 
itself, and the whole exchange is supposed to move into the new venue when the 
construction work finishes. There were widely circulated rumours that the exchange 
might abolish the trading floor altogether, and the same move may be taken by the 
other two Chinese futures exchanges at some point. Existing red jackets did have 
some concerns about their job security, although nobody was quite certain when they 
would be actually axed. When I talked to a member of staff in the other two 
exchanges about abol ishing the trading floor, the only concern he had was, "That is 
possible. But then what are we going to show to our visitors?" ln fact when China 
announced its fourth futures exchange, the China Financial Futures Exchange (cp~ 
~~WH:'f3(:~,PJT, CFFEX) in Shanghai in 2006, the CFFEX made it explicit that the 
new exchange will not have a trading floor; everything will go electronic. The 
Chinese financial media reported this feature as an "advance" compared with the 
three earlier futures exchanges. 
8.5 Technology and Gender in the Market 
When global markets migrate from manual trading to electronic trading, a number of 
important changes may occur. This chapter is a record of one specific transition that 
took place in China's commodity futures markets in 2000-2002: new possibilities in 
trading software and broadband networks have changed the pattern of agency and 
mediation. The access points of real-time quotes and trading terminals are further 
distributed, moving out from the hubs of local clusters (the offices of futures 
companies) to the offices and homes of individual traders. The reach of "connected 
markets" has moved one level down from the futures exchange, the provincial hubs, 
futures company offices in cities and towns, to reach the personal home. We can see 
that as the non-human components (network, hardware and software) distribute 
trading activities further into more scattered physical space, the roles of human 
brokers and red jackets are simultaneously being redefined. Technological 
connections, online access, advice, analysis, news and knowledge content are in; the 
onsite provision of refreshment, entertainment and personal company are out. An 
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ethnographic study cannot give a comprehensive overall picture of the transition, 
nonetheless this chapter captures some vivid phenomena of the above transition in 
China's futures markets - such as the close ties between brokers and clients before 
the transition; and how the company Webstock seized the opportunity of technology 
change to reshape the structure of the online futures trading software market. 
Despite the fact that different market segments are located separately in 
physical space, the case illustrates their intimate connections. When the pattern of 
agency changes on the client-broker level, the change simultaneously propagates to 
the trading floor. Human agency and the brokering role on the centralized trading 
floor is quickly replaced by computer programmes installed at distributed, faraway 
locations. Exciting market events such as block trades and corners can now bypass 
the trading floor altogether, occurring directly between the traders ' terminals, the 
brokers' network gateways, and the exchange's computer servers. Humans are still 
involved at the three locations, but the trading floor can be pre-empted. 
Between 1998 and 2005 where the technology change took place, two 
dramatic phenomena could be observed on the trading floor during this critical 
transition: the decline in salary and status ofthe red jackets; and the change in gender 
ratio, with female percentage changing from 40% to 90%. Care should be taken 
when attempting to establish a direct cause-effect relationship between the two 
events. Which one is causing which? 
In field records in section 8.1 , how both male and female futures practitioners 
describe different skill sets verifies the views of Philips and Taylor (1980), and Levin 
(2001)79. Women can be paid less because skills labeled as "feminine", such as fast 
and accurate typing and multi-tasked mediation on the trading floor ofExchange P, 
79 The case study of Cockburn ( 1985) on the typesetting industry is a typical example of this gender-
biased language of skills. Levin (200 I) finds a similar classification of skills in the case study on work 
and gender in a US futures exchange. 
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are regarded as Jess valuable than skills labeled "masculine", such as aggression and 
risk-taking. During occupational changes such as the redefinition of workflow and 
responsibilities, gender bias can be introduced in an apparently gender-neutral 
language of ski lls. A language of contradictory dichotomy (Cockburn 1988) can be 
observed in the workplace. If the job requires physical properties, "rough" and 
" tough" is deemed more valuable than "nimble"; if the job demands mental skills, 
"rational" is deemed more valuable than "attention to details". Once females start to 
become the predominant gender in one position, the salary and status of the position 
start to fall, and male workers tend to move out from those jobs.80 The rise in female 
ratio can be a direct cause of the fall in salary and status. On the other hand, already 
faJl ing status and salary of the red jacket position can also impose a "gender filter" 
(Fernadez and Sosa 2005)81 to existing workers and new recruits. This is verified by 
observations in section 8.4. As the transition in online trading software takes place, 
male red jackets are more often promoted to managerial positions away from the 
floor, and young girls are more often recruited as their replacement. 
Therefore, in this case we have technology shift acting as a trigger, starting 
off a coupled pair of occupational transitions on the trading floor: a rising female 
ratio of the red jackets, and the falling level of wages. The two conditions are 
reinforc ing each other, leading to dramatic status decline and an equally dramatic 
80 Gender-segregated positions may form clusters of jobs that Cockburn ( 1988) terms as "gender 
cells". She found that when women start to break into a formerly predominantly male "cell" in the 
high-tech industry, the salary falls and the males move out. 
81 In a study on the call centre workspace, Femadez and Sosa (2005) finds that males are less likely 
than females to get call centre jobs or stay there, because: firstly, male applicants have better 
alternatives in the job market; secondly, male applicants have better education background, hence they 
are often seen as "overqualified" by call centre employers; thirdly, a "sisterhood" referral network 
exists between existing call centre workers and new recruits, reinforcing a high ratio of female 
workers; and fourthly, when employers select new recruits for a call cenrre, their expectations are 
linked with female stereotypes. 
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change in gender ratio. At the end of the transition, the red jackets in city P have 
experienced such an obvious status decline that they are prohibited from entering the 
canteen for staff members of the exchange (see chapter 5). 
The presence of Exchange P's female red jacket community provides field 
records of a predominantly feminized market space, which is a rare case in the social 
studies of global markets. Although the female red jackets are not the ones who 
actually make major trading decisions, and a stereotypically masculine style of 
trading is still recognized as more desirable in this market, the field subjects in city P 
do show the possibility of alternative values and practices of a feminized 
marketplace. They take pleasure both in launching big impacts on the markets, as 
well as from small things like lucid finger movements. However, whether men and 
women really have different trading styles is a largely open problem. In the study of 
Barber and Odean (200 1 ), male stock investors are found to be overconfident 
compared with their female counterparts. They trade 45% more, and lose more of 
their net gains in transaction costs. Verheul and Thurik (2001) show that in small 
loan projects for entrepreneurs in developing countries, females are more prudent 
than males in running the finance of their start-up business. This leaves an interesting 
question: if skills and character traits labeled as feminine were recognized with 
higher rewards and status in the markets, would a different pattern of volatility or 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
From this ethnography, I have identified three features of China's commodity futures 
markets: the deep infiltration of politics, the significance of network -based social 
connections, and the conscious appl ication of boyi (game theory) at common-sense 
level. This chapter will first give a brief summary of the three properties. Then I will 
retum to the three academic objectives declared at the beginning of the thesis in 
section 1.2: the questions of performativity, market transplant and social 
embeddedness, and the provision of ethnographic fieldwork data. At the end of the 
thesis, I will also discuss the road ahead for this young market. 
9.1 Cadres: Deep Infiltration of Politics 
Chapter 5 shows that the markets were deeply infiltrated by the state structure and 
political power, and the state occupied an important role in the hierarchical market 
makeup. Regulatory officials often adopted the position that they were responsible to 
"monjtor and manage" (jianguan ~~' to regulate) the markets, such that market 
stability could be sustained; members of the private sector also accepted such a 
market makeup, and many of them would expect the state to take actions when 
market crises occurred. (Such a position was in contrast to their counterparts in Hong 
Kong, the US or the UK, where neoclassical discourses such as "free" markets and 
"non-intervention" were often used by regulatory officials.) 
Political power was an utmost foundation for market construction, because it 
was necessary to provide the access to material , organizational and legal resources 
for running futures exchanges. The evidence of strong political support was also 
essential to foster public trust in a market. Under such a market structure, prices were 
extremely sensitive to policy news; state enterprises were major players of the 
markets; and regional governments often served as "guardian angels" of local futures 
exchanges and local futures companies. Sometimes the infiltration of political power 
might lead to problems of corruption, but infiltration itself was not equivalent to 
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corruption. The state structures were simply the most essential parts of the futures 
markets that must be present in this form of market construction. In fact the state 
structures and the markets were closely symbiotic: communism had been 
commodified, capitalism had been politicized, and both were mutually infiltrating 
each other in the actual social institutions. State structures and cadres were an 
integral part of the markets. 
9.2 Gangs: Network-based Rationality 
Chapter 6 shows that the corner events in the 1990s were active attempts of market 
manipulation by close teams, or loose gang-like networks. The presence of extensive 
guanxi (relationship) networks by geographical areas, industry sectors and personal 
acquaintances (built upon an existing network-based social structure) made it 
possible for traders to form cooperation cliques of different degrees of strength. Such 
cliques could range from strong collusion teams to loose connected cliques for 
occasional information exchange. Gang-like aggregates were examples of the active 
use of social connections and networks to alter the outcome of market prices. The 
aggregates might also penetrate across the public-private boundary to establish 
flexible, clientelist ties with the public and quasi-public sectors. ln one case of 
Exchange Q, network-based rationality seemed to override rule-based rationality in 
the market making system of 1-2 products. 
However, as the market depth (in terms of total capitalization, and number of 
traders) was increasing in the 2000s, and with tight regulatory control, it was more 
difficult for a single group to launch corner events and achieve effective market 
manipulation. More often traders talked about trends (,m~) rather than corners 
(bicang il!i::kt)- to decipher and ride on market trends and collective momentum, 
rather than using the influence of one's own capital and social connections to 
generate a new momentum. 
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9.3 Priests: Application of 11Game Theory" 
A number of"knowledge tools" such as fundamentals, chartism, trading heuristics, 
and programmed trading had been circulating in the markets. The use and circulation 
of these tools were supported by analysts, software companies, brokerage firms, 
industry groups, academics, and the media - all of which served as intermediaries of 
knowledge and meanings. However, for most field subjects the choice of knowledge 
tools were rather arbitrary - many of them made the choice based on accessibility, 
ease of use, or affordable cost. The choice rarely arose from deeper causes in 
ideologies or convictions. Most field subjects were ready to switch to new 
knowledge tools, if they could be convinced by evidence that the new tool could give 
better investment returns. The lack of faith and ideologies was remarkable. Unlike 
some of their counterparts in western markets, in this case study most of the market 
people did not hold precepts such as "markets are efficient", "traders are rational", 
"traders exercise rationality on individual basis", or "every asset has an intrinsic 
value". They were open-minded to learn and try out various models and tools, but 
there were also extremely pragmatic and result-oriented. The ultimate touchstone of 
any theories or tool was return of investment, not Nobel-prizes in economics. (In fact 
I fotmd books of the Black-Scholes model of derivative pricing theory gathering dust 
on some field subjects' bookshelves. They told me that the model "did not work" in 
China's futures markets due to the limited types of investment tools available, the 
prominence of policy factors, and other "Chinese characteristics" of the markets.) In 
the search of profits, even theories and knowledge tools were commoditized. Each 
market actor was acting as her own priest to adopt and discard various knowledge 
tools. 
The field subjects did not hold fixed beliefs in financial theories, but they did 
believe in "trends" and boyi ctw~, the application of game theory in a common-
sense level). Many field subjects were aware that " trends" and market prices were 
the combined result of thoughts and actions by everybody in the market, which were 
open to infinite possibilities. By boyi, field subjects were estimating what most 
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people estimated about what most people estimated about. .. the next action most 
people would take in the markets. Most of the time the bootstrapped estimations 
were exercised by intuition and common-sense only, yet the thinking process could 
be reflexive. 
9.4 A Dialogue with the Performativists 
My first research objective was to seek for evidence of performativity from the field. 
In the daily activities of the market agents, people and technological artefacts were 
heavi ly connected by personal networks and information technologies. The market 
agents were highly sensitive to signals in price data, politics, fundamentals, and the 
sentiments of others. One prerequisite of boyi is to be aware of one's position as part 
of a big, inter-connected cognitive array. 
Chartism was widely adopted in the field. However, due to the multiple 
possible ways to read charts and the highly subjective nature of graphical methods,82 
usually it was not easy to generate a strong and common consensus amongst chartists 
in their forecasts. This made chartism a good knowledge tool for the analysts and 
software companies to market their services, and perhaps a good means to deepen a 
sense of professional membership in the industry (see Preda 2004). However in most 
situations, I did not find chartism in China's futures markets a very strong case of 
performativity. A large proportion of futures people in the fie ld did use technical 
analysis; therefore by the definition of MacKenzie (2007), chartism was at least a 
case of generic perfonnativity. Whether chartism should be counted as a case onto 
the next level of performativity -effective performativity - was already arguable. 
Individual traders might claim that they made profits or losses by applying methods 
of chartism; it was true that chartism could "make a difference to economic 
82 In the five-day training course, my coursemates recognised the same chart as having three, four, six, 
seven, and nine "waves". 
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processes" on the individual basis. However on a collective scale, due to the lack of 
consensus amongst chartists (in market direction, target price levels, and suggested 
stop-loss positions), it was likely that the effects of a significant part of their 
forecasts would cancel out each other. That is also why chartism is often dismissed 
as "noise" by academics of finance. 
If we inspect the feedback pathway between knowledge, action and market 
reality, what could generate wider consensus and lead to synchronized actions in the 
China's futures markets in 2005? I think it was power - both political power, and 
power of the masses. The market people spent a lot of time speculating the direction 
of policies. Traders were sensitive to move their money to futures products and 
futures exchanges that seemed to be favoured by the regulatory authorities. By doing 
so, those products could gain wider market depths and better liquidity; which indeed 
could help the particular futures exchange to gain a better position in front of 
regulatory authorities. Instead of a feedback loop of market prices, here we have a 
feedback loop of political standing (Fig 9.1 ). This feedback loop illustrates the deep 
infiltration between politics and markets. Political favour could not be directly traded 
in the markets, yet it served as a commodity that could rise, fall, and be exchanged. 
Notice that it is a feedback loop ofBarnesian performativity (MacKenzie 2007). 
Perception of the market agents (political favour) led to action (trading decisions), 
which eventually helped to make the perception true. The Barnesian feedback cycles 
could also go in the opposite direction: if traders perceived that a market was losing 
the favour of regulatory authorities, there was an actual policy risk that its products 
and even the exchange itself could be closed down (as in the case ofTianjin in 1998, 
see section 7.4). The flight of capital would lead to a shrinking market with low 
liquidity, which was likely to lead to a lower political standing of the exchange. That 
was why at all the futures exchanges, photographs of important state leaders were 
hung outside the trading floor as an important evidence of political support. 
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Higher trading volume, better market depth and liquidity 
Ul 
The market gains better standing in front of regulatory 
authorities 
Fig 9.1 Feedback loop of political standing in market construction 
I agree with Didier (2007) and Calion (2007) that, markets are not purely constructed 
by language and theories alone. For market agencement to take place, conditions of 
felicity are needed. In this particular case study, political power and social networks 
(with cultural contexts) were more important issues to "make things work" in the 
markets. What matters in every market can be different, expressing the political and 
social structure, cultural values, legal and historical background of that particular 
society. Rationality and calculation is only one of the parameters of markets 
agencement. While the notion of calculative devices from Calion and Muruesa (2003) 
can be helpful to analyze the cognitive flow of markets, the parameters of power and 
culture cannot be dissolved too much. As we have seen in this research, the 
hierarchical market structure of public and private sectors, and the distribution of 
income were real issues that mattered; the perceived political standing was vital. 
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9.5 On Market Transplant and "Chinese 
Characteristics" 
4 January 2008 
Here we can revisit the second academic objective of this study: the technology 
transfer model of Alkrich ( 1992) described in Chapter I. Within a history of 15 years 
in China's commodity futures markets, the market "script" that was originally 
transferred from overseas markets had been interacting with the local political and 
cultural surroundings to form a different version of futures markets. Despite a limited 
market size, the markets were running with fluctuating supply, demand and prices. 
We can note that the state structures and the market structures were mutually 
infiltrating each other, and the roles of public and private sectors in the markets were 
different from most of the foreign markets where the original "script" came from. 
Social connections in the futures markets often went alongside gifts, favours, and 
banquets of guanxi connections, and the flexibility of network-based rationality. The 
integration of generic market structures and more specific local context had indeed 
taken place. 
One local differentiation of the futures people of China was that, they could 
be more daring than their western counterparts to abandon the theoretical 
assumptions and ideologies behind capitalism (see also Gray 2002: 191-193). I found 
that my field subjects were not easily convinced or mobilized by economic theories 
or ideologies. It is a cOLmtry where 800 million people had experienced the Great 
Leap Forward (::f;::Rili) and the Cultural Revolution in the 1950s- 1960s. These 
political movements could be understood as extreme experiments of Austinian 
performativity- in which the nation once believed that materiality could be 
overcome by political ideologies and social construction led by Mao Zedong. The 
experiment' s bitter failure, accompanied by long years of famines and hardship, was 
still a painful collective memory for the nation. That could be a good reason why my 
field subjects were pragmatic when it came to social construction of materiality. 
They were looking for "things that work" for economic development and personal 
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income, but in general they had little loyalty to knowledge models, theories or 
ideologies per se. 
Instead they chose to focus on what I call the ·'vanilla core'' of generic 
markets: markets as a big, collective feedback system, regardless of how market 
agents arrive at their decisions. If there is anything '·hardwired" into the script of 
markets, it is the organization of such a collective feedback system of consensus 
(knowledge), action and social reality. The consensus can be about economic outlook, 
political outlook, an ideology, a mathematical formula, an analytical tool, or a 
rumour. What the particular content is will be largely dependent on the particular 
economic, cultural, and political context- rationality is only one of the possibilities. 
The key factor of generic market construction is the capability to establish a strong, 
circulating consensus. A market is likely to be stabi lized and successful, if strong and 
stable feedback loops of Barnesian performativity can be established. 
The third academic objective of this research is to provide ethnographic data 
for the social studies of finance, economic anthropology, and economic sociology. 
By the work presented here, I hope the amount of ethnographic data suffices to fulfill 
this purpose. 
9.6 The Road Ahead 
15 years is a very young age for derivative markets. This research has described a 
number of crises, difficulties and problems in the futures markets of China, but the 
author never mean to present this study as part of the "China bashing" chorus from 
occidental standpoints. Market agencement requires heterogeneous input factors. 
Market construction in any country is expected to encounter problems and 
difficulties; and any market construction process will contain some trials, errors, and 
adjustments. Before drawing this thesis to a close, I have three comments on the 
prospect of this market. 
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The first point is about the asymmetrical strength between the public and 
private sectors. The asymmetry arises directly from the allocation of profitable 
opportunities -the public and quasi-public sectors had become the seats of real 
profits. That is also why in 1993 (and probably in 1921 also), heated competition 
took place in constructing new exchanges, not in trading activities in existing 
exchanges. Although the asymmetry arises from political and historical background, 
on the long-run, weaknesses of the private sector (private investment funds, 
brokerage firms, and retail investors) will greatly limit the industry's development. 
This is especially true when the local markets are open to global ones. To reform the 
industry and prepare for an open market, the public sector has to gradually reduce its 
profit margins and help to build a stronger private sector. 
The second point is, with the deep infiltration between the state structure and 
the market structure, there are always the risks of corruption and misappropriation of 
state funds. With the lessons from Event 327, it is important that the regulatory 
authorities keep a close watch against such practices. 
The third point is, for a young market, the market agents were already highly 
sensitive to decipher, synchronize with, and pre-empt the actions of others, and they 
were aware of the importance of boyi. These were essential skills and talents that the 
private sector has to identify, recruit and nurture. 
Local characteristics ("Chinese characteristics" in a non-essentili st sense) of 
the futures markets indeed exist; and "Chinese characteristics" can either be strengths 
or weaknesses. Instead of using the phrase for self justification or cynical mockery, it 
is more helpful to honestly face the industry's current position, understand where the 
strengths and weaknesses are, and bravely stride ahead. 
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Appendix 1 List of Fieldwork Events 
Internships 
1. Exchange Q, Research Department, City Q, 1 Aug- 27 Aug 2005 
2. A futures brokerage company in Beijing, 12 Sep - 20 Nov 2005 
Training courses 
1. Training course on commodity futures and options, Beij ing, 21-22 May 2005 
2. The "thousand village and ten-thousand household" project, city P, May- June 
2005 
3. The 2"d training course on futmes knowledge, City P, 25-30 July 2005 
Industry conferences 
1. 2005 Forum on Risk Management in China's Futures Markets, Beijing, 26 May 
2005 
2. 2005 China Financial Risk Management Conference, Beijing, 18-19 June 2005 
3. The 1st China (Shenzhen) International Futures Forum, Shenzhen, 3-4 Dec 2005 
Interviews 
B 1, fund manager and futures trader 
B2, financial journalist 
B3, member of staff working in a county agricultural bureau 
Cl , staff member of a futures exchange 
C2, trading floor representative 
C3, Webstock Ltd. (an information and software company) 
D, manager of a soybean farm 
F, researcher of a futures exchange 
G 1, staff member of a futures exchange 
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02, futures trader 
03, Webstock Ltd. (an information and software company) 
K, executive of a futures company 
L l , fund manager and futures trader 
L2, former wheat farmer 
L3, trading floor representative 
L4, futures journalist 
L5, futures analyst 
L6, futures broker 
M, analyst and chartist 
R, executive of a futures company 
S, futures trader 
Tl, member ofstaffofa futures exchange 
T2, manager of a private investment fund 
W 1, member of staff of an industry association 
W2, researcher of a futures exchange 
W3, futures analyst 
Xl, academic in economics 
X2, futures broker 
Y, academic in finance 
Z l , researcher in a national statistics unit 
Z2, futures analyst 
Z3, futures broker 
Z4, futures broker 
Z5, trading floor representative 
Z6, executive of a futures company 
Z7, research officer of a futures exchange 
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Also called technical analysis. Chartism is the use of graphical charts 
to forecast future price trends. 
China Financial Futures Exchange (cp~~iWI!M~3<:~J5JT), a new 
futures exchange formed in 2007 for financial futures products. 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (cpm~3J:~'grg!J_~~ 
f{), the regulatory body of securities and futures markets of China. 
commodity The generic term means goods and services traded across a market 
without qualitative differentiation. In the futures markets, commodity 
futures products are non-financial futures products. Commodities are 





To control a significant proportion of a particular commodity, and 
manipulate its price movements to obtain abnormal profits. When a 
party is exercising a corner plan, both spot and futures of the 
commodity can be involved. 
Dalian Commodity Exchange (:k~Fm~3<:~J5JT) 
To settle a futures contract by transferring the physical commodity 
from seller to buyer. The majority of markets traders would choose to 
settle their contracts by cash instead of physicals, but the delivery 
mechanism is important to maintain a close correlation between the 
futures price and the underlying commodity. Delivery is carried out 
after the contract expires under conditions specified by the futures 
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A contract made between two parties to buy or sell an asset in a pre-
agreed time in the future. The contract terms are custom-made 
between the two parties involved. 
A standardized contract to buy or sell an asset in a pre-agreed time in 
the future. A futures contract is issued by a futures exchange, which 
has specified the terms of the standardized contract. Futures contracts 
are traded on a futures exchange. 
To reduce or cancel out the risk of one investment item, by taking on 
another investment item. Businesses involved in the production or 
consumption of a commodity in their daily business can hedge their 
business risks by the use of commodity futures. 
A margin is the cash or collateral a futures trader places in one's 
account, to cover for the credit risk of unsettled futures contracts held 
by the trader. The margin of China's futures markets usually lies 
between 5-15% of the total value of futures contracts held. 
The committed status to buy or sell a given asset. Buying a futures 
contract is "opening a long position"; selling this contract afterwards 
is "closing a long position". On the other hand, short-selling a futures 
contract is "opening a short position"; buying this contract back 
afterwards is "closing a short position". 
Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor. It is a scheme used by the 
Chinese government to allow some domestic financial institutions to 
invest in offshore markets in regulated ways. 
QFII Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor. A scheme used by the 
Chinese government to allow some foreign financial institutions to 
invest in domestic markets in regulated ways, such as formingjoint 
ventures with domestic banks and brokerage firms. 
rat trading A dishonest practice of some brokers. When a rat-trading broker 
receives a trading order from a client, she uses her own account to 
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carry out the trade at the best timing (such as the lowest point to buy, 
or the highest point to sell). The she trades between her own account 
and the client's account at a less optimal price, pocketing the 
difference of prices. 
settlement To fulfil contractual obligations by payment in cash, or delivery of 
physicals. 
spot The commodity stock in the present time. "Spot price" and "futures 
price" are prices of the same commodity, deliverable at different times. 
SHFE Shanghai Futures Exchange (.L$!111:flt~~PJT) 
speculation The buying and selling of assets in order to gain profits from the price 
fluctuations. Speculation is the exposure to more risks, in the hope of 
getting better profits. Speculators and hedgers are people who trade in 
futures for contrasting purposes. 
ZCE Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (~1'1'[fftirfb~~PJT) 
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Appendix 3 Notes on Logic Gates 
When I was formulating this research in 2003-2004, I was scribbling on rough paper 
to sketch "digital logic devices": triangles and half-circles that denote the logic 
components of AND, OR, and NOT used in electronics and computer science. By 
working out a logic formula and combining these "logic gates" into an electric circuit, 
an undergraduate engineering student would be able to produce a row of flashing 
Christmas lights, or a cardboard tank with simplistic remote control features. 
It sounds peculiar to start a sociology thesis with tiny logic gates, but at that time I 
was fascinated by a science studies approach to see markets as huge logic arrays 
made up of humans and non-humans. Similar to digital circuits, the output signals of 
the markets (prices, news and trading volume) depend on the values of input signals, 
how the market agents are inter-connected, and the inherent logical properties of all 
the market agents (the "logic gates"). This approach can be traced back to relevant 
works in science studies include markets as experimental devices (Calion & Muniesa 
2003); as a cyborg structure (Mirowski 2002); as a circuit of cognitive feedback 
loops (Barnes 1983); as a network of actors, power and artefacts (Hughes 1993); and 
as a feedback pathway between speech (knowledge) and social reality (see 
"performativists" in chapter 2). I have also written a previous dissertation on how the 
properties of "market arrays" were rapidly re-configured by public discourses in the 
dotcom bubble (Siu 2002). In the research proposal stage of this project, I went as far 
as drawing analogues between digital circuits with market derivatives.83 I did not 
intend to build a simulation model in the form of digital circuits, but at an early stage 
a lot of attention was focused on configuration, feedback, and performativity. 
83 For example, a stock index is a circuit of weighted arithmetic averages; a call option is a conditional 
selection of two ways to calculate its value; and futures introduce a time delay component into the 
"circuit" . 
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Appendix 4 Synchronization 
I had one auxiliary observation during fieldwork, which could also echo with social 
synchronization in the markets, and in the society in general. Amongst the futures 
people of China, the wide-spread application and discussion about boyi reflected the 
sensitivity of deciphering, synchronizing and pre-empting the movements of others. 
On public meetings and gatherings, most people in mainland China (compared with 
Hong Kong or the UK) tended to leave earlier before the official program really 
came to a close. During the seven months of fieldwork, I had witnessed the same 
phenomenon under different social settings: cinema screenings, a dolphin show in a 
theme park, a Sunday church service in a Protestant church, and a nightclub 
entertainment performance in city Q. As soon as the audience deciphered that the 
program was going to end quite soon- when the MC (master of ceremonies) of the 
dolphin show said "thank you for coming", or when the priest started the 
Communion ritual on a Sunday service- the majority of the audience were leaving. 
Very often I found myself nearly the last one left behind with dolphins still jumping 
on the stage, the priest still saying a prayer, or the dancers still singing songs of 
farewell to the audience. I found that the general population of contemporary China 
was sensitive to synchronize with people around them, quick to grasp new 
movements, and reluctant to be "left behind" of anything. Such qualities were also 
part of the social embedding of markets. 
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